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Dr David Blagden, University of Cambridge – written evidence 
 
Written Evidence to the Parliamentary Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy: 
Priorities for the 2015 NSS 
 
Executive Summary 
 
 Multipolarity – a situation of multiple great powers – is returning to the international 
system, as new great powers rise through the convergence growth produced by 
post-Cold War economic globalization.  
 Such dynamics of relative rise and decline tend to produce major power competition 
and conflict incentives, with the potential to cause war unless other factors 
intervene.  
 In light of the destructive potential of major power conflict, which dwarfs that of 
other contemporary security concerns such as terrorism, guarding against it should 
be the prime focus of UK national security strategy (and at least receive more 
attention than found in the 2010 NSS): it need not be imminent – or even 
particularly likely – to still qualify as the greatest danger, now that it is no longer 
wholly inconceivable, given its severity.  
 While Western major powers in general are in decline vis-à-vis the rising ‘BRICs’, 
Britain’s economic outlook is actually relatively positive by European standards: so 
within Western Europe, the UK may actually qualify as a rising power, which will 
impact both the security benefits and burdens that we encounter in the years ahead.  
 
 Within Western Europe, interstate peace is reinforced by an array of strategic, 
normative, cultural, and institutional factors – however, the negative consequences 
of the return of great power competition in the wider world will still impact the 
European and UK security environments, in five key ways.  
 
1. The resurgence of Russia: globalization-driven growth has given Russia the 
military wherewithal – which may expand further, if global oil prices recover – to 
go with its political incentives to weaken NATO, particularly around its borders. 
As such, there is once again a hostile major power threat in Europe that poses a 
territorial threat to our allies, will likely seek to coerce us militarily, and is already 
confronting NATO forces in a way that creates a danger of potentially-
unintended escalation. 
2. The US ‘pivot’ to Asia: the resurgence of Russia would not otherwise be a serious 
security concern for the UK, except for the fact that the defence of Europe is no 
longer the United States’ principal strategic concern, focused as it is on balancing 
China. As such, European states – the UK foremost amongst them – will 
increasingly have to carry the burden of supplying European security and 
balancing Russia. 
3. International military crises: under US unipolarity, the United States could pacify 
all other major power relationships by threatening to defeat one or – if necessary 
– both parties to a conflict, thus rendering aggression futile. Under multipolarity, 
by contrast, this is no longer the case – and both rising and declining powers may 
have reason to instigate crises to advance their interests.  
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4. Vulnerable sea lines of communication (SLOCs): a key manifestation of the return 
of great power competition is likely to be additional maritime contestation in 
areas essential to our economic viability as an import-dependent island power 
reliant on seaborne energy and raw materials, including the Northeast Atlantic, 
Persian Gulf, and Suez region. Such threats to SLOCs could compel UK 
involvement in a crisis. 
5. Nuclear proliferation risks: a world of multiple competing major powers is likely 
to be one in which many states are attracted by the deterrent and coercive 
leverage provided by nuclear weapons. At the very least, this will create an 
unconducive environment for nuclear disarmament efforts – and possibly worse.  
 
 These security threats in turn point towards the incorporation of five core principles 
by the 2015 NSS. 
 
1. We must prioritise threats based on their relative danger, rather than just 
likelihood – which in practice means devoting more effort to hedging against 
powerful hostile states than has been the norm since 1989. 
2. We must not conflate threats to global human security with threats to UK 
national security. 
3. We must not mistake international activism for national security: status is not 
the same thing as safety. 
4. We must emphasise deterrence, containment, and the preservation of national 
strength by eschewing low-priority commitments that lack a strong national 
security rationale. 
5. We must preserve a balanced military capability set – even if that looks 
inefficient in the short term. 
 
 These core principles can, in turn, be used to derive implications for the following 
specific policy areas (discussed in order): resourcing national security, nuclear 
deterrence, choice of grand-strategic posture, cyber deterrence, SLOC protection, 
prioritisation of regional commitments, nuclear proliferation policy, responses to 
terrorism, humanitarian intervention, responding to climate-/resource-induced 
conflict, and alliance policy. 
 Certain key caveats are also in order: the BRICs’ current economic slowdown could 
turn into a more permanent stall or reversal of their rise, and the UK could choose 
self-defeating policies that weaken our strategic position. 
 
Introduction 
 
1. The purpose of this evidence submission is to address the question of the UK’s 
national security priorities out to 2035, so as to inform the 2015 UK National Security 
Strategy (NSS) and the subsequent Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR). It does 
this by discussing the security implications of – and appropriate UK strategic responses to – 
the return of great power competition to the international system: a consequence of the 
ongoing relative economic rise of the so-called ‘BRICs’ (Brazil, Russia, India, and China). It 
recognises that this is not the only national security concern that the UK faces in the next 
two decades – but it will make the case that it is by far and away the most important. Post-
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Cold War international politics has been shaped profoundly by the absence of great power 
competition: a product of the United States’ unmatched and unprecedented economic and 
military preponderance between 1989 and today. The freedom that Britain has enjoyed to 
engage in extra-regional humanitarian intervention, expeditionary counter-terrorism, and 
state-building far from home have all been contingent on the fact that state-based threats 
to UK vital interests have been weak or non-existent. To an extent, this has been a nice 
problem to have: international politics has rarely been so benign at the major power level. 
Yet it has also engendered an inability to prioritise national security tasks, a proclivity to see 
instability anywhere as an existential threat at home, a dwindling commitment to resourcing 
defence and security adequately, and a tendency to mistake the bad things that we see 
happening for the worst things that could possibly happen. Now that great power 
competition is returning to the international system, by contrast, these failings are in urgent 
need of correction – and many of the wider assumptions that have dominated UK thinking 
about post-Cold War international politics correspondingly require revisiting.   
 
2. The evidence submission proceeds as follows. First, it describes the evolving 
strategic context at the global level, explaining why the ongoing rise of the BRICs and the 
associated return of great power competition is likely to make the international system 
more conflict-prone, and why such conflict is so dangerous. Second, it discusses how this 
global outlook is likely to impact security conditions in the UK’s home region, Western 
Europe. Third, it discusses what this should mean for UK national security strategy out to 
2035 in terms of broad principles. Fourth, it moves to more specific national security policy 
recommendations of the kind that may practically inform the 2015 SDSR, and in doing so 
touches on the JCNSS’s other questions regarding alliances, risks, our world role, and how 
the NSS should impact national security spending choices. Fifth, it discusses key caveats and 
risks to the outlook, before concluding. Underpinning the argument throughout is the 
relative-value calculation between likelihood of conflict and costs of potential conflict that 
ought to lie at the heart of grand strategy. As such, while further UK involvement in small-
scale stabilisation missions and counter-terrorist operations against weak or dysfunctional 
states may indeed remain more likely than major-power conflict in the next two decades, 
the threat posed by minor powers and non-state actors with only limited arsenals should 
nonetheless be a lower strategic priority than hedging against the no-longer-inconceivable 
dangers of major-power coercion, crisis escalation, or even outright aggression.  
 
The Global Strategic Context 
 
3. New great powers are rising. The starting premise for this evidence submission is 
that multipolarity – a situation of more than one great power – is returning to the 
international system at the global level, following two post-Cold War decades of US 
‘unipolarity’, in which American economic and associated military preponderance was so 
vast as to render all other major powers essentially peripheral to the conduct of 
international politics.1 The economic rise of the BRICs is returning the world to a situation 
whereby, while the US may not yet face any genuine military peers, its freedom of action in 
key regions of the world is once again meaningfully constrained by local great powers with 
the wherewithal to balance US capabilities. China, moreover, has overtaken the United 
                                                          
1 Blagden (2015, forthcoming). 
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States as the world’s largest economy (in Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) terms) – and may 
perhaps eventually become its most capable military power too, although closing the 
military-technological advancement gap could prove close-to-impossible. The relative rise of 
the BRICs is a consequence of the catch-up convergence growth produced by post-Cold War 
economic globalization: a process driven from the outset, ironically, by the Western powers 
that are now being disempowered by it. In addition to the ‘top-level’ US-China dynamic, 
furthermore, similar relative power shifts are occurring between key major powers in 
important regions: between Japan and China in East Asia, for example, and – with caveats – 
between Germany, France, and Britain (on the one hand) and Russia (on the other) in 
Europe. Important regional powers are also emerging, such as Turkey and Indonesia, which 
while not likely to become powerful enough to project power beyond their own regions, will 
nevertheless have the capability to hinder external major powers’ operations in their 
immediate vicinity.2 
 
4. The rise of new great powers tends to cause conflict. Such dynamics of major power 
rise and decline produce conflict incentives, which often result in interstate competition and 
even war.3 Multipolarity tends to be less stable than unipolarity: if one great power 
possesses a sufficient preponderance of capabilities, they can pacify all other potential 
interstate military rivalries by threatening to defeat one side – or even both – should they 
launch aggression. Even bipolarity – a situation of two great powers – is more stable than 
multipolarity, since each knows that they (and only they) can deter the other. Multipolarity, 
by contrast, introduces uncertainty about which state – if any – will contain an aggressor: 
each major power has incentives to ‘pass the buck’ (shift the costs of containment) onto a 
third party rather than bear such costs themselves; potential aggressors know this, and can 
exploit such division. In addition to such systemic instability risks under multipolarity, 
dynamics of rise and decline can cause hostility within particular international relationships. 
A declining power has incentives to contain and retard the rise of a potential rival while it 
still has the ability to do so, before its relative advantage disappears. A rising power, 
meanwhile, has incentives to weaken and ideally supplant the declining power as soon as 
possible, not least to dilute or remove the threat that the declining power poses to the riser 
(because of its own incentive structure). This interaction can produce what international 
relations analysts term a ‘security dilemma’: a situation whereby two states may each only 
want to be safe, but since the characteristics of each side (both their relative power 
trajectories, and their associated military choices) appear threatening to the other, they 
end-up in an escalatory spiral of competition and – if they cannot break the cycle – eventual 
war. Thus, while it is usually assumed that economic globalization and interdependence is a 
force for peace, where it produces relative power shifts – as it usually does, by enabling 
some countries to grow faster than others – it can actually be an underlying cause of war.  
 
5. Such abstract theorisation can sound detached from real-world international politics, 
but it helps to explain many of the major strategic rivalries and associated wars of modern 
history. A full review of cases is naturally beyond the scope of this evidence submission, but 
an obvious comparison exists between the combination of multipolarity and rise/decline 
                                                          
2 For relevant projections, see Johansson et al. (2012), O'Neill and Stupnytska (2009), UK Development, Concepts and 
Doctrine Centre (2014), US National Intelligence Council (2008), Alexander, Cooper, and Snowdon (2010), and McWilliams, 
Davis, and Corge (2013). 
3 Blagden (2015, forthcoming).  
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dynamics in the run-up to both 1914 and 1939, and the hostile peace of the (bipolar) Cold 
War. 
 
6. Power shifts need not necessarily result in conflict – but peace-inducing 
intervening factors cannot be relied upon. The presence of conflict incentives does not 
necessarily result in war, of course. The power transition of economic size and associated 
naval pre-eminence between Britain and America in the early twentieth century occurred 
largely without incident. The precipitous decline of the Soviet Union in the late 1980s 
similarly occurred without major war. Yet in such cases, contingent and contextual factors 
intervened. The transition of naval dominance between Britain and America occurred 
largely within the context of a major war that saw the two pitted against a common enemy, 
which – thanks to a combination of geographical proximity and manifestly aggressive 
intentions – was a much more pressing security threat to declining Britain than a 
geographically remote, hitherto isolationist rising power across the Atlantic. The military 
decline of the Soviet Union, meanwhile, became visible only once its economy was already 
broken; given that it was already a weaker power than the United States by the time its 
decline accelerated, and in the presence of a survivable US nuclear arsenal capable of 
retaliating against (and thus nullifying) the one area of military equality that the USSR still 
possessed, Moscow lacked military options to shore-up its declining position, even if it had 
wanted to.  
 
7. Unfortunately, therefore, the world cannot today rely on such contingent and 
contextual factors intervening to render contemporary relative power shifts so peaceful. 
The 2010 NSS’s hope that great power competition can be constrained by multilateral 
institutions is similarly misplaced: states with the capability to do so have never reliably 
subordinated themselves to such institutions when their vital interests are at stake (which is 
precisely why the endurance of the UN Security Council required the creation of veto-
wielding permanent membership for the states with the wherewithal to otherwise ignore its 
edicts). The rest of this evidence submission therefore proceeds with the following global 
strategic context in mind. First, the major Western powers, namely the United States, Japan, 
Germany, France, and – crucially for us – Britain are getting weaker vis-à-vis China, India, 
Brazil, and Russia. Second, this process is likely to continue – albeit with risks to this outlook, 
and with key caveats subsequently discussed – over the next two decades. Third, this 
process of relative rise and decline carries an elevated risk of major power competition, 
conflict, and possibly even war. Interestingly, while the last NSS – like the previous year’s 
IPPR Commission on the future of UK national security – recognised that multipolarity is 
returning to the international system, the concern was primarily for the waning and 
multilateralisation of UK political influence that this would bring, rather than the conflict 
incentives that such a relative power shift creates.4  
 
8. The risk of major power war dwarfs all other security threats. The London 
bombings of 7 July 2005 killed 52, excluding the attackers themselves. The 2013 killing of 
Fusilier Lee Rigby – while shocking, brutal, and tragic – was the murder of one individual. 
Cyber attacks – another pressing contemporary concern – have, thus far, killed no-one. 
World War II, by contrast, killed around 451,000 Brits (military personnel and civilians) – 
                                                          
4 HM Government (2010), p. 15, and IPPR (2009), pp. 30-31.  
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making it significantly less lethal for British citizens than its 1914-18 predecessor. Despite 
never developing into outright great power war in Europe, the Cold War – the last time that 
the UK was engaged in military confrontation with another major power – could have left 
Britain a smoking, radiating ruin if one of its multiple crises had escalated beyond the point 
that they actually did, and included lower-level ‘proxy’ wars that (in the case of Korea) still 
managed to kill more than a million on all sides. Despite waves of defence cuts, moreover, 
the major powers’ underlying destructive capability has not declined since 1945 or 1989: if a 
modern industrial state ever again unleashes its military potential against another, the 
dangers posed by terrorism, (weak) ‘rogue’ states, and various other post-Cold War forms of 
instability and criminality will be rendered statistically insignificant. In short, the fact that 
major power competition is returning to the international system, and that military crises 
between such capable states is even slightly more likely, should condition how we evaluate 
and rank all other national security concerns – and the 2015 NSS should recognise this.  
 
9. Britain is in relative decline globally – but not within Europe. Before proceeding to 
discuss the European security implications of this return of multipolar competition, one 
important qualification is due to the general picture of Western decline and BRIC rise. 
Namely, while Western Europe in general may be in relative economic and associated 
military decline vis-à-vis non-European powers, the United Kingdom specifically is likely to 
be a rising power within Western Europe. Thanks largely to favourable demographics – a 
combination of immigration and the resident population’s replacement ratio – in addition to 
certain underlying economic strengths, such as world-class universities, associated 
technological development, and a globally sought-after professional services sector, the UK 
is often forecast to become the largest economy in Western Europe, perhaps overtaking 
Germany somewhere around 2030-40.5 When coupled to our already-region-leading 
military expertise and technological advancement, such relative economic growth provides 
grounds for guarded optimism about Britain’s strategic position. Such an outlook, if it comes 
to pass, will confer certain national security benefits on the UK – but it also suggests that 
there could be certain Western European security requirements that only Britain may be in 
a position to provide.  
 
European Security Implications of Global Multipolarity 
 
10. The previous section discussed key ongoing changes in the structure of the 
international system that will condition the future global security environment. This section 
now turns to discussion of how this global outlook will impact the security environment in 
Britain’s home region. In particular, while there are an array of normative, institutional, and 
strategic factors that point towards continuing peaceful and cooperative relations between 
Western European states, this is unlikely to wholly insulate these states – Britain included – 
from the negative security consequences of the return of multipolarity in the wider world. 
Below, five likely consequences of the return of global multipolarity for European – and 
specifically British – security are discussed.6 
 
11. Russia: expanding capabilities and hostile intentions. First, while most of the rising 
major powers in the world today lie outside Europe, one of them – Russia – is of critical 
                                                          
5 O'Neill and Stupnytska (2009), and McWilliams, Davis, and Corge (2013). 
6 Blagden (2015, forthcoming). 
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importance to European security. Of course, Russia is only a ‘rising’ or ‘resurgent’ power 
taken against its post-Soviet nadir of the 1990s; viewed against the 1980s and previously, 
Russia is and will remain severely diminished. Indeed, it is not a comparable state to the 
other BRICs, in that it is not a ‘new’ great power, and far from experiencing its first boom of 
industrialisation, its industrial recovery from Soviet collapse has been stilted by its economic 
reliance on hydrocarbon exports, demographic decline, and – most recently – US and EU 
sanctions.  
 
12. Nonetheless, the era of post-Cold War globalization-driven BRIC convergence growth 
– and the hydrocarbon demand that it created – allowed Russia to launch a $140 billion 
rearmament and military modernisation programme in 2009, which bore fruit during 2014’s 
annexation of Crimea and subsequent large-scale military incursions into the rest of 
Ukraine. The Ukraine invasion is only the latest manifestation of Russian military 
assertiveness and outright aggression in Europe, moreover: the 2008 invasion of Georgia, 
2007 and 2012 cyber attacks on Estonia and Finland, 2009 military exercises that simulated 
an invasion of the Baltic states and nuclear strike on Warsaw, 2013 simulated bombing runs 
on Stockholm, repeated violation of NATO and EU states’ airspace and territorial waters, 
and repeated confrontational interactions with NATO forces (for example, close-range 
overflight of warships while locking them with fire-control radar) are all indicative. Indeed, 
2014 has been the most militarily confrontational year of Russia’s post-Soviet history.7 
Where Western governments were taken by surprise by the Ukraine intervention, therefore, 
it was only because they had embraced the idea that international economic engagement 
would pacify Moscow, whereas such engagement has instead simply made Russia more 
powerful. Moscow’s leveraging of nationalism for political legitimation also creates the risk 
of domestic pressures for further bellicosity – a risk that could be exacerbated by a shortage 
of major allies, internal challenges (weak demographics, stalled democratization, 
vulnerability to oil price shocks, sanctions-induced capital flight, and mounting inequality 
amongst them), and two post-Cold War decades of perceived encroachment on its 
immediate peripheral region by Western states and institutions. The Russian decision to test 
an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) while the Ukraine crisis was in its early days 
provided a chilling reminder of the stakes involved. To be sure, Moscow may now avail itself 
of innovative tactical techniques – coercive cyber attacks accompanied by the handing out 
of passports to Russian ‘nationals’, for example, thus providing a pretext for funnelling arms 
and covert military support to oppressed ‘freedom fighters’ – but it is important to 
recognise that these stages only represent low-level steps on the escalatory ladder towards 
direct invasion: a ladder that was ascended in both 2008 and 2014. Equally important to 
recognise is that this escalatory ladder is still topped by the threat of strategic nuclear use 
against those who may seek to oppose Russian aggression.  
 
13. Note that none of this is listed to accuse Russia of necessarily being ‘evil’, or bent on 
expansionary conquest – although neither can these possibilities be ruled out. On the 
contrary, a country of its size, history, and shortage of major allies is likely to see 
rearmament and further efforts to weaken both NATO aspirants and actual NATO members 
on its periphery as simply prudent, now that it possesses the rejuvenated economic and 
military resources to do so. However, since no state can ever know for sure what another 
                                                          
7 Frear, Kulesa, and Kearns (2014).  
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will do with its military-industrial wherewithal, it makes sense for us to pay most attention 
to potentially-hostile near neighbours’ capabilities. Should Russia once again benefit from 
catch-up convergence growth towards Western European development levels, moreover – 
as seems possible, unless a combination of relatively weak global hydrocarbon prices and 
current US and EU sanctions are maintained indefinitely – it may still emerge as Europe’s 
principal major power in terms of military-industrial potential. Back in 2011, for example, 
Goldman Sachs projected that Russian GDP will surpass French GDP in 2024, UK GDP in 
2027, and German GDP in 2029.8 By 2050, they expected the Russian economy to be half as 
big again as Germany’s. Even despite the recent stalling of Russian growth, it is worth noting 
that a Russia with GDP per capita approaching even the Czech Republic’s would once again 
lead in terms of European military-industrial potential, albeit perhaps not military-
technological sophistication or professionalism.  
 
14. In short, the key manifestation of the rise of the BRICs in the European security 
context has been the resurgence of Russia to the point where it possesses the economic and 
associated military resources, as well as the incentives, to once again pose a direct threat of 
military coercion and even territorial conquest in Central and Eastern Europe. The risk that 
Russia could attempt something similar to what it has achieved in Ukraine on the territory of 
a NATO member – most plausibly, one or more of the Baltic states – is therefore small but 
non-negligible, as is the risk of a confrontational encounter between Russian and NATO 
forces resulting in shots being exchanged and subsequent escalation. The risks of large-scale 
conventional aggression against Central and Eastern European states more broadly are 
smaller still, but cannot be wholly dismissed – particularly within the context of a wider 
NATO-Russia crisis that might start over other issues. By contrast, further Russian attempts 
at militarised coercion of Western European states, including the UK, are highly likely: cyber 
attacks, intentionally provocative military exercises and force-on-force interactions, 
violations of territorial waters and airspace, ballistic missile movements and testing, Russian 
sponsorship of third-party enemies, and even limited conventional attacks are all 
possibilities. Crucially, however, none of this need necessarily represent a major challenge 
for UK national strategy, were it not for the second likely consequence the return of 
multipolarity at the global level: a decreased US focus on European security.  
 
15. The US ‘pivot’ to Asia. While Russia may have recovered from the economic, 
political, and military collapse of the 1990s, it is unlikely to ever again be a peer-competitor 
of the United States. As such, if the resurgence of Russia was the only notable power shift 
going on in the world, it would not necessarily require any change in British national security 
priorities: the UK could continue to focus on humanitarian intervention, out-of-region 
counter-terrorism, and stabilisation missions of the kind that have characterised its post-
Cold War national strategy, while relying on overwhelming US preponderance to address 
hostile major-power threats. 
 
16. Unfortunately, however, pacifying Europe is no longer the United States’ principal 
strategic concern. During the Cold War, the US commitment to European defence was 
unshakeable largely as a result of the continent’s position as the centre of (non-US) 
industrial production; had the Soviet Union come to dominate Western Europe, the balance 
                                                          
8 O'Neill and Stupnytska (2009), and Wilson, Burgi, and Carlson (2011). 
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of power would have shifted decisively against the United States. Today, by contrast, US 
strategy is focused on Asia, as it seeks to balance against the rise of the most powerful peer-
competitor that it has faced since its own rise to global military pre-eminence – and if 
China’s rise continues, as is likely, then this Asian focus of US strategy and associated 
military resources will only increase. That being the case, the United States will likely prove 
increasingly unwilling – and eventually unable – to shoulder Western Europe’s defence 
burden. Signs of this already abound, in terms of total levels of US force withdrawals from 
Europe, certain areas of ongoing commitment – such as the deployment of ballistic missile 
defence-equipped destroyers to Spain – notwithstanding.  
 
17. Such an assessment is not to suggest that Britain’s long-standing alliances are 
suddenly set to fracture. But it does suggest that the burden of supplying European security 
– including the burden of balancing against a potentially hostile Russia – will fall increasingly 
on those who consume it. Given Britain’s combination of a relatively positive economic 
outlook (by European standards) and already region-leading military expertise and 
technological sophistication, this points to a future with a distinctly ‘back to the future’ 
twist, in which the UK is the foremost major power in a Western European balancing 
coalition seeking to pacify the region in general – and to deter aggression to the east in 
particular.  
 
18. International military crises. A further likely consequence of the return of great 
power competition will be an elevated risk of international military crises with the potential 
to embroil Britain – either inadvertently, or because our vital interests are directly affected. 
As noted earlier, under unipolarity, militarised interstate disputes between other major 
powers can be pacified by the leading great power’s uncontested ability to contain, or if 
necessary defeat, one or both parties to a conflict. Under multipolarity, however, this ceases 
to be the case. Moreover, as noted above, dynamics of rise and decline produce conflict 
incentives and tensions – tensions that can be exacerbated by factors such as resource 
scarcity (energy, water, raw materials, and so forth), since access to such resources or the 
lack thereof can accelerate relative power shifts.  
 
19. Laundry-listing how or where such crises may unfold is an exercise fraught with 
uncertainty, and requiring of space far beyond what is available here. The key point, rather, 
is that in a world of general great power tension, the likelihood of serious militarised crises 
will increase. The European periphery has obvious potential, given the likely trajectory of 
the NATO-Russian relationship discussed above. Likewise, the Middle East will likely remain 
a focal point of security competition and an arena of conflict with the potential to embroil 
Britain, given its proximity to the European periphery, its economic importance (especially 
as a source of hydrocarbons for Europe, China, India, and Japan), Syria and Iraq’s on-going 
civil wars, the strength of regional revolutionary movements such as ‘Islamic State’ of Iraq 
and the Levant (ISIL), and the presence of several militarily-capable regional powers with 
divergent interests, such as Israel, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and post-revolutionary Egypt. That 
said, if the UK can reduce its economic dependence on Middle Eastern hydrocarbons – 
through alternative finds around the Falklands, say, or via fracking, as the United States has 
done – we will be in more of a position to leave the region to its own internal conflicts 
without feeling the same compulsion to intervene directly ourselves.  
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20. There is also the risk of involvement in military crises further afield, particularly 
where key commercial or strategic interests are at stake. For example, threats to UK 
interests in the South Atlantic will increase if Argentina ever manages to run sufficiently 
disciplined macroeconomic policy to experience sustained convergence growth and the 
military modernisation that this would facilitate, especially if the seabed around the 
Falkland Islands contains large-scale mineral deposits. Key flashpoints also exist in East Asia 
(China versus the US and Japan) and South Asia (India versus China and or Pakistan): but, 
notwithstanding the threat such crises might pose to UK imports and supply routes, these 
lack the geopolitical salience to Britain to merit concerted UK involvement.  
 
21. Vulnerable SLOCs. Following closely from the previous point, a key mechanism by 
which such international military crises could embroil and threaten the UK is via the threat 
that such crises would pose to European sea lines of communication (SLOCs) and associated 
critical supply chains (for food, energy, raw materials inputs, and so forth). European energy 
supplies rely heavily on the Middle East and Russia – both potential sources of diplomatic 
and strategic tension, as discussed above – although many other European states’ exposure 
is worse than Britain’s. The Indian Ocean, Persian and Arabian Gulfs, Eastern 
Mediterranean, Suez region, and the Straits of Hormuz, Malacca, and even Gibraltar, 
meanwhile, are all crucial to British seagoing commerce – and thus to our overall economic 
viability – as well as potential arenas of maritime great power contestation. Yet Britain and 
other European states’ maritime capability to provide independent (non-US) influence over 
such SLOCs has been hollowed-out by progressive waves of naval cuts. Meanwhile, the 
South Atlantic will remain an important theatre for the UK as long as London sustains its 
current Falklands resolve, and all Western European states should take note of Russia’s 
increasing maritime assertiveness in the Northeast Atlantic – the single most crucial SLOC 
for European powers, both commercially and strategically – and question whether they still 
have the ability to exert sea control in their home region as the United States’ Asian 
preoccupation grows.  
 
22. Nuclear proliferation risks. A final consequence of the return of major power 
competition will be the improbability of meaningful steps towards multilateral nuclear 
disarmament – and, quite possibly, the opposite. Multipolar great power competition will 
make many states feel vulnerable, and the best deterrent against coercion by the 
conventionally-strong is a nuclear arsenal. Likewise, in such a world, states are more likely 
to feel that they require a potent means of coercion to promote their interests. That being 
the case, non-proliferation efforts will potentially continue to struggle in the coming years – 
and those with existing nuclear arsenals will be loath to give them up.  
 
UK National Security Strategy: Core Themes 
 
23. As implied from the outset, many of the characteristics of UK national security policy 
that are often assumed to be the ‘norm’ of post-Cold War international politics have, in fact, 
been highly contingent on a structural feature of the international system: namely, the 
unrivalled – and historically unprecedented – military and economic preponderance of the 
United States. Humanitarian intervention, protracted counter-terrorist operations that 
subsequently became counter-insurgency (COIN) campaigns, and transformative attempts 
at stabilisation and state-building have all been a product of possessing the military, 
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diplomatic, and intelligence ‘spare capacity’ to prosecute such endeavours. Such ‘spare 
capacity’ has itself been a consequence of UK national security policy not needing to 
concern itself with protecting us militarily from powerful hostile states. Under US 
unipolarity, and as a close ally of the ‘unipole’, we have had no need to concern ourselves 
with the dangers posed by other major powers – the 2010 NSS explicitly stated that we face 
no major state threat9 – freeing us to focus on essentially second-order security concerns. 
Such unipolarity is now ending, however, and UK national security policy must reflect this 
fact – particularly in light of the challenges for UK and wider European security posed by the 
return of multipolar great power competition, as discussed above. Here, five core themes 
are outlined that should guide UK national security strategy over the next two decades. The 
following section will develop more concrete recommendations for specific policy areas.  
 
24. Prioritise based on relative danger, not just likelihood. Starting with prioritisation, 
at the heart of national strategy should lie a relative value equation. Multiplying a small-but-
non-negligible number (probability of major power conflict) by a massive number (the 
destructive potential of advanced industrial states) still produces a large number. As 
discussed above, moreover, the ‘small number’ in question is no longer even that small, as 
Russia’s 2014 behaviour demonstrates – and it is increasing, as multipolarity returns. By 
contrast, multiplying a somewhat-larger number (probability of further UK involvement in 
‘small’ wars, focused on counter-terrorism, stabilisation, and humanitarian protection) by a 
small number (the destructive potential of failed states and state-less individuals with 
rudimentary weapons) does not necessarily produce a number that is large enough to justify 
being made the principal focus of national security policy.10 The latter category of wars, 
moreover, are the kind that we can choose to forego, without risking our national survival – 
which is why their recent frequency should not be taken as a guide to their importance, 
since this is more indicative of (internal) policy choice than external threat. The former 
category, by contrast, are the kind that – if deterrence fails – leave states with little 
discretion over participation.  
 
25. Outright major power war need not be imminent for it to nonetheless constitute the 
top-level concern of national security policy, because – given the stakes involved – anything 
that makes it even slightly more likely is very dangerous indeed. This leads us to another 
point about prioritisation: we must not confuse the bad things that we see happening for 
the worst things that could possibly happen. Post-Cold War US unipolarity and the 
associated strength of NATO deterrence made major power war pointless, since no actor 
could hope to gain anything from it in the face of US opposition. As a consequence, we – 
especially in Britain and the rest of Europe – have started to think that such major war is no 
longer even possible, and therefore does not merit hedging against. Instead, we see a 
Middle East and North Africa engulfed by civil and cross-border conflict, apparently rampant 
cyber crime, possible Iranian nuclear proliferation, far-away and home-grown terrorists who 
wish us harm, the negative consequences of climate change, and conclude that these bad 
things we see happening are the most dangerous things that could happen. In fact, of 
course, a major power confrontation and deterrence failure in Europe – or perhaps at sea in 
the Gulf and Indian Ocean areas – that escalated into outright war would eclipse all of these 
recent ‘threats’ in terms of its human and economic costs to Britain, and this is the proper 
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Dr David Blagden, University of Cambridge – written evidence 
13 
 
context in which they much be seen. Social scientists would classify this situation as a case 
of hidden variable bias: major power conflict is not impossible, but it has been prevented 
from manifesting itself since 1989; we thus end-up measuring – and worrying about – the 
conflict patterns that we can see, rather than reflecting on what causes us to not see other 
(much worse) forms of conflict.  
 
26. In terms of the practicalities of prioritisation, we must apply this ‘likelihood 
multiplied by potential costs’ equation with reference to the material resources, offensive 
capabilities, offensive incentives, and geographical proximity of potential foes and 
dangers.11 The following examples elaborate this approach. 
 
 Home-grown radical Islamist terrorists are certainly geographically proximate, 
residing as they do within Britain itself, but they also have very limited resources, 
very limited offensive capabilities, and are unlikely to have offensive incentives 
unless the UK is at war – or too-obviously supporting an oppressive authoritarian 
regime – in a Muslim country. They thus require attention, but as potential 
murderers that merit sustained police and security service investigation, rather than 
as an existential national threat.  
 China may have large material resources and substantial offensive capabilities, but it 
is geographically distant, regionally preoccupied, and – with certain key caveats, such 
as cyber espionage/attacks against strategic industrial targets (e.g. BAE and Rolls-
Royce’s nuclear submarine programmes) and potentially seeking to exert greater 
naval control of the Indian Ocean and Persian/Arabian Gulfs – lacks incentives to 
threaten British interests. Containing China’s rise is therefore a key concern for the 
US, Japan, and India in East and South Asia, but not one that Britain can or should 
seek to seriously impact; the UK focus should be on avoiding confrontation, while 
nonetheless having the capacity to safeguard key SLOCs and defend cyber targets.  
 ISIL militants may represent an existential threat to certain Middle Eastern regimes, 
but they lacked the resources, capabilities, proximity, and incentives to threaten 
Britain directly – until, of course, we started bombing them. Their resources and 
offensive capabilities remain trivial, and such an air campaign may degrade their 
capabilities further, but their offensive incentives have soared and their resources 
may subsequently also increase (albeit not by much), as they attract more 
sympathisers. Some limited intervention may prove to have been justified, if there 
was a genuine risk of ISIL overrunning the region and thus jeopardising British 
strategic interests in the Gulf, such as uninterrupted energy exports – but such 
expansive regional conquest seems unlikely, and they certainly do not merit the 
hyperbolic rhetoric of global existential threat recently bestowed upon them, given 
their limited capabilities and regionally-focused interests.  
 What remains of al-Qaeda and its splinter groups (AQ et al) may still have offensive 
intentions towards the UK, but – short of acquiring a nuclear or sophisticated 
biological weapon – they lack the capabilities to progress from being a law-and-order 
issue to an existential threat. Prioritisation therefore points not towards seeking to 
destroy AQ et al via unending global war, which instead gives more people reason to 
terrorise us, but rather towards avoiding anything – such as destabilising Pakistan by 
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infringing its sovereignty via drone strikes – that might make their acquisition of 
nuclear weapons more likely.  
 Russia, by contrast, possesses the material resources, offensive capabilities 
(unconventional – such as cyber attackers and tame ‘rebels’ – as well as conventional 
and nuclear), offensive incentives (rolling back and weakening perceived NATO 
encirclement), and geographical proximity to threaten Britain and our regional allies 
directly and seriously. Given this combination, in relative-value terms, it merits 
higher prioritisation than the other possible threats listed here.  
 
27. Obviously, these are all instances of contemporary security challenges, whereas the 
2015 NSS seeks to look out to 2035. The point of listing these instances, therefore, is not to 
document all security threats that the UK could conceivably face in the next two decades – 
although the negative security consequences of the rise of new great powers is likely to 
remain an enduring feature – but rather to illustrate the approach to prioritisation that such 
a world will require. Of course, no prioritisation would be required if Britain possessed 
unlimited national security resources. Yet since such resources are finite – and likely to 
remain painfully so for the foreseeable future12 – such danger-over-likelihood prioritisation 
becomes necessary when contemplating which national security missions to invest in.  
 
28. Be circumspect about causal claims: threats to global human security are not 
necessarily threats to UK national security. Following closely from this need for 
prioritisation based on relative danger – along with the examples bulleted above – the next 
NSS must encourage critical questioning of claims made about the foundation of UK national 
security. The weakness of the alleged causal link between Saddam Hussein’s Iraq and 
terrorist threats is an obvious egregious example from the past fifteen years. Yet similar 
charges can be levelled at the most recent Iraq re-intervention to counter ISIL. In 2013, the 
UK Government sought permission from Parliament to attack Bashar al-Assad’s Syrian 
regime, in the absence of any meaningful strategy – yet in 2014, the same UK Government is 
attacking the same forces that Assad’s army was itself fighting back in 2013, again without 
any clear idea of a desired end-state or connection to UK security. Both of these mutually 
exclusive policy positions have been justified as countering the threat allegedly posed to 
British security by instability in the Middle East, without a clear articulation of why the 
various warring factions – all of which are militarily weak, regionally focussed, and 
preoccupied with fighting each other – would either want, or have the means, to attack the 
UK. If the stakes are so low that backing either side is possible without a noticeably different 
result, does this suggest that this is not in fact a conflict that merits the deployment – and 
depletion – of scarce British military capacity? Relatedly, there is currently great media and 
political attention on the threat posed by British jihadis returning from Syria’s civil war: yet if 
that was genuinely the existential threat that it is billed as, why are we still calling for the fall 
of the local forces – Assad’s – most likely to kill such ill-prepared raw recruits on their arrival 
from Britain, before they have a chance to gain combat skills, and instead waging war 
against them indirectly ourselves, further fuelling radical Islamists’ grievances with UK 
policy?  
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29. Moving beyond the current Syria/Iraq/ISIL context to other examples, if the UK has 
an interest in discouraging the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) – as it 
surely does, because only via the acquisition of WMD can terrorists go from being a law-
and-order issue to an existential threat – why did we attack a state (Libya) and thus 
effectively subject its leader to a brutal execution, when we had previously had great 
success in persuading that same state to dismantle its WMD programme? If climate change-
induced resource shortages represent a future source of global instability – as they may – 
how would this instability, which will be felt most acutely in impoverished states outside 
Europe, actually manifest itself as a security threat to Britain? If cyberspace represents a 
potential medium of attack on Britain’s critical national infrastructure – as it could well – 
who are likely to be the actors with the resources to utilise that medium to maximum 
effect? After all, flooding in Bangladesh represents a humanitarian tragedy, and the mass 
theft of credit-card details represents a crime with many victims – but neither empty wells 
and penniless thirsty people, nor the internet and its numerous charlatans, have any 
grievance with Britain or Britons in themselves. Put simply, threats to global human security 
are not necessarily threats to UK national security: and, while mitigating the former is a 
worthy humanitarian goal, safeguarding the latter is the highest purpose of the British state.  
 
30. The point of these questions, then, is simply to illustrate that observing that there 
are sources of instability in the world – civil war and state failure in the Middle East, or the 
suppression of demands for greater suffrage, or climate change, or limited authority and 
difficulties with attribution in cyberspace13 – does not (a) constitute a causal claim for how 
these humanitarian problems actually come to manifest themselves as a security threat to 
Britain, or (b) make a case for their relative importance. Making a case that struggles for 
control of resources will lead to increased naval competition in the Indian Ocean and 
associated threats to critical UK SLOCs, or that cyberspace is most dangerous when it is 
utilised by powerful, well-resourced, hostile states to coerce NATO members or steal 
submarine reactor designs, by contrast, makes clear the causal link actually being claimed – 
but it also makes these security challenges seem much less ‘new’ and much more 
‘traditional’ in their mode of manifestation, and in how UK strategy can respond.  
 
31. Do not mistake international activism for national security. The 2010 NSS asserted 
from the outset that Britain cannot have a national security strategy without an assessment 
of our role in the world.14 Yet while role is certainly an interest of states, it is not 
coterminous with security: it is possible to have an elevated international role and be 
relatively insecure, just as it is possible to have a lower-profile international role while being 
highly secure. Conflating status and security is a recurring mistake in debates over UK 
strategy: there may be good reasons to seek a ‘special’, militarily-active social role in the 
world, and such activism may contribute to security, but the link is not necessary. Indeed, 
where such activism creates enemies or generates hostility, it can actually detract from UK 
security.  
 
32. This conflation is a key driver of the UK’s commitment to expeditionary military 
operations, even where – as discussed above – the causal link to national security is poorly 
articulated or wholly absent. As will be discussed below, in an era of major power 
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Dr David Blagden, University of Cambridge – written evidence 
16 
 
competition, cautious stewardship and conservation of strength is the key to retaining the 
wherewithal to deter – and, if necessary, counter – aggression from similarly-capable states. 
Yet post-Cold War UK defence and foreign policy has been united around an idea that 
activism equates to greatness – and the further military capabilities are reduced, the more 
desperately this notion is pushed. Contemporary China is no less of a major power because 
of a lack of overseas military interventions; on the contrary, eschewing such missions has 
allowed it to focus on the capability set most relevant for its national security, namely 
denying the US military access to its littoral region. During the latter half of the Cold War, 
Britain was a much ‘greater’ power than it is today, yet – with the exception of a long-range 
expeditionary deployment in 1982, to repel an invasion of sovereign territory – that 
greatness owed to carefully conserving the country’s military strength, rather than over-
using it. The post-Cold War UK has been doing the opposite of what Theodore Roosevelt 
counselled: speaking loudly, while carrying an increasingly inadequate stick.  
 
33. Note that calling for reduced international military activism is neither a call for no 
military activism nor a call to give up on remaining a major power. On the contrary, it calls 
for international activism in cases that meet the prioritisation criteria discussed above, in 
the hope that – by eschewing activism where such prioritisation criteria are not met – 
Britain will actually be able to prevail in the cases where it matters most. Similarly, it draws 
a distinction between being a major power – as measured by a state’s ability to secure itself 
against its greatest potential dangers, other major powers – and pursuing major power 
status – as measured by a state’s activist image of itself in the world. This may be thought of 
as a trade-off between quality of intervention and quantity of intervention.  
 
34. Deter, contain, preserve strength. Following directly from the previous point, 
preparing for the return of great power competition – and particularly for standing as the 
principal Western European military power seeking to balance a potentially hostile Russia – 
will necessitate a focus on deterrence, containment, and the preservation of military 
strength. Prioritising the danger posed by potentially hostile major powers will necessitate a 
de-prioritisation of ambitious attempts at transformative state-building and ‘upstream’ 
stabilisation of conflict in cases where the actors involved are only weak states or non-state 
actors with limited capabilities for threatening the UK, in order to avoid unnecessary, 
capability-sapping military embroilments. The post-2001 Afghan and Iraq campaigns have 
succeeded in costing hundreds of British service lives and tens of billions of pounds,15 while 
providing the UK with more enemies, overstretched armed forces, and a land-centric 
military that is configured primarily for COIN, direct intervention, and state-building, to the 
detriment of other military tasks. Avoiding further such strength depletion on low-priority 
military tasks, and recognised the limits to armed social transformation, will therefore be a 
key requirement for confronting and surviving in a competitive, conflictual, multipolar 
future.  
 
35. The natural corollary to a less activist, less militarily interventionist approach to 
solving the world’s problems will be a greater reliance on the deterrence of potential 
enemies and the containment of emerging threats. Deterrence can occur through the threat 
of punishment (retaliation for damage already suffered) or by denial (preventing an 
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opponent from achieving their aims). Similarly, it can be counter-value (directed at things 
that an opponent values, such as their economic prosperity or political authority) or 
counter-force (directed at an opponent’s own offensive and defensive capabilities). All such 
approaches require retention of sufficient capability and resolve to make deterrence 
credible – such capability can include conventional forces, ‘unconventional’ forces (cyber 
attacks, economic sanctions, and so forth) and, if the ability to deter even the most 
devastating of attacks is to be achieved, nuclear forces – so they are not cheap. Yet all are 
also far less costly – in money and lives – than major power war. Deterrence, coupled to 
limited military action if deterrence fails, is meanwhile a necessary component of 
containment: where there is a potential aggressor with both the conflict incentives and the 
capability to be dangerous, preserving some balance between accommodating their vital 
interests – which may necessitate abandoning our transformative ambitions for their total 
compliance – and safeguarding our own vital interests is likely to be the lowest cost, least 
dangerous approach to achieving strategic stability. 
 
36. Preserve balanced capabilities – even if that looks inefficient right now. In the face 
of ever greater cuts to UK military, diplomatic, and (to a lesser extent) intelligence 
capabilities, there is a natural temptation to specialise in line with particular areas of 
expertise, particular areas of technological superiority, or particular areas of recent demand. 
Military examples include calls for the British Army to completely abandon armour and 
artillery in order to focus on special forces and light infantry units, for the Royal Navy to 
abandon high-end sea control capabilities in order to focus on amphibious power 
projection, and for the Royal Air Force (RAF) to abandon air-to-air combat and long-range 
strike capabilities in order to focus on tactical lift and close support missions. The alternative 
– preserving tiny pockets of everything from what was once a much bigger overall military 
force – can appear to risk inefficiency and ineffectiveness in all areas, rather than just the 
abandonment of some. 
 
37. Such calls are misguided, however. Indeed, the 2009 IPPR Commission on National 
Security’s argument that, since there will be more major powers in the world we should 
abandon major war-fighting capability, was a particularly striking example of this sort of 
contradictory reasoning.16 In keeping with the themes that have run throughout this 
evidence submission, the fact that recent UK military operations have focused on counter-
terrorism, COIN, and stabilisation does not mean that they will be the most important kind 
of operations in future – and neither does the fact that such operations have recently taken 
place, while more conventional state-on-state warfare has been less of a concern, tell us 
anything about the more serious conflict that high-end combat forces deter (and which 
therefore cannot be observed). Indeed, RAF fighters have clearly had one of their most 
active post-Cold War years of air-to-air interdiction of Russian forces in 2014,17 the Navy is 
being forced to once again devote significant attention to detecting and tracking major 
Russian units in the Northeast Atlantic, and – at the time of writing – the Army is concluding 
a large-scale armoured exercise in Poland aimed at reassuring our Eastern European NATO 
allies. These are all developments that would have been inconceivable to many during the 
COIN-centric first decade of this millennium – and they are developments that, while 
certainly stretching the services, all involve capabilities that are at least still in Britain’s 
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possession, which would not be the case if the MOD had too-enthusiastically embraced 
specialisation according to the ‘new’ visions of future conflict that were prevalent before 
the last NSS and SDSR processes. By contrast, by retaining a balanced spectrum of military 
capabilities, we retain the expertise and associated equipment necessary to adapt to – and, 
if necessary, scale-up to fight – evolving future threats that multipolarity might bring.18 
 
UK National Security Strategy: Specific Policy Implications 
 
40. The previous section discussed five core principles of UK national security strategy 
that follow from a recognition that major power competition with the potential to result in 
conflict is returning to the international system. This section turns to an exploration of how 
these core principles can inform specific policy choices, as manifested via the 2015 SDSR and 
subsequent SDSRs, during the period impacted by the 2015 NSS.  
 
41. Resource security and defence properly. It is perhaps a fool’s hope to call for 
additional resources for national security, given the fiscal climate that has endured since the 
2008 financial crisis and which will surely continue in the next Parliament. Nonetheless, 
given the fact that there is once again a hostile major power threat in Europe, coupled to 
other dangers in the wider world and a waning US commitment to European defence, there 
must come a time when we question the assumption that the direction of travel for defence 
spending as a proportion of GDP in particular – intelligence, aid, and to a lesser extent 
diplomatic spending having held up better since the start of the millennium – will always be 
downwards, and that the armed forces will always be capable of doing more with less. 
Indeed, the services’ ‘can-do’ attitude to papering over cracks is the principal reason that 
emerging capability gaps have not thus been felt as painfully as they might.  
 
42. Nuclear deterrence remains pivotal. The ultimate deterrent of aggression by the 
conventionally strong and of coercion by the nuclear armed is a secure second-strike 
nuclear arsenal. The outlook for the Baltic States today if NATO were not a nuclear alliance, 
for example, would be bleak indeed. Given a combination of renewed major power 
aggression in Europe by a nuclear-armed Russia, and a waning US commitment to European 
defence, therefore, it is essential that the UK retains a survivable retaliatory strategic 
nuclear capability into the future – which, in practice, means pressing ahead with the 
planned four-boat replacement Successor SSBN class.19 The Government can continue to 
pay lip service to the goal of global nuclear disarmament if that is necessary politically: but 
since it is never going to happen, and since it would dangerously elevate conventional war 
risks if it did, we must plan for a nuclear future. 
 
43. Pursue a grand strategy of ‘offshore balancing’. As implied by the calls above to 
prioritise threats based on relative danger and preserve strength where possible, the UK 
should seek to act as what strategic theorists call an offshore balancer: an over-the-horizon 
sea and air controller that seeks to utilise local allies wherever possible, intervening ashore 
itself only where there is a hostile state powerful enough to pose a danger of conquest in a 
region vital to UK interests and where local allies lack the strength to address the threat 
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themselves. ISIL might constitute such a threat, if local allies were incapable of containing 
them: although the fact that they have not even managed to fully defeat such fragile states 
as Iraq and Syria, let alone much more capable regional powers, such as Turkey, Iran, Saudi 
Arabia, and Israel suggests that they may fall some way short of this bar. Russia, by contrast, 
almost certainly constitutes a threat that local allies are incapable of handling 
independently, hence the necessity of robust guarantees and associated force commitments 
to the Baltic States and Poland. Utilising base networks, naval platforms, and air assets, 
offshore balancers are well-placed to defend their SLOCs, deny mobility to their enemies, 
and conduct stand-off strikes from the sea in support of local allies where needed, but 
without the crippling attenuated costs and enmities produced by direct ground 
intervention. They are therefore better able to pick only essential fights, and to otherwise 
conserve their capabilities. Offshore balancing does not deny the need for land forces: but 
they must represent the core of a capital- and firepower-intensive army that can be scaled-
up for major conflict on the rare occasions that that is needed, rather than an army tailored 
towards frequent efforts at COIN and state-building.20 
 
44. Cyber threats are real but deterrable. In keeping with the call to think carefully 
about the causal underpinnings of national security arguments, the current concern 
surrounding cyber attacks must be considered not just in terms of there being ‘bad people 
out there on the internet’, but rather in terms of which actors have the resources and 
incentives to use cyber attacks and espionage to maximum coercive and destructive 
advantage. In practice, this means that rather than thinking about cyber threats as a 
competing alternative to the dangers posed by hostile major powers, they must instead – at 
least in the case of the ones serious enough to count as a danger, rather than a mere 
irritation – be thought of primarily as a manifestation of the dangers posed by hostile major 
powers. Crucially, moreover, because the coercive aims of cyber attackers identify the 
interests that they are seeking to advance, there is scope for deterring such attacks in 
‘traditional’ ways, via linkage to our conventional and nuclear capabilities. 
 
45. Rediscover our SLOCs. As noted above, the return of great power competition in the 
wider world – and particularly the rise of new navies approaching the reach and capability 
levels of the major Western navies – is likely to result in increasing maritime competition, 
for example over access to scarce resources. As an import-dependent island economy, 
ensuring security for our SLOCs in the face of such strategic competition will necessitate a 
re-emphasising of naval and maritime-aerial assets. Steps to restore hull numbers and thus 
presence to the Royal Navy’s escort fleet should be investigated, such as the Development, 
Concepts and Doctrine Centre’s Black Swan sloop concept, as should the regeneration of 
maritime patrol and strike options for the RAF.21  
 
46. Prioritise regions by geopolitical relevance. Europe will always be the region most 
critical for UK security, because it is where we happen to reside; the ‘global village myth’ – 
that instability anywhere in the world is a direct threat at home22 – should be resisted. This 
means that retaining the ability to control and secure the Northeast Atlantic and the 
Mediterranean, and contributing to the defence of Continental Europe, must once again top 
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our national security agenda, now that Russia once again has both the capability and the 
intent to threaten NATO. Beyond Europe, the South Atlantic contains UK territory that faces 
a direct threat, and the Middle East is important for its energy supplies, so they must be our 
next two priorities – although the security situation in the latter is better managed by 
offshore balancing (discussed above) than through direct military intervention. Beyond 
Europe, the Middle East, and the South Atlantic, however, direct threats to our security 
interests – and our ability to influence such dangers as there are – both fall markedly.  
 
47. ‘Do no harm’ on proliferation. As noted above, a world of multipolar great power 
competition is unlikely to be one where optimistic visions for multilateral nuclear 
disarmament are fulfilled. Recent British policy choices have also made proliferation more 
likely: attacking Saddam Hussein’s Iraq at a time when Baghdad was belatedly complying 
with weapons inspectors (and, when no WMD were found, declaring that we would have 
invaded anyway, for different reasons) – like deposing Muammar Gaddafi’s Libyan regime 
after successfully persuading him to give up his WMD programme – has sent a strong signal 
to the likes of Iran that Western powers pose an existential danger regardless of their 
assurances, but also that, if a state can achieve a nuclear arsenal, then those same Western 
powers will have no choice but to respect and bargain with it (like North Korea’s 
experience). That said, UK strategy can still minimise the proliferation of nuclear dangers. 
Eschewing policies that pose an existential threat to Iran (and counselling the same to our 
allies) will give Tehran less reason to cross the threshold of turning its nuclear technical 
capability into an actual arsenal. Yet if Iran does cross the threshold, we must also recognise 
that such a situation will likely be better handled via containment and deterrence, rather 
than invasion, since the latter would incentivise the leadership to disperse and devolve 
control of the arsenal to make it more survivable (which would make acquisition of a 
weapon by terrorists more likely) – or even to use one or more of their weapons to display 
resolve, to coerce our regional allies, or to weaken our deployed regional forces. Such 
containment could also feature security assurances to regional allies, in order to reduce the 
likelihood of a regional arms race (which could again result in the loss of a nuclear weapon 
to terrorists, if a state such as Saudi Arabia built its own arsenal and then suffered a 
revolution). Similar logic was applied to Pakistan earlier in this evidence submission: it is not 
so much the existence of nuclear weapons that poses a danger, but rather risk of loss of 
control by conservative, risk-averse national leaders to the advantage of potentially more 
radically-minded terrorists or renegade officials, hence the suggestion that the best way to 
minimise the risk of nuclear terrorism is to avoid doing anything that might destabilise a 
nuclear-armed regime.  
 
48. Keep terrorism in perspective. As stressed at the outset, even the highest-profile 
recent terrorist attacks on the UK have been closer to serious criminal incidents that acts of 
war, in terms of their casualty figures. That is not to deny that they are deeply shocking – 
that is the purpose of acts of terror, after all – or that future attacks could not be 
substantially more fatal, particularly if terrorists acquired a nuclear or sophisticated 
biological weapon. The UK will continue to face a terrorist threat, and at some point the 
best efforts of the security services will not be sufficient to thwart another significant attack. 
Yet the fact remains that terrorists simply do not represent an existential threat in the way 
that the military forces of advanced major powers do. A counter-terrorism-centric national 
security strategy may therefore have made sense during two decades in which major power 
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threats were absent from the international system, but such centrism is no longer justifiable 
if it begins to impinge on Britain’s ability to hedge against the threat posed by hostile 
powerful states via the conservation of strength, the retention of balanced forces, and an 
offshore balancing posture. As discussed above, moreover, terrorist threats are not 
necessarily even made less severe – and are quite possibly made worse – by the prosecution 
of expeditionary counter-terrorist operations, particularly when they sprawl into 
transformative attempts at state-building via COIN, given the enmities and proliferation 
risks generated.  
 
49. A high bar – and a low cost-threshold – for humanitarian intervention. As stressed 
throughout, the need to prepare for a return of multipolar great power competition 
necessitates a conservation of military resources, intelligence capacity, and diplomatic 
capital – all of which point towards an avoidance of unnecessary wars. The place where this 
applies most obviously is to humanitarian intervention: not only must we face the ‘hard 
truth about a noble notion’, in US scholar Benjamin Valentino’s words – that it usually does 
more harm than good to those on the receiving end23 – it also drains military, diplomatic, 
and intelligence resources on operations that do not contribute to UK national security. 
Pursuit of the ‘responsibility to protect’ may have made a nice luxury good during the two 
post-Cold War decades, when our armed forces were required for little else, but now that 
they once again need to be preserved for deterring similarly-capable potentially hostile 
military forces, such overuse of our under-resourced forces is no longer justifiable. This is 
not to say that there can never be humanitarian crises serious enough to merit a UK 
intervention: but there must be a clear strategy for how British military involvement will 
actually make the situation better (rather than just the hand-wringing ‘something must be 
done!’ impulse), and crucially, such intervention must only occur in situations where the 
potential costs of doing so are negligible. Thus, preventing a genocide that is being 
conducted with machetes, and where there are no local actors with the ability to 
meaningfully resist UK forces, may fit the criteria – but intervening on one side of an 
intractable and poorly-understood civil war will not.  
 
50. Question how ‘climate wars’ or ‘resource wars’ will actually threaten Britain. As 
noted previously, identifying that resource shortages and climate-induced famines and 
droughts will likely be a cause of future human insecurity has been a valuable contribution 
of recent work on the future character of conflict – but it is not the same as explaining how 
such global insecurity constitutes a threat to UK national security. Countering climate 
change and global poverty constitute worthy goals of Britain and Britons: but such 
challenges only become a national security threat when they pit capable and hostile 
adversaries against the UK (either as a threat to our own vital resource supplies, or because 
they oppose us as threat to their vital resource supplies). This means that countering such 
dangers may actually require a much more ‘traditional’ strategic response than the 
discourse of ‘new’ security threats might suggest: the Royal Navy cannot prevent the 
dwindling of fossil fuel supplies, for example, but it can certainly counter those who might 
seek to secure preferential access to – or superior profits from – such dwindling supplies by 
closing the Straits of Hormuz.  
 
                                                          
23 Valentino (2011).  
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51. Utilise alliances, but do not become ‘romantically attached’ – or surprised when 
they let us down. Britain is privileged to benefit from some of the strongest alliance 
relationships that have ever existed, and with some of the most capable partners in the 
world today – including the state that remains by far the contemporary international 
system’s foremost military power, the United States. The US partnership is tremendously 
valuable, in terms of the balancing contribution that it brings to NATO, the levels of 
technical expertise and interoperability we share, and concrete capabilities – such as the 
shared Trident D5 ballistic missile stockpile, preferential sales of the Tomahawk land attack 
missile, tier-one involvement in the fifth-generation F-35 joint combat aircraft programme, 
and sharing of satellite intelligence assets – that would likely otherwise be beyond Britain’s 
material means, at least with current budgets. Nonetheless, we must not mistake the fact 
that they find us useful for affection: the United States is a separate country with vital 
interests that, very sensibly, Washington will not jeopardise for the sake of a foreign power, 
as US opposition to the 1956 Suez intervention, reticence over providing open support in 
1982, and lack of interest in British counsel following 2003’s Iraq intervention all illustrate. 
Moreover, as noted above, our centrality to US national security strategy is waning as 
Washington focuses on balancing the rise of China. That said, if we subsequently assume 
more of an independent role as a contributor to the defence of Europe and the Middle East, 
we may be able to forge more of a peer relationship of equals with the United States, via 
the implied division of labour, than the current senior/junior partners arrangement (or the 
current ‘parent/child’ relationship, to be less flattering).  
 
52. As for Europe, cooperation is of course positive: and there are some tangible 
examples of effectively pooled capability, such as the Anglo-Dutch Amphibious Group. It is 
also, as stressed throughout, the most geopolitically salient region for the UK: so it should 
certainly be a focus of our alliance-building efforts. Nonetheless, given the current 
difficulties in jointly procuring even a single medium-weight missile with France, for example 
– the Sea Skua-replacing ‘FASGW(H)/ANL’ – the more far-reaching visions for Anglo-French 
cooperation are as unrealistic as the visionary claims for the EU as an expeditionary military 
superpower that were common before the Eurozone crisis. The claim that London or Paris 
would deploy the principal unit of their respective navies in any one of a potentially infinite 
category of scenarios vital to the interests of one state but peripheral (or even inimical) to 
the interests of the other, in particular, is wholly incredible, which is why visions of future 
carrier-sharing (say) are unlikely to succeed. Indeed, it is important to remember that Britain 
already is Western Europe’s principal military power, and if our relative economic position 
within the region improves as projected, then this military advantage will likely increase: as 
such, we should not be too optimistic about European defence sharing, because there will 
simply not be many similarly-capable powers to share with; we may well thus have ‘carrying 
the can’ for regional security foisted upon us by circumstances.   
 
Caveats and Risks to the Outlook 
 
53. The analysis above is premised on the assumptions that great power competition is 
returning to the international system as the BRICs rise and that the UK will remain a 
European major power with some limited extra-regional power-projection capability. 
However, there are clearly risks to both such outlooks.  
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54. In terms of external developments, the BRICs’ rise – jeopardised in 2014 by an 
economic slowdown – could stall in a more permanent way, or even go into reverse, in 
which case US unipolarity would likely reassert itself. China’s construction bubble and 
shadow banking sector could explode. Russia’s economy could collapse in the face of 
Western sanctions, falling global oil prices, and associated capital flight and fiscal shortfalls, 
coming up on two decades of hydrocarbon-based growth having crowded-out other forms 
of more sustainable economic activity, via the associated corruption and rouble strength. 
India could prove unable to overcome the economic challenges of entrenched corruption, a 
sluggishly bureaucratic state, and poor infrastructure. Brazil, like Russia, could prove unable 
to move beyond a resource export-based economy. And further BRIC convergence in 
general may require the additional global liquidity that only full renminbi 
internationalisation may be able to provide – yet it is far from clear that China has the 
resolve to implement the reforms that that would require. If the BRICs’ rise does indeed 
stop or reverse, then many of this evidence submission’s arguments regarding the security 
consequences of the return of multipolarity would require revisiting. This all said, however, 
while a stalling of the BRICs’ rise would be good for Western states’ relative power position, 
a China or Russia facing a domestic political crisis as a consequence of their government 
models’ inability to channel popular discontent over an economic crisis might be an even 
more dangerous proposition, if they resorted to nationalist belligerence to shore-up 
domestic control. Turning away from the BRICs to look beyond state-based threats, if it 
became known that terrorists had secured a nuclear weapon, then the prioritisation of 
state-based threats advocated here would require reappraisal, since a non-state actor 
would have attained state-like levels of destructive capability – although this is still not to 
say that the terrorist threat should represent the sole focus of security strategy, that 
terrorists cannot be deterred, or that state-based threats could then be justifiably 
neglected.  
 
55. In terms of internal developments, the UK could pursue self-defeating policies that 
weaken its strategic position. First, if we vote to leave the EU, the most important barrier – 
British resistance – to further political union and eventual federalisation of the remaining EU 
states would be removed. This would at a stroke create a German-dominated superpower in 
the centre of Europe, the wishes of which the UK would have no choice but to comply with: 
having spent centuries intervening militarily in Continental Europe in order to prevent the 
regional dominance of any one great power that could then dictate political and economic 
terms Britain, leaving the EU would pave the way for just such an outcome. On the positive 
side, Britain would not then be the principal power seeking to balance Russian aggression – 
but on the down side, the UK would no longer be a meaningfully independent actor in its 
home region. Second, if the UK is unable to achieve a constitutional settlement vis-à-vis its 
constituent nations that adequately assuages Scottish nationalism and we see a re-run of 
2014’s referendum in another ten years, the subsequent break-up of the Union would leave 
Britain a diminished international actor, both strategically and symbolically. Third, if income 
inequality continues to rise, Britain’s ability to operate as a coherent political-military actor 
may be fundamentally undermined; that is, if the small fraction of the population that 
controls the bulk of the country’s wealth has divergent interests from the vast majority of 
the people who occupy it and may be expected to fight for it. Fourth, and in a similar vein, if 
government policy becomes sufficiently ‘captured’ by external interests, a similar inability to 
act as an independent, cohesive political-military actor may be a consequence; the 
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inadvertently photographed Cabinet Office memo of early 2014 suggesting that Britain 
should adopt a light-touch response to the Ukraine crisis because of the importance of 
Russian financial interests to the City of London was particularly disturbing in this regard. 
Fifth, of course, Britain could weaken itself via further ill-fated and strategically irrelevant 
wars in the mould of the Iraq and Afghan campaigns; while the question of a UK security 
rationale for taking limited aerial and naval steps to reverse ISIL’s territorial gains may be a 
moot point, therefore, it is nonetheless crucial that the likely mission-creep of deepening 
ground involvement is resisted firmly – and that great reticence is showed over future such 
embroilments.  
 
Conclusion 
 
56. This evidence submission has made the case that multipolar great power 
competition is returning to the international system, and that – given its dangers – it should 
represent the highest concern of the 2015 NSS. At the very least, the danger posed by 
potentially hostile major states should receive more recognition that it did in the 2010 
NSS. Thinking in terms of this return of great power competition in turn provides a 
framework for evaluating policy choices in areas as diverse as nuclear deterrence, 
humanitarian intervention, cyber and climate conflict, and alliance politics, which will thus 
enable the NSS to effectively influence the concrete policy and spending choices of the 
SDSR. As such, while the world is dangerous, and while UK defence and security spending is 
likely to remain as constrained in 2015 as it has ever Britain’s modern history, there are 
some useful grounds for prioritisation. Encouragingly, moreover, in terms of our longer term 
economic outlook, our existing military expertise and technological sophistication, and the 
fact that a degree of balance has thus far been retained in our armed forces, meeting this 
priority – while challenging – should nonetheless prove possible. 
 
*   *   * 
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Disclaimer: As noted in the biography above, the author is an officer in the Royal Naval 
Reserve, alongside his primary role as a university-based international relations scholar. He 
stresses, however, that this evidence submission is based on work completed in his civilian 
academic capacity; it has not received input from – and does not reflect the official views 
of – the Royal Navy or the Ministry of Defence. He is also obviously unable to comment on 
the specifics of Royal Navy operations in an unclassified forum. These remarks should 
therefore be treated as taking a balanced view of national security ‘in the round’, based on 
the author’s scholarly assessment of contemporary threats and priorities, notwithstanding 
his allocation of a substantial proportion of his spare time to a reserve service commitment 
and an associated base level of military professional knowledge. 
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Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy 
 
1a;   What has happened to the Electricity Industry, since privatisation, has not been 
conducive to having a secure, efficient, and coordinated organisation. In the process we lost 
our manufacturing, coal, and nuclear industries. 
 
1b:  Government put in place a Regulator that was only as good as its remit. 
What was considered as a Utility item, was now treated as a commodity, and put in the 
hands of Traders. 
 
1c:    The Generators were further broken up, while the Area Distribution Boards were sold 
off, all now, mostly, in the hands of foreign investors. The main priority for the Companies is 
to be profitable, and part of the Regulators remit is to ensure this.  
 
1d:  Capital investment in new gas, wind, and solar plant, paid for by customers, was the 
order of the day. It was not profitable to maintain older Power Stations on standby, to 
maintain the CEGB’s 30% Headroom capacity. This has now eroded to circa. 5%. Security of 
supply should have been part of some bodies remit. 
 
1e:  We have been made dependent on coal from Russia, and wood chips from America, for 
much of our electricity. Much of our gas is imported, and we have little storage capacity. 
One giant seaborne tanker carries enough gas for just two days. 
 
1f:   We are coal rich, and have exploited less than 10% of it. 
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1g:  DECC’s preoccupation with CO2 is costing us dear, making our energy costs 
uncompetitive, and will drive out existing, and emerging industries, to countries that have 
not been so single minded. 
 
1h:  I append my observations, for your information, regarding pollution of our atmosphere. 
DECC have refused to even consider the implications. 
 
1i:  Do we fit, so called, carbon capture, and moisture traps, to all aeroplanes? Or do we 
continue to blame pollution on coal, and gas, fired Power Stations. 
 
Cabinet Office – written evidence 
 
The Government has previously promised to consult the Committee on its plans for the 
next National Security Strategy. Members are concerned at the short time left available 
for this consultation; can you tell us when this consultation will take place, and what 
aspects of the next NSS you expect to consult on? 
Although work is at an early stage, the in-confidence briefing on the NSRA arranged for 16 
March may provide an opportunity to brief the Committee on contextual analysis being 
prepared by the FCO and the Home Office. It will also be an opportunity to consult the 
Committee on its views on the central issues which need to be addressed in a post-election 
National Security Strategy and SDSR.  
The Committee is aware that after the General Election there may be pressure to 
complete the next National Security Strategy quickly. What measures are being taken now 
to either gather expert opinion from outside Government, or to enable it to be gathered 
quickly after the Election?   
Decisions on the nature and scope of expert consultation for the next National Security 
Strategy will be for the next government to take. We would expect to offer the incoming 
government options on consultation and would welcome the Committee’s views on what 
these might cover. Options might, for example, include whether or not to select an 
independent, specialist expert advisory group and/or a number of flexible, issue-dependent 
or sector-specific groups co-ordinated by departments; regular in-confidence consultation 
of expert Select Committees; engagement with multilateral and bilateral partners; and 
wider consultative processes such as through release of a Green Paper for consultation.  
The Committee has asked before for the names of specific experts and institutions 
advising the National Security Council.  Could you please give us these details in relation 
to the meetings of the NSC in 2014? 
The National Security Council receives advice and assessments from Departments, the Joint 
Terrorism Analysis Centre and the Joint Intelligence Committee. Departments draw directly 
and indirectly on work conducted in partnership with organisations outside Government, 
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including the private sector, think-tanks, academia and international organisations. The NSC 
is also exposed directly to non-governmental experts through seminars; and, as a matter of 
course, Ministers consult a wide range of experts in their preparations for the NSC.  
For example, on conflict-prevention policy, a range of expert NGOs is invited to provide an 
independent view and challenge the Government’s performance on a confidential basis: 
organisations are selected on the basis of their expertise concerning the country under 
discussion and their understanding of the Government’s conflict prevention activity. On 
defence and security policy themes in the context of the 2014 NATO Summit, a National 
Security Experts Group consisting of representatives from think-tanks and academia 
provided advice to the National Security Adviser.  
In addition, each risk in the National Security Risk Assessment is owned by the Department 
or agency best placed to coordinate evidence and expertise relating to it. These risk owners 
are encouraged to consult a wide-range of experts, including those external to Government 
where feasible given both sensitivities and security clearances. Examples include:  
 
 the Natural Hazard Partnership, comprising a consortium of 17 public bodies;  
 
 the Space Environment Impacts Expert Group, consisting of a number of UK 
scientists and engineers; and  
 
 a virtual group of volcanic hazards experts from academia, along with the 
British Geological Survey and the Met Office.    
 
How often does the National Security Council (Officials) meeting convene? Is this tied 
to the NSC meeting or does it also meet at other times? The Committee would find it 
most useful to receive NSC(O) agendas as well as the NSC agendas.    
  
The Officials’ group of the National Security Council (NSC(O)) meets at least weekly, to 
prepare the NSC the following week, and sometimes for senior level discussions on strategic 
policy issues, after which the Chairman submits conclusions to the Prime Minister and other 
members of the NSC.   
NSC(O) meetings allow for strategic priorities to be set, enable closer alignment between 
strategic policy-making and the work of the Joint Intelligence Committee, and seek to 
achieve agreement on issues which do not, at that stage, require Ministerial attention. 
NSC(O) also allows officials to seek to resolve disputes or differences of perspective 
between Departments before these are put before the NSC itself.  
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1. The Campaign Against Arms Trade (CAAT) in the UK is working to end the 
international arms trade. This has a devastating impact on human rights and security, 
and damages economic development. CAAT believes that large scale military 
procurement and arms exports only reinforce a militaristic approach to international 
problems.  
 
2. CAAT is pleased that the Joint Committee is to look at the issues raised as the new 
National Security Strategy (NSS) is developed, inviting views from the public. As 
security is an issue which affects everyone, every effort should be made to make the 
process as open as possible with Committee hearings held in public and documents 
published. 
 
3. Discussion of UK national security is handicapped by the considerable degree of 
homogeneity between the leaders of the three main UK political parties. Narrowly 
focussed, they all support the armed forces, nuclear weapons and the arms 
companies. This consensus is exacerbated by the media, particularly the broadcast 
media, which sees balance largely in party political terms. This makes it difficult to 
challenge the "establishment" view. 
 
4. A further impediment to useful discussion is the conflation of "security" with 
"Defence". This predisposes thinking towards military responses and can pigeon-hole 
the subject within the Ministry of Defence and the Defence teams of political parties, 
even when it is being argued that security is a much broader issue than this. Any 
actions that the Joint Committee can take to encourage public, political and media 
discussion on security issues, particularly from a broader perspective, would be 
welcome. 
 
How broadly should the NSS define national security? 
5. As was the case in 2010, the NSS should look at all kinds of threats to UK security, not 
only those which are military. The 2015 NSS should go further and also examine the 
deeper roots underlying these threats, and consider what contributes to and 
exacerbates them.  
 
6. Climate change, unequal trade policies and authoritarian rule are just some examples 
of the causes of insecurity. The NSS should contain a full examination of them and 
how they feed into each other, compounding the problems. 
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What should be the UK's national security priorities for the next twenty years, and how 
should these steer the next NSS 
7. Tackling these problems, the underlying causes of insecurity, over the next twenty 
years should mean a shift in focus right across Government. Human rights, tackling 
climate change and global development need to be consistently at the centre of 
policy; human needs must take priority over commercial concerns. 
 
8. A major component to the UK's security policy should be a commitment not to make 
the underlying threats worse. Overseas military interventions should be removed as a 
policy option. The UK government's continued support for arms exports is a major 
factor in the general cynicism about UK foreign policy. Successive UK governments 
have called for universal human rights, but this has been totally undermined by their 
commitment to promoting arms sales.   
 
9. The UK government has had an arms sales agency since 1966. In this time weapons 
have been promoted and sold to many human rights violators and countries involved 
in conflict. These include Pinochet's Chile, Galtieri's Argentina, Saddam's Iraq and 
Gadaffi's Libya and continue today with sales to repressive and authoritarian leaders 
such as those in Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates. With the arms 
goes a message of UK support and international credibility for oppressors. 
 
10. Saudi Arabia is the largest customer for UK arms, giving it huge power to mute any UK 
criticism of it policies. Although it may say it wants democracy or to end corruption, 
the UK governments have continued to act as the sales department for BAE Systems 
and the other arms companies. If the UK wants to wants to be seen as a power of 
good in the world it needs to stop prioritising arms sales. It should switch from 
helping despotic regimes remain in power to supporting those struggling for 
democracy and human rights. The consequences for improved UK security will be 
immense. 
 
11. One particular cause of injustice urgently needs tackling as part of a strategy for UK 
and global security. Jewish people were treated appallingly for millennia in Europe. 
This history should not, however, mean that the state of Israel, set up in response to 
this, should be allowed to flout United Nations' resolutions and international law 
while the UK and the West do nothing. In July and August 2014, while television 
screens and social media showed horrific deaths and injuries and smashed 
infrastructure in Gaza, the UK government did not even impose an arms embargo or 
sever its military links with Israel. Such inaction in the face of catastrophe was 
inexcusable.  
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Should the UK plan to maintain its global influence? Should we aim for a national 
consensus on the UK's future place in the world? 
12. The maintenance of UK global influence seems to have become, as illustrated by 
some of the discussion about Scottish independence, conflated with military might, 
the possession of nuclear weapons and a permanent seat on the UN Security Council. 
This is a negative definition of UK influence that appears steeped in the primacy of 
hard power. Military intervention, arms sales and armed forces collaboration by the 
UK can also leave many of it citizens feeling ashamed. 
 
13. There are plenty of ways the UK could, and does, already have a positive influence, 
not least because the English language has become the global one. Music, theatre, 
scientific invention, sport and the example of the National Health Service are all 
illustrations of this. Another beneficial role the UK might consider is becoming a 
leader in the development and promotion of renewable energy and low carbon 
technologies. 
 
14. It is also vital that the UK be seen to consistently encourage democratic participation 
and uphold the rule of law in the UK and overseas. Those who flee injustice to the UK 
should be treated with respect. 
 
How can the next NSS be made most useful in guiding decisions in Government and long-
term spending decisions? 
15. The 2010 NSS identified fifteen major threats to UK security. Only two of these 
involved a military attack by another state on the UK and just three more had any 
military component at all. The others were non-military such as cyber attack and 
terrorism, as well as energy security and natural disasters, including flooding.  
 
16. The allocation of resources since 2010 has not matched the identified threats. 
Instead, the status quo has prevailed, suiting the armed forces and arms companies. 
They have successfully argued for military spending of 2% of Gross Domestic Product, 
meaning that the UK has the world's 6th largest military budget without any 
explanation as to how such spending enhances security. Inside that budget, 
equipment costs have been prioritised over personnel showing the influence of arms 
company lobbying. 
 
17. To tackle the underlying causes of insecurity, vested interests need to consciously be 
set to one side. As well as ending tax-payer support for the arms trade, UK military 
spending should be reduced. Resources should, for example, be shifted from 
developing new nuclear-armed submarines, or building and operating new aircraft 
carriers, towards environmental work to minimise flood risks or greater support for 
renewable energy development. 
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18. Many of those employed in the arms industry are skilled engineers, and there is a 
generally acknowledged shortage of these. Sectors that could benefit from these skills 
include renewable energy and low carbon technologies. The public funds which 
support the arms trade should be redirected to investment in renewable energy and 
low carbon technologies. Since energy security and climate change are acknowledged 
threats it would seem to be a win-win situation to use the skills of current arms 
industry workers as well as those seeking employment to address this.  
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National Security Strategy 2010 
1. The 2010 National Security Strategy (NSS) officially classified the Trident nuclear 
weapons system as falling outside the top rank of security concerns faced by the UK 
and yet this assessment has had no impact on subsequent government policy. The 
2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review and the 2013 Trident Alternatives 
Review both failed to consider disarming Britain’s nuclear weapons, even though the 
government accepts that ‘no state currently has the combination of capability and 
intent needed to pose a conventional military threat to the territorial integrity of the 
UK’24. 
2. The failure of the government to address the conclusions of the 2010 NSS in strategic 
policy making poses serious concerns. To overcome this gap in strategic thinking, the 
government should pledge to base the next Strategic Defence and Security Review 
on the findings of the next NSS and sequence the research, analysis and publication 
of these documents accordingly. It should be noted that the Liberal Democrats 
passed an emergency motion to include Trident in the Strategic Defence and Security 
Review at their annual conference in 2010. Labour agreed at their 2014 conference 
to include nuclear weapons as part of the next National Security Strategy. The House 
of Commons Defence Committee has also stated that ‘NSS 2015 will need to identify 
which threats Trident will be expected to deter’.25 
 
                                                          
24 ‘Securing Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The Strategic Defence and Security Review (point 3.32) 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/62482/strategic-defence-
security-review.pdf 
25 ‘Deterrence in the twenty–first century’, House of Commons Defence Committee, 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201314/cmselect/cmdfence/1066/1066.pdf 
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International Context 
3. The world faces huge challenges. Hundreds of thousands of people are being 
displaced due to climate change and conflict. The battle for dwindling resources and 
displacement due to environmental changes poses the greatest security risk for the 
international community today.  The United Nations Refugee Agency estimates there 
will be over 25 million climate change refugees by 2050.26 The changing climate 
affected Britain in 2014, with the government having to announce £540 million 
worth of spending to deal with the homes and livelihoods ruined.27 
4. States, including the United Kingdom, are also dealing with a fast evolving political 
landscape. Twenty five years after the end of the Cold War, characterised by two 
sides threatening each other with mutual destruction, we now live in a multi-polar 
world where many states – both nuclear-armed and nuclear-free – have complex 
relationships. As with much of the Western world, the UK’s political and economic 
influence is declining, affecting its traditional relationships. The United States has 
declared a rebalancing of its foreign policy to concentrate more on Asia, shifting the 
country’s geo-strategic focus from the Europe-centred Cold War past to the new 
realities of power across the world.   
5. The increasing conflict in the Middle East poses continued problems for the region 
and the wider world. Britain’s involvement in the 2003 Iraq war, and the war on and 
occupation of Afghanistan, together with a century of western economic, political 
and military intervention, have undoubtedly contributed to the destabilisation of the 
region and the rise of terrorist groups such as Islamic State and Al-Qaeda – 
previously non-existent in Iraq - which may pose threats on British soil as well as 
resulting in great dangers for the people of the Middle East.  
6. The recent Ebola outbreak in West Africa is the biggest ever known, with the US 
Centres for Disease Control predicting there will be 1.4 million cases by late January 
2015. As well as causing thousands of deaths, this outbreak is having a severe impact 
on already fragile healthcare systems and the wider economy in many countries. 
7. There is considerable insecurity in the world at the moment, but the risk of state on 
state nuclear warfare is not one of the main dangers. The British government 
acknowledged this changing political climate in its previous National Security 
Strategy, published in autumn 2010. Whilst identifying the same range of twenty-
first century threats just described, the NSS downgrades the risk of state on state 
nuclear warfare to a tier two threat. This analysis should have forced the 
                                                          
26 ‘The State of the World’s Refugees’, The UN Refugee Agency, http://www.unhcr.org/publications/24-
chapter-7-displacement-climate-change-and-natural-disasters.html#more-24 
27 ‘UK floods 2014: government response and recovery’ https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-floods-
2014-government-response 
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government to challenge the level of spending allocated to a Cold War nuclear 
weapons system. 
 
Britain’s Approach 
8. Instead, there is a disconnect between the government’s analysis and its actual 
policies. Nuclear weapons were developed specifically in the Cold War context: to be 
able to win an actual nuclear war against a hostile, massively armed state. Despite 
the Cold War coming to an end, with the Soviet Union dissolving in 1991, the UK 
went ahead with acquiring Trident which was launched in the mid 1990s with the 
last submarine entering service in 2001. 
9. The UK Parliament voted in 2007 to begin preparatory work on a new nuclear 
weapons system, to replace the current system as it wears out between 2025 and 
2030. A final vote on whether to go ahead with the system is expected in 2016. This 
new system will cost at least £100 billion over its lifetime. 
10. If the UK envisages at least another 50 years of British security being based on 
threatening other populations with mass destruction then we will encourage other 
states to do the same and thus paradoxically we increase our security risk rather 
than decrease it. The Labour Party has committed to including nuclear weapons in a 
post-election Strategic Defence and Security Review should they be in government. 
A serious review of the usefulness of nuclear weapons in dealing with today’s 
problems will conclude that they do not protect us from any real security issues. 
 
Required Policies 
11. Nuclear weapons cannot have a role to play in responding to the actual threats we 
face today. Principally, we already know from the terrible attacks in New York in 
2001 and London in 2005 that possession of nuclear weapons by a nuclear weapon 
state does not dissuade terrorists. In addition, terrorists could never present any 
accurately located target for such a weapon of indiscriminate devastation. It is 
obvious that nuclear weapons will not protect us from environmental changes such 
as floods or drought. Similarly, cyber-attackers will not be deterred by Britain 
possessing nuclear arms.  
12. In fact, the opposite is true. Instead of spending at least £100 billion on a new 
nuclear weapons system, resources should be invested in addressing the real threats 
we face. At a time when the armed forces – along with wider society – are facing 
severe budgetary cuts, it seems inconceivable that a third of the Ministry of 
Defence’s procurement budget should be spent on a strategically useless weapon. 
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Not surprisingly, military sources have questioned whether this money would be 
better spend on meeting other, more pressing and relevant military needs. Field 
Marshal Lord Bramall, General Lord Ramsbotham, General Sir Hugh Beach, and 
Major General Patrick Cordingley – four former senior military commanders – have 
written in The Times that ‘replacing Trident will be one of the most expensive 
weapons programmes this country has seen. Going ahead will clearly have long-term 
consequences for the military and the defence equipment budget that need to be 
carefully examined’. They pointed out that ‘this decision will have a direct impact on 
our overstretched Armed Forces’, and that ‘it may well be that money spent on new 
nuclear weapons will be money that is not available to support our frontline troops, 
or for crucial counterterrorism work; money not available for buying helicopters, 
armoured vehicles, frigates or even paying for more manpower’.28 
13. The cases of Iran and North Korea and their actual or potential nuclear proliferation 
are of significance to Britain’s military strategy. Both countries were included in the 
United States’ ‘Axis of Evil’ and in the light of the US-led war on Iraq (the third 
country in the so-called Axis) not surprisingly had concerns for their security. The 
response of North Korea was a very clear indication of how proliferation can be 
provoked: it withdrew from the NPT, saying that it had a deterrent need to develop 
nuclear weapons. There are many observers who take the view that Iran might well 
note the double standards of the West with regard to nuclear weapons. Remaining 
nuclear-armed for at least another half century and by example encouraging other 
states to take the nuclear road, will ensure that we face those very threats in 
decades to come that we least want to see. 
14. The most effective strategy to guarantee Britain’s security is to work towards nuclear 
disarmament, rather than pursuing a path which is certain to contribute to 
proliferation. Britain’s future security will be best provided for by pursuing global 
disarmament initiatives in tandem with the decision not to replace Trident. The 
decision on whether or not to replace Britain’s nuclear weapons system must be 
taken on the basis of what will most contribute to the security of the British people. 
A decision not to replace Trident will best meet that requirement. It will strengthen 
the international disarmament and non-proliferation regime by ensuring Britain’s 
compliance with its international treaty obligations; it will deter nuclear proliferation 
and de-escalate current global and regional tensions; and it will release significant 
financial resources to meet a range of public spending priorities, including meeting 
the new security challenges of the twenty-first century.  
                                                          
28 ‘Money spent on Trident can’t go on troops’. Field Marshal Lord Bramall, General Lord Ramsbotham, 
General Sir Beach, and Major General Patrick Cordingley. The Times, 21 April 2010: 
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/comment/columnists/guest_contributors/article7103196.ece 
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15. Future threats should not be dealt with by buying a new nuclear weapons system. 
Pursuing diplomatic negotiations with, rather than an attack on, Syria has resulted in 
President al-Assad’s government agreeing to join the Chemical Weapons Convention 
and eliminate their entire stockpile of chemical weapons. A new, more positive, era 
in United States-Iran relations could be about to begin, not as a result of military 
attack but because of sanctions and negotiation. The government should take note 
of these developments. 
16. The decision not to replace Trident will help shape the type of world we will face in 
decades to come. Active support for disarmament and non-proliferation will help 
prevent a new nuclear arms race and increased proliferation. Choosing to replace 
Trident will ensure that we will face the nuclear threats in the future that we most 
wish to avoid. The choice we face today is clear: nuclear disarmament or nuclear 
proliferation and war. A bold initiative by our government not to replace Trident, 
together with strong promotion of multilateral initiatives, can help reshape the 
global security context and ensure a future free from the threat of nuclear 
annihilation. 
17. The government’s next National Security Strategy should acknowledge the futility of 
committing vast resources on a nuclear weapons system which will not guarantee 
the security of the British people. It should instead seek to address the real 
challenges we face today, as outlined in the 2010 National Security Strategy. 
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1. Conciliation Resources welcomes the call for evidence by the Joint Committee on the 
National Security Strategy (JCNSS) to inform the next phase of its work on a new 
National Security Strategy, to be published in 2015.  
 
2. This submission puts forward two arguments: that (1) The basis of a national security 
strategy should be founded on an informed understanding of how the British people 
themselves perceive local-to-international security, and their vision, views and 
priorities for Britain in a safer world; and that, (2) As the policies and approaches the 
UK Government deploys in responding to conflicts around the world have both direct 
and indirect impact on national security, there needs to be a paradigm shift in the 
Government’s priorities and approach. Multiple capabilities and strategies are needed 
to engage with today’s complex conflict and peacebuilding challenges.   
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3. Our submission builds on our experience as an international peacebuilding 
organisation supporting people through dialogue and mediation in conflict-affected 
contexts for over 20 years.29 Conciliation Resources understands well the root causes 
and drivers of conflict and insecurity in the areas where we work, and along with the 
wider peacebuilding sector, has built up knowledge through comparative learning of 
effective ways to respond. We are only too conscious of the potential for conflicts to 
spread across national boundaries, displacing communities, disrupting livelihoods and 
giving rise to new and violent conflicts – as well as of the consequences for regional 
and international security.  
 
4. We are also conscious of the UK’s role as an important economic and political player in 
global affairs, and as such one of myriad factors and actors influencing international, 
and therefore national security. The UK has a responsibility to uphold international 
norms and standards that put the lives of vulnerable people first and to explore 
smarter and more effective conflict-response strategies.  
 
Shift from state to human security 
 
5. In its call for submissions, the JCNSS asked how broadly the new National Security 
Strategy should define national security. Conciliation Resources would argue that 
national security should be measured not only by a state’s ability to resist external and 
internal threats, but also by the extent to which the basic needs and security concerns 
of its citizens are addressed.  
 
6. This people-centred ‘human security’ approach suggests that a more informed 
understanding is needed of the needs and views of people affected by conflict and 
insecurity (organised groups, communities and the wider public), including those of 
the wider British public.30 These views need to have their place in the new National 
Security Strategy.  Recent research suggests a significant gap between the UK 
Government’s priorities for and understanding of national security and those of the 
wider public.31 For example, economic uncertainty, social disorder and ‘Islamophobia’ 
represent a more pressing everyday source of insecurity for many than does terrorism.  
                                                          
29 To learn more about the work of Conciliation Resources, visit: www.c-r.org  
30 To note that a number of leading figures engaged in peacebuilding have called greater public dialogue on the 
nature of security within the UK, in order to ensure that the new National Security Strategy is an accurate 
reflection of the interests and concerns of those whose security it seeks to defend. See the Ammerdown 
Invitation: ‘Security for the future: In search of a new vision’, published online at opendemocracy.net: 
https://www.opendemocracy.net/opensecurity/ammerdown-invitation/security-for-future-in-search-of-new-vision 
31 Findings of survey by Universities of Exeter and Warwick as part of Economic and Social Research Council 
funded project looking at public attitudes towards security threats: 
http://www.exeter.ac.uk/news/featurednews/title_246995_en.html 
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7. A human security approach, based on people’s needs, participation and inclusion, 
should also be reflected in the Government’s external action in conflict-affected 
contexts. In our submissions to the Government’s Strategic Defence and Security 
Review (SDSR)32 and the 2010 Building Stability Overseas Strategy (BSOS)33, we called 
on the Government to support the development of peaceful and resilient societies 
abroad as a key component of the UK’s national security. The BSOS reflects this 
concern: ‘effective local politics and strong mechanisms…weave people into the fabric 
of decision-making’; ‘all sections of the population need to feel that they are part of 
the warp and weft of society’34. 
 
8. In the years since the publication of the last National Security Strategy, the link 
between poor state-society relations, unaccountable governance and the increased 
likelihood of instability and conflict has been confirmed in a number of important 
international policy frameworks and developments.35 They have highlighted that 
efforts aimed at bolstering the security of states and their borders fail to address the 
grievances and concerns of citizens. While the current National Security Strategy (NSS) 
heavily references the threat of terrorism emanating from fragile, ‘failed’ or ‘failing’ 
states, it only fleetingly discusses the social and demographic changes that fuel many 
citizens’ grievances in these states: such as poor infrastructure, political exclusion, 
unemployment and resource pressures.36  
 
9. Policies and practices which identify and respond to the security needs and 
perceptions of those most affected by conflict can help tackle the root causes of 
instability37 and ultimately contribute to the reduction of foreign threats. Violent 
extremism, both in the UK and abroad, is as likely to be rooted in a legacy of political 
and economic exclusion, past conflicts or the denial of human rights, as it is in zeal for 
a particular ideology or religion. This implies a need for greater coherence between 
the UK’s counter-terrorist and conflict prevention policies.   
                                                          
32 http://www.c-r.org/resources/submission-uk-strategic-defence-and-security-review-peaceful-and-resilient-
societies 
33 http://www.c-r.org/resources/reflections-and-recommendations-uk%E2%80%99s-building-stability-overseas-
strategy 
34 p12, HMG Building Stability Overseas Strategy: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/32960/bsos-july-11.pdf 
35 Inter alia: the World Bank World Development Report 2011: Conflict, Security, and Development 
(http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTDEC/EXTRESEARCH/EXTWDRS/0,,contentMDK:23252415
~pagePK:478093~piPK:477627~theSitePK:477624,00.html); The High Level Panel on the Post-2015 
Development Agenda report: ‘A New Global Partnership: Eradicate Poverty and Transform Economies through 
Sustainable Development’ (http://www.post2015hlp.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/UN-Report.pdf); The New 
Deal for Engagement in Fragile States (http://www.newdeal4peace.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/01/new-deal-
for-engagement-in-fragile-states-en.pdf) 
36  p17, A Strong Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The National Security Strategy (2010) 
37  p32, ibid, National Security Task number 2 – ‘Tackle at root the causes of instability’ 
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Investing more and long-term in the full range of conflict prevention tools and capabilities  
 
10. The National Security Strategy identifies ‘shaping a stable world’ as one of its key 
strategic objectives, with an emphasis on the need both to ‘address trends that 
contribute to instability’ as well as to ‘focus on early identification and mitigation of 
risks’38. HMG has adopted a disappointingly narrow interpretation of this objective, 
investing too heavily in interventions that are limited to the containment of violence 
and short-term mitigation of consequences of conflict,39 such as military interventions 
or peacekeeping missions. These actions are of limited long-term value to UK national 
security if they do not help to help people to resolve the structural drivers of conflict 
that cause violent actors to appear, and reappear, in fragile states.  
  
11. We question whether a reliance on such costly and resource-heavy interventions is 
appropriate, effective and sustainable given on-going spending cuts to military 
capabilities, as noted by the JCNSS40. The new National Security Strategy must put 
forward a smarter approach that reduces the UK’s reliance on crisis management 
interventions and humanely and sustainably addresses sources of insecurity. It is time 
to give shift the emphasis from ‘shaping’ or ‘building’, to ‘supporting’ and ‘enabling’ 
positive processes of change. 
 
12. During its August 2014 presidency of the UN Security Council, the UK initiated an 
important debate on conflict prevention,41 which recognised that conflict prevention 
tools, such as negotiation, mediation and conciliation, had not been fully utilised by 
the Council. The British Ambassador to the UN, Mark Lyall Grant, told the debate that 
the Council ‘must stop acting only in crisis mode’ and ‘switch from a mindset of 
reaction to prevention’.42 If the UK is to make this switch itself, then it must bolster its 
soft power assets and work more effectively with competent multilateral, bilateral and 
non-governmental partners43; develop its competencies in mediation and conciliation 
and alliance building; and value and develop the art of support to locally and 
nationally led and owned (and internationally supported) peace processes. It must 
                                                          
38 p21, ibid 
39 p29, ibid 
40 p14, Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy: The Work of the Committee on the National Security 
Strategy in 2013-2014 – First Report of Session 2013-2014: 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/jt201314/jtselect/jtnatsec/169/169.pdf 
41 Security Council 7247th Meeting, 21 August 2014 (SC/11528): 
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2014/sc11528.doc.htm 
42 Security Council 7247th Meeting, 21 August 2014 (SC/11528): 
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2014/sc11528.doc.htm 
43 The UK has an exceptionally developed and able sector, which includes organisations such as Saferworld, 
Conciliation Resources, International Alert, Inter Mediate, Peace Direct, Cord, Concordis and many others.  
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develop strategies to use these to good effect in regions where threats to UK national 
security can evolve. 
 
13. Such a shift would require the UK Government to make greater investment in a long-
term, preventative approach and capabilities44 that prioritise consultation, dialogue, 
understanding and analysis in order to identify and address structural drivers of 
insecurity. This investment should not lapse at the term of political office; as such it 
means a more sustained and cross-party commitment to effective conflict prevention. 
The Government’s intention, as expressed in its Building Stability Overseas Strategy 
(BSOS), to invest in upstream prevention45 as a key pillar of its strategic response to 
instability and conflict should be strengthened and prioritised under the forthcoming 
Conflict, Security and Stability Fund (CSSF).46 Oversight of the CSSF by the National 
Security Council is an opportunity to ensure that all elements of UK external 
engagement work holistically towards the same set of objectives underpinned by 
BSOS’ vision and priorities.  
  
A commitment to support and promote local ownership and agency in peace processes  
 
14. Our peacebuilding experience, as well as recognised good practice, tells us that 
sustainable political settlements ultimately come from or are owned by actors and 
initiatives within conflict-affected societies. Local ownership of solutions, as well as 
some of the compromises in achieving peace, is essential to the popular legitimacy of 
a peace process and ensuing political settlement. Legitimate peace processes, which 
are broadly inclusive of society and recognise multiple sources of authority, can 
provide a solid platform for states to navigate a path away from instability.47 
 
15. There are therefore inherent limits to our, and that of the UK Government, ability and 
responsibility to ‘build’ stability and peace abroad. Yet there is much that the UK can 
do to support, accompany, promote, and enable locally driven peace processes and 
initiatives. Developing good practice, investing in expertise and strategies, and placing 
mediation and peacebuilding on a higher footing in relation to security and military 
                                                          
44 Specifically capabilities for conflict resolution and peace process support that address the challenges of 
engaging with people, groups and difficult to reach non-state actors. These are capabilities within Whitehall, at 
the EU and UN, but also part of the expertise of UK charities.   
45 p12, HMG Building Stability Overseas Strategy: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/32960/bsos-july-11.pdf: ‘helping to 
build strong, legitimate institutions and robust societies in fragile countries that are capable of managing tensions 
and shocks so that there is a lower likelihood of instability and conflict’ 
46 See briefing paper by Conciliation Resources, International Alert and Saferworld, Sep. 2014, on the 
forthcoming Conflict, Stability and Security Fund: http://www.c-r.org/resources/investing-long-term-peace-new-
conflict-stability-and-security-fund 
47 See, for example, Conciliation Resources publication ‘Legitimacy and peace processes: from coercion to 
consent’, 2014 http://www.c-r.org/accord-project/legitimacy-and-peace-processes 
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responses in the toolkit of responses to conflict, would be an economic, people-
centred and politically effective way to enhance national security. Furthermore, 
finding ways to forge new and collaborative partnerships, which will have collective 
impact on complex conflict systems, is a key challenge for the 21st century.  
 
16. Finally, the NSS argues that, in order to respond to risks before they develop into 
crises, ‘our diplomats must thoroughly understand the local situation on the ground so 
that they can influence it’.48 People living in the midst of conflict often have the best 
understanding of local conflict dynamics, and are therefore best placed, with external 
support where needed, to drive forward non-violent initiatives that address 
grievances, strengthen societal resilience and build political participation and 
inclusion. What they often lack is the space to explore this collectively, to 
communicate their perspectives to decision-makers, and to discover their agency over 
the situation affecting them. The UK Government should draw on this wealth of 
insight and peacebuilding potential in these state-society relationships, so often 
mediated by UK charities and other organisations, through consultation and dialogue 
with representatives of those most affected by conflict. 
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Executive Summary: 
 
• Economic constraints will not preclude attempts to maintain global influence, but 
this does not necessarily mean such attempts are “unrealistic”; 
• The current climate will create an increase in covert action and special operations as 
a means to plug the gap between capability and perceived responsibilities;  
• Such activity is an important part of a government’s arsenal but is also risky; 
• It must not be treated as a “silver bullet” to bypass costs and maintain global 
influence. 
 
 
1. The UK will plan to maintain its global influence. The question, as acknowledged by 
JCNSS, is whether this is realistic given political, strategic, and particularly economic 
constraints. The problem, however, is far from new. Britain has been in relative and steady 
decline since the end of the Second World (at the very latest). Nonetheless, successive 
governments have continually sought to maintain the global role. This has created a gap 
between capabilities on the one hand and perceived responsibilities or policy goals on the 
other. This gap must be addressed by the NSS. 
                                                          
48 Foreword, A Strong Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The National Security Strategy (2010) 
49 Dr Rory Cormac is an Assistant Professor of International Relations. His research specialises in British 
approaches to covert operations since 1945. 
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2. Faced with such a paradox, successive governments (of both colours) have often 
turned to unorthodox measures to plug the gap. In such circumstances, event-shaping 
action from intelligence and Special Forces becomes increasingly appealing. Examination of 
the declassified historical record offers voluminous examples of governments resorting to 
covert action – a state’s intervention in the affairs of another in a plausibly deniable manner 
– and Special Forces in these circumstances. 
 
3. Conditions are ripe for use of such measures in 2015. Firstly, the climate of ongoing 
austerity combined with British pretensions as a global power creates such a framework. 
Indeed, the 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review placed a premium on the role of 
Special Forces and intelligence. Secondly, the National Security Council machinery 
institutionalises regular contact between senior policymakers and the intelligence chiefs, 
again creating a framework conducive to such activity. Thirdly, counter-terrorism 
necessitates the use of Special Forces and a more “active” role for the intelligence 
community. And counter-terrorism will undoubtedly remain both a core priority and a 
forum in which Britain will seek to maintain a global role. A combination of these three 
factors will likely lead to an increase in covert action. 
 
4. Numerous examples have come to light of Britain’s use of SIS and Special Forces 
since 2010. Firstly, SIS and Special Forces were involved in Libya – including both a bungled 
and later more successful operation. Secondly, the SIS website clearly acknowledges the 
agency’s role in detecting and disrupting terrorist threats overseas. Thirdly, in 2012, the 
Chief of SIS acknowledged that British covert operations had disrupted the Iranian nuclear 
programme. Fourthly, in 2013, the Defence Secretary announced a British dedicated 
capability to counter-attack in cyber-space. Fifthly, in 2014 documents stolen by Edward 
Snowden demonstrated GCHQ moving into the realm of cyber covert action. Increasingly 
sophisticated online operations have targeted Iran, Serious and Organised Crime, as well as 
terrorist and insurgent groups. It can be assumed many other operations have rightly not 
come to light. 
 
5. Such activity is likely to be increasingly seen as a means of: a) projecting British 
influence; b) securing British interests; c) protecting British security, and; d) maintaining the 
global role. This is not necessarily a bad thing. It is important to move beyond the normative 
considerations usually clouding analysis. Covert action and use of Special Forces is, and will 
remain, a crucial part of a government’s arsenal.  
 
6. Given the risks involved however, it is important to critically consider the British 
approach. The British government should not undertake such activity as a “silver bullet” 
designed to bypass economic and political constraints in order to maintain global 
influence. 
 
7. The National Security Council machinery constitutes a somewhat horizontal 
approach to overseeing such activity. This has important benefits. Firstly, it ensures 
interdepartmental coordination, which is particularly important in an era of increased 
“jointery” between Special Forces and the intelligence services. Secondly, it ensures 
interdepartmental scrutiny. This is, of course, vital in considering potential consequences. 
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Committees have traditionally tempered more aggressive or ambitious proposals. Thirdly, it 
sets important guidelines and boundaries for the scope of such activity. This ensures policy 
coherence and avoids mission creep (something to which covert action has traditionally 
been prone as ministers develop personal attachment to the policy).  
 
8. The current machinery is not without drawbacks, however. Previous incarnations of 
a horizontal approach suffered from two problems. Firstly, committees could be somewhat 
cumbersome and unwieldy. They ground to gridlock. Secondly, they can bypass the 
traditional departmental policymaking channels and erode ministerial responsibility. When 
disconnected from overt policy, covert action has time and again led to damaging 
repercussions. Accordingly, British approaches to such activity since 1945 have fluctuated 
between horizontal and vertical bureaucratic approaches.  
 
9. In conclusion, economic constraints will not preclude attempts to maintain global 
influence. This does not necessarily mean such attempts are “unrealistic”. The current 
climate will merely create an increase in covert action and special operations as a means to 
plug the gap between capability and perceived responsibilities. As such, the government will 
likely continue to emphasise the role of intelligence and Special Forces. This pattern has 
happened throughout the recent past and we have already seen examples since 2010. Such 
activity is an important part of a government’s arsenal. However, it is also risky. The NSS 
should therefore ensure that employment is adequately scrutinised, coordinated, and forms 
part of a coherent overarching policy. It must not be treated as a “silver bullet” to bypass 
costs and maintain global influence. 
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Investigating incoherence and weakness in the United Kingdom’s Defence & Security 
Strategies  
1. The Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy (JCNSS) calls for evidence to 
inform its next phase of work. It said this should cover energy security and domestic 
resilience, as well as foreign policy and defence, and criticised as unrealistic the 
Government’s stated policy expectation of no shrinkage in the UK’s international influence. 
This input is made by DefenceSynergia and uses the JCNSS questions (in bold) below to 
focus each response.   
 
2. The UK’s national security priorities: What should be the UK’s national security 
priorities for the next twenty years, and how should these steer the next NSS? 
 
3. DefenceSynergia (DS) would suggest that the JCNSS question above rather ignores 
the requirement for strategy to be articulated before setting the national security priorities. 
In saying this we support the following quote: “...nor is strategy – despite the beliefs of 
George Bush and Jack Straw to the contrary – a synonym for policy.” (Professor Sir Hew 
Strachan, page 27, 'On the Direction of War' Cambridge University Press, 2014)   
 
4. The question we ask is: does the UK have an articulated grand strategy and if so 
what is it and where is it published? The Prime Minister (PM) recently gave his view to the 
JCNSS and in so doing David Cameron said the following in an answer to Lord Waldegrave of 
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North Hill in respect of his understanding of the workings of national strategy: “To me, 
strategy is about setting out a very clear series of goals that you want to meet and then 
making sure that you have sensible means for achieving those goals. I do not have to look at 
a bit of paper to tell us what our strategy is: it is to restore Britain’s economic strength, it is 
to tie us to the fast growing parts of the world, it is to refresh and enhance the great 
alliances that we have, it is to tackle the threats that could threaten our country—and it is to 
make sure that we do this right across government and it is not just the Foreign Office 
fighting for us abroad but every single bit of government working together. That is the 
strategy...Of course in the NSC we discuss strategy, but I want us to determine policy, I want 
us to agree action, and I want us to check that we have done what we said we were going to 
do. To me, that is not misusing the NSC and making it too much about implementation 
rather than strategy; it is the right use.”  
 
5. This is an incredibly muddled statement to make, and a very dangerous and 
confusing stance for a Prime Minister to take. A defined - written - Strategy is an 
indispensable articulation of principles that drive the government. It is the focal point, the 
single point of reference, for all ministers, civil servants, and senior figures in our 
government departments, for determining their departmental plans and associated 
resourcing and budgeting that ensures ‘joined up government’. Moreover, having set the 
strategy, the government - the Cabinet - must have something against which to measure 
their implementation of the strategy using Specific, Measurable, Actionable, Relevant, 
Timely (SMART) and verifiable metrics and data. The risk of not having a Strategy is that the 
roads travelled will diverge and go down their own departmental silo priorities and focus, 
rather than meet at the destination to achieve a coherent and coordinated government 
effect. 
 
6. If the PM is confident that he has a formulated strategy, why should he feel it 
unnecessary to see it articulated? If the PM (like the JCNSS) expects to see “every single bit 
of government working together” all departments must surely have an unambiguous 
understanding of what the strategy is and that it is the highest level of direction for 
collective government policy? It is an odd governmental practice to expect departments of 
state formally to work on the basis of the minutes of past National Security Council (NSC) 
meetings and their interpretation of the PM’s strategic thoughts. Yet without further  
explanation from the PM this is certainly one worrying interpretation of his remarks. 
 
7. Equally, perhaps more worrying, is the PM's drift in logic where he appears to slip all 
too easily between strategy, policy and plans with little effort to explain how and where he 
believes they interrelate. Does the PM understand what strategy is, never mind whether he 
believes he has one? To which can be added; is the NSC the right place to set and 
implement policy when, by the PM's own admission later in his evidence, the NSC does not 
always have the time to discuss the overarching strategy? In any event we are still left with 
the question - how did the PM formulate his four strategic nodal points and are they really a 
national strategy? 
 
8. In order to understand why all this is important DS analysed the terms commonly 
used by the PM and others in this debate – typically, ways, means, ends, goals and policy - 
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and how they should relate to strategy. We concluded that usage and definition required 
ratification. 
 
9. Many talk of Ends, Ways and Means in relation to government foreign, defence and 
security policy and all are valid in their own way but when discussing strategy it is as well to 
understand the terms and their effect within the process. Therefore, DS believes that the 
terms Destination, Direction and Enablers are more apposite in describing the building 
blocks to grand strategy. Looked at in this way Destination is the key for establishing the 
highest level UK Grand Strategic goals to be attained; Direction defines the Policy; Enablers 
quantify the budget and resources to meet policy and achieve the Destination.  
 
10. The PM's verbally articulated strategic vision is “...to restore Britain’s economic 
strength...to tie us to the fast growing parts of the world...refresh and enhance the great 
alliances that we have...tackle the threats that could threaten our country...to do this right 
across government not just through the Foreign Office fighting for UK abroad but every 
single bit of government working together”. Therefore, these destinations (his strategic 
vision) must be supported by clearly articulated, pan-government coordinated and 
coherent, direction and adequately funded enablers (the policy actions) to achieve the 
destination. Not to do so relegates strategic vision from achievable to a mere wish list of 
worthy aspirations commanding low priority with no certainty they will be achieved.  
Possibly worse, be achieved and no one know it because there is no point of reference 
against which to measure success. 
 
11. The PM should not be shy of enshrining his vision (his strategic destination) as the 
highest level of government policy for all departments of state to chart their course (policy 
direction) and to which they must devote resources (policy enablers)? Otherwise his publicly 
stated view that “I do not have to look at a bit of paper to tell us what our strategy is” may 
set His ground rules but sends the wrong message, or allows him to veer and haul his 
‘strategy’ at a whim and without the ability to be held to account. Is it any wonder that the 
PM's other central message “every single bit of government working together” seems, 
particularly where the Treasury is concerned, to be honoured more in the breach than the 
observance. Therefore, articulate the strategy in the NSS and then set the pan-department 
security priorities (not just the Ministry of Defence) to achieve it. 
 
12. The UK’s place in the world: Should the UK plan to maintain its global influence? 
Should we aim for a national consensus on the UK’s future place in the world? 
 
13. The DS view is that UK global influence is a valuable but vulnerable asset. The UK's 
place in the world has been driven by history and active involvement in international affairs 
and UK foreign policy and defence doctrine have developed to match this legacy paradigm. 
DS believes that this paradigm is extant - as, apparently, does HMG - but that the prevailing 
financial position of the nation is being allowed to fudge strategic decisions. However, the 
UK, whilst cognisant of its history, mustn’t allow the past to restrictively constrain the 
future.   
 
14. The decades since the end of WWII have been characterised by the continuous 
engagement of successive British governments in international affairs whilst steadily 
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unlinking their foreign policy aspirations from the military enablers (hard power capability) 
required to match policy. Since 1991 and the collapse of the Warsaw Pact the trend towards 
taking a 'peace dividend' has gathered pace with a preference for diplomatic-soft-power 
solutions that, in a strategic vacuum, have led to open ended commitments, with no 
measurable end effect success, because political end game and hard-power enablers are 
under-funded and policy planning acumen is deficient.  
 
15. Over two decades Her Majesty's forces have conducted many foreign intervention 
operations: Iraq x 2 , Bosnia, Kosovo, Sierra Leone, Libya, Mali, and Afghanistan. If these 
operations have a common denominator it is difficult to accurately define except perhaps to 
somewhat lazily apply the term 'counter insurgency' (COIN) to the way most eventually 
panned out. Yet each operation differed in the way the UK became involved; why the UK 
became involved; the warning time frame; the expected and actual outcome; and under 
who's auspices UK intervened in the first place. There is often confusion between the initial 
and eventual reasons for intervention: national interest, United Nations Mandate, North 
Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), European Union, or ally request? Hence commitment 
to operations without strategic vision, an international political and diplomatic plan 
supporting combat intervention, joint international understanding and an agreed 
'measurable end game' have proved to be a recipe for mission creep, over extension, loss of 
public support, and unnecessary expense of lives and treasure. 
 
16. Indeed, as the British forces have not engaged alone in a major combat operation 
since the 1982 Falklands campaign – the last time UK had the ability to deploy its forces as 
an integrated war-fighting, war-winning single-force capability - it is easy to see how and 
why current thinking in respect of UK defence doctrine and planning are under review. 
However, the recent crisis in the Crimea and Eastern Ukraine has suddenly refocused NATO 
attention back onto its Eastern borders so now is probably not the time for the UK to 
become fixated upon soft-power COIN operations to the exclusion of all else. If Russian 
unpredictability warns of anything, it is that peer on peer warfare may not be as remote a 
possibility as perhaps some analysts formerly believed. And while a major war with a peer 
competitor is certainly an unwelcome prospect, simply ignoring it is not the answer –  
prepared, credible, coordinated deterrence and coherent coalition action is. 
 
17. Thus it is incumbent upon all NATO nations to reflect that COIN, in one guise or 
another, is here to stay - but that a peer on peer engagement is still a threat to prepare for if 
only to prevent a major war occurring in the first place. Perception of weakness is a variable 
and NATO fire power vested in high-end technology, large mobile armies, armour, warships 
and jet aircraft may not impress or deter jihad fighters who may require a more nuanced 
and subtle approach. Whilst, hard power enablers and robust cooperative military actions, 
planning, and shows of strength are definitely a factor that potential peer adversaries like 
Mr Putin consider and are likely to factor into their own strategy. However, as previously 
stated, international security and stability are not just about hard power. Military activity 
must be viewed as part of a coordinated and coherent ‘smart security’ strategy and 
approach linking political, diplomatic, economic and international development activity that 
identify, pressurize and engage an adversary's ‘centres of gravity’ and pain points to instil 
the required end effect and desired behaviours. 
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18. Future UK foreign and defence policy is not therefore a zero sum game, a case of 
either or, but a balance to be struck between what we know and what we predict.  Hence 
the lessons learnt in COIN operations must not be ignored and service training, equipment 
and culture must adapt to allow for an effective, appropriate and measured response in the 
future. The UK military must have the resources, equipment and training to operate along a 
sliding scale of intervention from peace keeping to formation combat. At the lower end of 
the spectrum this may require the formation of a unique Brigade trained and equipped to 
specialise in conducting COIN operations world wide. However, this new COIN formation 
must be additional, and be able to contribute to the capacity, capability and numbers of 
conventional and nuclear deterrent war fighting assets that allow UK forces to be ready to 
deter and/or counter emerging peer level threats. Vice versa, to sustain a COIN Brigade will 
require roulement from the wider military units. 
 
19. Therefore, now is certainly not the time for UK to withdraw from international 
obligations – if we do not adequately fund our own defence is it reasonable to ask others to 
do it for us? Hence, DS argues that the gaps in our defences are large, widening and 
unsustainable on land, sea and in the air. As an example of that, it recently took more than 
24 hours to get the only available RN vessel – a Type 45 Destroyer – from the south coast to 
the Moray Firth to intercept a previously undetected and unchallenged Russian cruiser that 
remained just outside the 3 mile coastal zone. No ally was tasked to do this, and this effects 
readiness. 
 
20. To examine just one example in respect of readiness (there are many others). It 
takes over a decade, if not 20 years, to design, build, test and field a new fast jet (F-35), it 
takes at least 3 years to train the aircrew to combat ready status, a little less for ground 
crew. Time, therefore, is the crux of readiness. In the modern era the complexity of 
weapons platforms, the training and available industrial capacity dictate that 'you fight with 
what you have on day one' with little leeway for reinforcement (minimum buy of 
equipment) or battle casualty replacements (minimal Armed Forces personnel). Unless the 
warning time for war is in years not months there is simply no time to generate significant 
new or extra capability and capacity. And, as we never know when the clock starts to tick, 
whilst belligerents who set the agenda do, balanced-in-place-forces are the only guarantee 
of deterrence. Autocrats know this! Government hubris is transparent to a prospective 
enemy, who will make his own assessment of strength, and react accordingly. If UK is 
perceived weak, no amount of hubris-laden PM briefings will shore up the fallen wall. Si vis 
pacem, para bellum. 
 
21. Strategic Choices: How can the next NSS be made most useful in guiding decisions 
in Government and long-term spending decisions? 
 
22. In seeking to address this complex question DS has considered one major aspect of 
UK strategic international involvement – the United Nations. Strategic choices may be a 
government's responsibility but action and subsequent spending is most often dictated by 
external events forcing action to honour international treaty obligations. For UK nothing is 
more defining in this respect than our position as a permanent member of the United 
Nations Security Council (UNSC).     
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23. Since the formation of the United Nations (UN), international diplomacy has been 
locked into a legal position dictated through undertakings in the overarching UN Charter 
with action restrained or enabled by UNSC resolutions and oversight and obligations 
inherent in historically extant international jurisprudence. The attitudes and actions of 
nations are judged through this prism of internationally accepted legal, ethical and moral 
behaviour.  
 
24. But does this international system perform in practice? How do legal, ethical and 
moral imperatives impact on nations? Notwithstanding the UN Charter, how do the realities 
of strategic necessity in international diplomacy - the application of soft, flexible (smart) and 
hard power in pursuit of national interests impact on the need for and legitimacy of 
International Intervention Operations?    
 
25. Syria - An unresolved case study: Consider the running sore that is the latest 
manifestation of the 'Arab Spring' - Syria. Thus far the toll in the 3 year uprising is estimated 
to be well over 100,000 killed on all sides and circa three million displaced people taking 
refuge in camps in neighbouring Jordan, Turkey, Lebanon and Iraq. The European Union has 
imposed and, in response to French and British lobbying, lifted an arms embargo; the USA 
has talked of 'red lines' if WMD are used by the regime and then reneged from direct 
intervention; Russia and Iran have continued to support the Assad regime with advisers and 
weapons; Gulf states support and arm the 'rebels'; NATO has deployed anti-aircraft missile 
systems to Turkey (Russia has done the same in Syria) and Israel has attacked Syrian 
munitions sites.    
 
26. The Assad regime realises that the UN is incapable of speaking with one voice and 
that this, de facto, renders the UN executive powerless to effectively intervene directly in 
this internecine struggle. In acknowledging this ineffectual role it would be remiss not to 
recognise the constraint that a lack of 'unanimous consent' imposes on the Secretary 
General through the arcane workings of the UNSC, not least when the 5 permanent 
members - Russia, China, USA, France and the UK - fail to agree a course of action. To fill this 
vacuum in international solidarity, nations tend to fall back upon the only common 
denominator open to them - their own national interests.  
 
27. In this latter respect, Iran and the Gulf states, and their predominant Alawite, Shiite 
& Sunni groupings, whilst all Muslim, have diametrically opposed geopolitical and religious 
interests intertwined in Middle East politics. This generates issues for neighbours such as 
Israel, Turkey, Lebanon, Iraq and Jordan who all have border stability and internal security 
concerns as a fallout of Syrian, and now Iraqi internal conflicts. The USA, France and UK - 
stymied by the legalities preventing 'Regime Change' (and no doubt lessons learned of the 
consequential failures of such intervention over the last 30 years) - are unable to convince 
China and Russia that the Assad regime must be forced to go if stability is to be restored to 
the region and the Syrian people offered respite from a brutal regime. All this is set against 
an international background in which China is vying for greater influence in all regions of the 
world and Russia is looking to its own interests and influence in the Eastern Mediterranean 
and what it sees as its own backyard – The Caucuses and Ukraine.  
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28. When British troops were assigned to UN forces on peacekeeping and humanitarian 
relief duties in the Bosnia-Herzegovina region of the Former Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) in 
1992 Her Majesty's Government (HMG) was responding to a series of UNSC resolutions 
initiated by UNSC 743. This willingness of HMG to offer forces and aid in response to UNSC 
resolutions was merely an extension of a long history of support by the UK for the UN going 
back to Korea in 1950. However, as the United States (US) and British intervention in Iraq in 
2003 illustrates, a UNSC resolution (UNSC 1441) can provide a wide range of interpretation 
and lead to legal challenge.  
 
29. However, for the UK independent intervention operations are not as frequent as 
some might think. Indeed, since the 1982 Falklands War, UK interventions have been as a 
consequence of legally authorised and mandated UN operations – Iraq 2003 being a notable 
possible exception. But in Syria what we appear to be left with is diplomatic stalemate with 
the USA led allies being caught in the international legitimacy and (lack of) credibility and 
influence in the ME trap. Thus Russia successfully argues that regimen change in Syria is 
illegal whilst ignoring their own actions in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine despite majority UN 
General Assembly disapproval of both Assad's and Putin's conduct. The UN ‘Responsibility to 
Protect’ concept seeming to be effectively moribund as a lack of unanimous consent has 
forced status quo by default, preventing any action or intervention that is not covered by a 
UNSC resolution.  
 
30. One could argue that this is a good thing if the net effect is to prevent wider conflict 
escalation or unilateral intervention in another State due to disagreement about its 
activities, but a bad thing if the result is to hamper conflict resolution and/or prevent the UN 
from protecting innocent citizens from harm. However, this could be used as a double-
edged sword against UK global interests. To this end, and to avoid another UNSC 1441 
débâcle, the JCNSS might consider that there is a case for UK to lead on UN reform in this 
area.  
 
31. From an MoD, National Security and Defence perspective there must be a clear and 
tangible ‘line of sight’ between the UK’s Grand Strategy defining its role in the world, its 
external and internal security and defence strategy, through the required supporting 
Military Tasks and likely military planning scenarios and contingent operation assumptions. 
These Military Tasks and operational assumptions drive the military Capabilities required, 
determine the equipment and people needed, thus, the equipment procurement 
programme and military personnel recruiting, training and Force Elements at Readiness and 
Force Element sustainability, and ultimately the Defence budget.  
 
32. As UK foreign policy interventions have been traditionally exercised, at times, 
determined, by international legal treaty – stand fast the right to unilateral action in 
immediate self defence –  a revised NSS narrative must surely start with this as its guiding 
principal statement. Ultimately the defence, foreign policy and foreign aid budgets will be 
primarily driven by UK's international UN obligations.        
 
33. International relationships: Which will be the UK’s critical international 
relationships over the next 20 years? 
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34. DS, like many observers of the two premier Western alliances – NATO & EU – cannot 
help but sense the divergence of interpretation in aims and objectives that the allied 
nation's involved bring to the two organisations. So, for example, after four decades of 
membership the UK has at best an ambiguous relationship with the EU over sovereignty and 
prefers, for defence and security, to see NATO as its prime focus.  Conversely Germany and 
France see sovereignty as a more negotiable aspect of their relationship and are far more 
committed to EU institutions than UK. This heavily inclines them towards a European 
military command and control position despite the certain knowledge that current UK 
thinking is opposed. Hence, whilst the UK is economically tied into the European project, in 
security terms the United States of America (USA) is the first among equals when British 
security interests are at stake. NATO, because of USA leadership, coming a very close 
second. The Australia, Canada, UK, USA (AUSCANUKUS) alliances being next in line. After 
that would come the EU and individually or bilaterally France, Poland, Norway, India, 
Pakistan, Japan, the 5 power agreement (Singapore, USA, Australia, New Zealand and UK) 
possibly Brazil? Every nation and treaty alliance listed has strengths and weaknesses but UK 
must do better at “calibrating’ the importance of each treaty/range of agreements which 
must be made based on a Nationally agreed and desired ‘place in the world’ - Strategy. 
 
35. How should the 2015 NSS handle the uncertainty over the UK’s role in Europe? 
 
36.  The DS position is that the political future is uncertain especially with the ground 
swell of public discontent with aspects of EU membership. An openly debated and 
articulated strategic narrative will assist the public to decide where UK's national interests 
lie. In the interim the UK must publish a “Plan B” for an exit from the EU having made 
judgements based on in depth discussions with the full range of allies, and some adversaries 
perhaps, who will be affected. 
 
37. Risks and contingency planning: In 2014 the JCNSS said, “in our work we have 
become concerned that in some areas the Government seems genuinely not to have any 
contingency plans. This is dangerous and unwise. (Paragraph 34).” 
 
38. DS asserts that a core task of the NSS should be to audit contingency plans across 
Government for substance and cohesion. Examinations, exercises, training and resourcing 
need to be prioritised and assessed against realistic strategic scenarios that have been 
developed by a combination of government and independent specialists who have equal 
status on a sub-committee of the NSC. 
 
39. What are the main risks to the UK’s national security? 
 
40. There are published and classified papers identifying risks to National Security. These 
also outline remedial activities, but lack of public knowledge, restricted access and the 
mercurial interest of the media generally ensure that most of this good work remains 
unheralded. However, DS has identified resource supply as a major UK 'capability interest'. 
The primary threat – whether oil, food, raw materials, information or cash flow - being from 
resource starvation potentially causing economic chaos and social unrest. In earlier evidence 
to the PASC in 2011 DS wrote: “Therefore, DS contends that these 'Capability Interests' are 
enabled by a combination of political, commercial, diplomatic and military means all of 
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which are interlinked domestically and internationally through a stable global diplomatic 
environment which is enhanced by much admired British core values. In turn these shared 
values create the conditions essential for manufacturing and world trade to flourish and for 
UK to prosper”. Hence DS contends that it is no giant leap to deduce that protection of these 
vital interests must form the core of UK strategic thinking. As history has consistently 
demonstrated, the UK's primary 'Capability Interest' has been maritime not continental: the 
principle vulnerability of the British Isles, whether threatened by Napoleon, The Kaiser, 
Hitler or a modern day equivalent, being resource starvation. Furthermore, whilst direct 
invasion of the UK mainland may still be viewed as a distant threat it is still an issue for 
overseas territories (The Falklands Dilemma) and European allies – hence UK support of 
NATO and the UN is extant.  
 
41. What are the main risks to the UK’s national security? Is the Government’s 
horizon-scanning effective, and are our national contingency plans adequate? 
 
42. In relation to the part of the question concerning national contingency plans, these 
are probably inadequate but what there is may be all that is affordable now. The 
unanswered question is, will any government allocate greater resources to achieve more as 
the economy improves? In this respect, there must be a priority list published to explain to 
the public where extra money would be used when it becomes available? An indication of 
these priorities would be invaluable to taxpayers (voters) even if the Government of the day 
might not like them published. Defence is a national – non political – activity.  
 
43. Scope: How broadly should the NSS define national security? 
 
44. All issues that threaten the UK should be covered – cyber, resources, existential, 
domestic. However, with International Companies becoming more influential than some 
Governments, their viewpoints should be considered and government must learn from 
them. In many cases the International Company makes decisions that are faster, better 
considered from the aspect of risk and outcome than Governments. This is because they 
tend to be more clearly focused structures that are responsible and accountable for their 
long and short term decisions. In the world of successful commerce innovation is rewarded 
and the hard lessons of failure acknowledged. Often those that learn the lessons are able to 
‘try again’ and succeed. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
45.  A full range of the elements that can contribute to the formulation of a National 
(GRAND) Strategy are “out there” but successive governments have seen fit to ignore the 
reality of the UK’s strengths and, most particularly, weaknesses which do not fit with the 
zeitgeist of the age. Lulled into complacency following the perceived end of the Cold War 
and declarations that real emerging threats were of little consequence, our “Establishment” 
has sought to entice the British people into personal profligacy at the risk of numbing their 
understanding that the world is an increasingly dangerous and unpredictable place. 
Austerity measures combined with Chinese and Mr Putin’s ambitions may be reversing this 
trend so, this may well be the very best time to articulate, very clearly and concisely, the 
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above covered elements into a strategic vision that defines the UK’s stance for and against 
the changes and emerging threats the world is now facing.  
 
46. Following the PM's lead as outlined in paragraph 4 above DS might echo his 
thoughts and say “The United Kingdom’s Grand Strategy is”:  
 
 To take all measures that maintain Britain’s economic strength through sound 
financial and monetary measures allied to the maintenance of free international 
trade.  
 To make full and proportionate contributions to those alliances that contribute to 
and ensure world peace; most particularly, the UK’s seat on the UN Security Council 
must be retained and supported by a judicious mix of hard, soft and flexible (smart) 
power.  
 To maintain and, where necessary, improve the living standards of all UK’s people 
and make a valid contribution to the well-being of the underprivileged in the wider 
world.  
 To make a leading contribution to the search for the very best use of the world’s 
energy and raw material resources.  
 
Professor Andrew M Dorman, Centre for British Defence and Security Studies, King’s 
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Background 
1. In 2010 it was originally envisaged that the next Strategic Defence and Security Review 
(SDSR) would be a relative modest affair which marked time as the armed forces and 
defence more broadly transitioned to the 2020 structures. No mention was made of a 
follow on to the National Security Strategy (NSS), although many have assumed that a new 
NSS would accompany the next SDSR. However, events in Libya and more recently in the 
Ukraine, Syria and Iraq raise question marks about the assumptions contained within the 
NSS about relative stability prior to 2020. Moreover, the recent NATO Summit has led to the 
pledge to create a new rapid reaction force to supplement the existing NATO Response 
Force with the British government apparently pledging an all arms battle-group and a 
brigade headquarters to the new force.51  
 
2. The 2010 NSS was the third version to emerge in little over two years. Despite the fact 
that it, and the accompanying SDSR and Spending Review, was put together in the space of 
about five months it was a significant improvement on its’ two predecessors for three 
reasons. The first reasons was that, unlike its’ two predecessors, the 2010 version sought to 
provide a framework to prioritise the various threats and dangers identified. Second, the 
2010 NSS went beyond merely identifying that the world is dangerous but then identified 
through the 2010 SDSR various mechanisms to tackle these threats and challenges. Third, 
                                                          
50 The analysis, opinions and conclusions expressed or implied in this paper are those of the author and do not 
necessarily represent the views of the Joint Services Command & Staff College, the Defence Academy, the 
United Kingdom’s Ministry of Defence or any other government agency. 
51 Brooks Tigner, ‘NATO works to flesh out Readiness Action Plan’, Jane’s Defence Weekly, vol.51, no.38, 17 
September 2014, p.5. 
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the 2010 NSS and SDSR were accompanied by the development of a structure to implement 
their findings including a bi-annual review of the new National Risk Register, National 
Security Advisor and National Security Council.  
 
3. Linked to the NSS, in general many have welcomed the creation of the National Security 
Council but there have been calls, particularly from Lord West the former First Sea Lord and 
Labour Security Minister, to have a political appointee to the National Security Advisor role 
and he has been keen to put his name forward. Few have criticised the creation of a 
national register, although the apparent exclusion of Scottish independence as ‘too political’ 
somewhat weakened its credibility, and have not challenged the basic reasoning behind its 
establishment. Similarly, the adoption of a risk based approach to the NSS has also been 
welcomed and there has not been any significant call for a change to the basic methodology 
used. Rather, the criticisms outlined push for a more vigorous national security process in 
which the National Security Council and its’ supporting secretariat play a greater role. 
 
4. What is not clear is whether the promised 2015-6 SDSR will also be accompanied by a 
new or updated National Security Strategy. Whilst it was a sensible move to provide for 
regular defence reviews it would also have made sense to also commit successive 
governments to a similar process for the National Security Strategy. The process is also 
hampered by the fact that a general election precedes it. In 2010 the Ministry of Defence 
was surprisingly allowed to publish a Green Paper in February 2010. It does not look as 
though this will be repeated which means that the level of preparatory work undertaken 
before the new government enters office in May 2015 will be correspondingly less. A more 
sensible approach would be for the main political parties to agree on a process whereby 
much the preparatory staff work each new NSS and SDSR is undertaken and perhaps 
published as a Green Paper just prior to the general election ready with the acceptance that 
this does not necessarily reflect the views of the government of the day. This would put the 
incoming government in a better position to then conduct the NSS and SDSR.  
 
5. Nevertheless, both the 2010 NSS and SDSR have been subject to significant criticism 
particularly in terms of the cuts made to various defence capabilities. Stepping back from 
individual decisions, the underlying issue is really the failure to fully integrate the NSS and 
SDSR. For example, neither the army’s initial 2010 construct nor its subsequent 2012 variant 
did not really addressed the primary concerns that the NSS had set out. The overall defence 
package looked far too land-centric reflecting more the weight of influence within the 
Ministry of Defence than the more maritime-air focus articulated within the NSS.52  
 
6. It is also clear that the five months used to develop the 2010 NSS and SDSR prevented the 
level of wider consultation seen in the 1998 Strategic Defence Review. Moreover, much of 
the consultation which did take place was limited to select London based think-tanks. This 
not only limited the level of input but also meant that much of the cutting edge academic 
thinking was excluded as the government chose to remain within the London think-tank 
bubble.  
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Britain’s place in the world 
7. A number of commentators and previous witnesses have put forward the case that within 
the NSS the British government should set out its vision for the future of the United 
Kingdom, put forward the ways in which this vision can be achieved and then present the 
Treasury with the bill. Whilst such an approach is appealing it ignores the basic dynamic 
between ends and means. Moreover, it is invariably those states that are on the rise that set 
out grand visions outlining the direction of travel where their government wishes to take.  
 
8. By way of contrast, status quo states, such as the United Kingdom, tend not to have a 
vision defined in terms of maintain their relative position. As a consequence, they 
emphasise values and ideas as a mechanism maintaining their existing standing and would 
prefer no change. As the world’s first industrial nation and with its legacy of empire and 
relative standing successive British governments have found themselves in a position in 
which the United Kingdom has a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council, a 
significant voice within NATO and the European Union, membership of the G-8 group of 
nations, leading member of the Commonwealth and so forth. It makes little sense to aspire 
to a diminished position as the United Kingdom’s relative position is overtaken by rising 
nations such as India. Moreover, there is an argument that to articulate a position of relative 
decline is to hasten change.  
 
9. This is not to say that this is the only option. In their article ‘Brown Britain: post-colonial 
politics and grand strategy’ Tarak Bakawi and Shane Brighton53 argue that this narrative 
reflects a particular view of the United Kingdom and that there is the choice to move away 
from this. However, such a move is unappealing for most politicians because it raises too 
many awkward questions. First, it raises the question who or what the United Kingdom is. 
As the Scottish vote on independence and the number of British citizens who have gone to 
Syria in support of Islamic state have demonstrated, there isn’t a single view of the United 
Kingdom and the United Kingdom’s current demographic outlook suggest that this will 
continue to change. Second, no Prime Minister wants to be remembered as the one who 
oversaw a step change down in the United Kingdom’s standing on the international stage. 
This is why successive Prime Ministers have supported the retention of a nuclear capability 
knowing full well that the replacement costs will fall to their successors.  
 
10. Therefore the next NSS will continue with the traditional emphasis of maintaining 
Britain’s place in the world, maintaining international order and freedom of trade. The only 
difference that any change in government will bring will focus on how this view is 
articulated. Liberal interventionalism is clearly out and a new strap-line is needed. Similarly, 
the risk based approach adopted in 2010 retains credibility and therefore looks as though it 
will not change. Instead the logic next step is to ensure that the next SDSR more closely 
follows the risk-based approach and the lose interpretation of the force elements required 
to support this is likely to come into question.  
 
11. The economy is now recovering with gross domestic product passing its 2008 figure this 
year. However, as The Economist highlighted recently, this recovery has not been matched 
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by improvements to the nation’s finances.54 In 2010 George Osborne proposed to close the 
deficit, then 11% of GDP – within five years. Unfortunately he is only two-fifths of the way 
there and the fault had been blamed on slow growth. However, the British economy is now 
the fastest growing amongst the G7 countries but this growth has not been matched by 
increases in tax revenue, particularly income tax. This means that the next government will 
face a challenging 2016 Spending Review with significant pressure to cut public spending 
still further. Both the Chancellor and the Shadow Chancellor’s speeches at their respective 
party conferences emphasised that the debt issue still needed to be tackled. The difference 
between these revolved around whether the actual deficit or structural deficit should be the 
basis for calculating the requisite cutbacks. With the Health and International Development 
budgets likely to be protected, the desired cost savings are likely to focus on the defence 
and social security budgets.  
 
12. Naturally defence does not agree that it should bear further cuts. However, the 
language the current government have used so far allows means that defence can be cut. 
Even the NATO member’s goal of defence budgets reaching 2% of GDP applied only to those 
who are currently below this level. This means that the United Kingdom can continue to let 
defence spending as a percentage of GDP continue to fall. The Chancellor of the Exchequer 
announced further reductions to the defence budget as part of the autumn 2012 budget 
statement and the National Audit Office has noted that if these revised figures for defence 
are used as the basis for the promised 1% increase in the equipment budget then there is a 
£15.874bn deficit in the planned 10-year defence equipment programme.55   
 
13. The big debate will therefore centre on the ways in which these Ends can be achieved 
given the economic constraints that beset the United Kingdom. To this end, the next 
government will inevitably continue to emphasize the importance of partners. The United 
Kingdom has a long history of partnerships and alliances and a future government is unlikely 
to want to chart a more unilateral path. Such partnerships help provide underpin the United 
Kingdom’s relative place in the world and its standing.  
 
14. Given current events in Ukraine and Syria, NATO looks like it will remain a central pillar 
of British defence and security policy. Similarly, the Five Eyes partnership of the Anglo-Saxon 
nations looks set to remain a key global partnership. The UK’s future role within the 
European Union looks less settled. Here domestic politics, particularly the rise of UKIP, is 
likely to influence the next government’s view of the EU irrespective of whichever political 
party(ies) forms the next government. If a referendum is held on the United Kingdom’s 
continuing membership of the European Union then there will be a good deal of 
uncertainty, at least in the short term, and it will be interesting to see whether the next 
government is prepared to let Britain’s potential exit from the European Union to appear on 
the National Risk Register. Whether the emphasis with France will remain is questionable. 
The reality is that the United Kingdom has a series of bilateral as well as multilateral 
partnerships and these look set to remain in place. Moreover, the United Kingdom is likely 
to continue to try and establish ever closer relations with new and old partners that provide 
for an increased global presence for the United Kingdom.  
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Way ahead 
15. The biggest problem the United Kingdom confronts is uncertainty. In Don Rumsfeld’s 
world the known, knowns are fairly clear. As events since 2010 have shown, the known, 
unknowns and the unknown, unknowns are far more problematic. This has been 
exacerbated by the speed of events and the ability for news and events to be posted around 
the globe. The next NSS and SDSR will therefore need to place far greater emphasis on 
horizon-scanning and knowledge development and retention. The focus will need to be on 
identifying trends and issues and the time frames in which the United Kingdom will need to 
respond. In other words, far more attention needs to be placed on the information 
gathering and analysis of government even at the expense of capability. 
 
16. Following on from this the risk based approach should be taken to the next logic point 
where the capabilities, such as the armed forces, are defined more in terms of the 
timeframe and scale in which they are needed. This may well result in smaller numbers, 
particularly in the land environment, but with the ability to regenerate and reconstitute 
forces as necessary. This will require both a change in mind-set and also in the capacity of 
the national security secretariat.56 
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Written evidence submitted to the JCNSS on 30/09/2014 by James Flint, in a personal 
capacity, containing an argumentative component in synthesising security and aid 
strategy.57 
 
Investing in Defence: Security through Cooperation 
 
Executive Summary 
 It is crucial to uphold extant international agreements, law and norms. 
 ‘Grand strategy’ in security resource allocation must be proactive- not reactive. 
 A credible (nuclear and conventional) deterrent is fundamental to continued UK 
state security, and is mandated by extant alliance commitments. 
 Offensive military capability and the ability to project proportionate force is a 
requisite of coercive diplomacy, which is a fundamental implement of foreign policy. 
 The UK’s future power lies within ever closer economic and political union in Europe:  
Extant memberships and alliances must be fortified, inclusive of NATO and the EU. 
 ‘Soft power’ must complement exertions of ‘hard power’, as a ‘smart power’. 
                                                          
56 Paul Cornish and Andrew M Dorman, ‘Fifty shades of purple? A risk-sharing approach to the 2015 Strategic 
Defence and Security Review’, International Affairs, vol.89, no.5, September 2013, pp.1183-1202. 
57  This summative submission is forwarded from the perspective of a PhD researcher in International 
Relations (with research specialisms in Security and Foreign/Overseas Aid).  However, it also draws upon the 
practical experience of serving in Afghanistan on Operation Herrick.  Its contents are submitted in the hope of 
expanding upon understanding of how National Security Strategy may be synthesised with aid policy, 
assistance and cooperation.  Supporting factual information is derived from academic literature and historical 
precedent. 
 
James Flint – written evidence 
57 
 
 As a naval power in an uncertain world, the RN requires significant investment to 
ensure continued expeditionary capability, redundancy and interoperability. 
 A significant portion of the aid budget should be allocated to foremost the RN, and 
secondly the Army, in order to facilitate enhanced humanitarianism.   
 
Recommendations 
 Develop grand strategy which is proactive towards the UK’s interests- not reactive. 
 Upload the UK’s values and norms into supranational EU foreign policy discourse. 
 Allocate a significant portion of the aid budget towards strengthening the RN, for 
humanitarian as well militaristic ends. 
1. This submission succinctly presents an argument calling for the maximisation of 
extant memberships and alliances, such as the EU and NATO, in order to further the 
UK’s security.  It further calls for greater coherence and synthesis between the UK’s 
soft and hard power capabilities in the pursuit of grand strategy.  
2.   It is crucial to uphold extant international agreements, law and norms. 
3. Within the conduct of international politics and foreign policy, the international 
system of states does not hold a higher authority (see Hill, 2003; Hilsman, 1990).  As 
a ramification, if state government’s lack the courage to uphold extant international 
law and norms, these systems and frameworks effectively cease to exist.  There 
exists a real and present risk that short-term and domestic pressures undermine 
long-term foreign policy commitments. 
4. A multitude of worrisome contemporary examples exist, such as with the failure of 
the Budapest Memorandum (after Ukraine relinquished its nuclear arsenal) to 
guarantee Ukraine’s territorial integrity.  This failure undoubtedly holds negative 
ramifications with regards to the regime on nuclear non-proliferation.  Then there is 
the arguably weak response to Assad’s use of chemical weapons, and with rhetorical 
red lines being crossed, where political rhetoric perhaps failed to be fully 
substantiated. 
5. The Responsibility to Protect (R2P, post-2001) principle is also being tested, with 
ongoing commitments in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, and the 
underestimation of the Islamic State (ISIS).  Furthermore, while democratisation is 
arguably progressing in Afghanistan, and with President Ghani having signed the 
Bilateral Security Agreement with the US, the commitment to required levels of 
assistance to Afghanistan remains questionable (see Flint, 2014).  The failure to 
enforce international law and norms vigorously undermines resolve and sets a 
negative precedent 
6.   ‘Grand strategy’ in defence resource allocation must be proactive- not reactive. 
7. The need for an ‘overarching strategy’ has been noted (JCNSS, 2014).  However, this 
is hindered by ‘party politics’ and uncertainty over such colossal issues as 
referendums over Scottish and EU independence.  But, without coherent strategy all 
foreign and security policy will be reactive in nature; the budget will be allocated in a 
reactive manner to circumstances, and thus enemies will hold the initiative. 
8. The word ‘strategy’ has itself arguably become watered-down through ubiquitous 
use.  Strategy should entail a multitude of facets, including a targeted problem, 
objectives, plan, results and contingencies.  As reference to seminal texts on 
understanding of strategy, such as Freedman (2013) and Luttwak (2001), make 
profoundly clear, strategy demands initiative.  Defence resource allocation cannot 
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hold the initiative or purport to attain any future objectives if they are derived from 
perceived threats in a reactive manner alone.   
9. It is less important as to whether ministries and departments such as the Ministry of 
Defence (MOD), Department for International Development (DFID) and the Foreign 
and Commonwealth Office (FCO) are organisationally independent or part of a 
greater whole (as Labour and Conservative governments traditionally differ over 
management of aid).  However, they all need to be coherent in working towards the 
fulfilment of a common greater strategy. 
10. A clear grand strategy removes the need for governments to micro-manage, through 
facilitating operational strategy, doctrine and beneath this tactics, techniques and 
procedures.  Thus, the point of a grand strategy is not to know how to respond to 
events, but a consensus on courses of action whilst maintaining initiative.  Long-term 
spending decisions cannot be conducted on anticipating what other powers are 
planning. 
11.   A credible (nuclear and conventional) deterrent is fundamental to continued UK 
state security, and is mandated by extant alliance commitments. 
12. As Leon Trotsky purportedly said, “you may not like war, but war may like you!”.  In 
what may be considered to be an inter-paradigmatic period, the UK cannot risk 
degradation of conventional or nuclear deterrent capability, or the industries which 
support them to function.  As the outgoing Secretary General of NATO, Anders Fogh 
Rasmussen observed, just five years ago the present behaviour of Putin’s Russia and 
the spread of ISIS were not fully predictable (Rasmussen, 2014).  
13.   Offensive military capability and the ability to project proportionate force is a 
requisite of coercive diplomacy, which is a fundamental implement of foreign policy. 
14. With regards to military capability, expeditionary potential and deterrence go hand 
in hand, as the ability to project force may be necessary to deter a course of action.  
While the British Army has seen considerable deployments, the Royal Navy (RN) is 
the UK’s institution of excellence where it comes to projecting power.  This isn’t just 
in terms of hard power and anecdotal evidence such as from the Falklands War of 
1982, but also in humanitarian terms, and as a ‘latent’ power possessing a multitude 
of capabilities.  The RN’s relief mission to the Philippines is a recent example of this. 
15. It should be noted that the Royal Air Force (RAF) and the use of air-power in isolation 
is a non-strategy (Luttwak, 2001).  The RAF, as the junior and least capable of the 
three armed services, should only be used to support the RN and Army.  Inter-service 
rivalry must become a problem of the past; the pursuit of strategy must be attained.  
Standing armed force peculiarities such as with the RAF land force, the RAF 
Regiment, which performed so poorly in Afghanistan (HCDC, 2014; USDA, 2013) 
should be ended. 
16.   The UK’s future power lies within ever closer economic and political union in 
Europe:  Extant memberships and alliances must be fortified, inclusive of NATO and 
the EU. 
17. As the US ‘pivots’ towards Asia-Pacific, the UK must take up the slack and balance in 
Europe, from a position of inclusion and leadership.  Legitimacy, strength and 
influence may be derived from greater consensus and alliance politics.  The UK’s 
relative position within the international system will change (JCNSS, 2014).  
However, relative power need not significantly decline.  Ever closer union within the 
EU is not a threat, but an opportunity.  The UK may upload discourses and norms 
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into supranational levels of union, and so create positive futures for both the UK as a 
member state and the EU as a whole (see Howell, 2004).   
18. Overlap and dualism between developing EU security and defence policy 
frameworks and a resurgent NATO needs to be coordinated, but should be fortified, 
not resisted.  The UK’s seat on the UN Security Council and within the G8 group of 
nations also should not be overlooked.  However, the EU arguably holds most 
potential.  It has already been noted how once UK engagement with EU 
supranational governance has engaged with uploading norms, the EU has become a 
more useful foreign policy avenue (Gross, 2009; Oliver and Allen, 2008).  The UK 
need not prioritise Europe over the US or vice versa; the UK is in Europe, and the US 
is the Western Hegemon.  The two are not mutually exclusive.  
19.   ‘Soft power’ must complement exertions of ‘hard power’, as a ‘smart power’ (see 
Wilson, 2008). 
20. The UK has overtly championed soft power as a positive mode of influence within 
the international system, and commits to a significant aid budget.  Aid may be 
conceptualised as an economic power (Hill, 2003) or a structural power (Holden, 
2009).  It has always been a mode of influence within foreign policy (CIA, 1965; 
Petřík, 2008).  Whereas it may be argued that the ‘European approach’ to aid is for 
purely developmental and poverty reduction purposes, in contrast with the US’s 
linking it with foreign policy (Natsios, 2006), development aid and the greater 
industry of development has produced questionable results and as such has been 
strongly critiqued (see Foreman, 2012, 2013; Glennie, 2008). 
21. Soft power is arguably a façade without hard power behind it.  The EU’s reputation 
as a ‘civilian power’ should be operationalised to be supportive of hard power, 
through both developing foreign and security policy, and in coordination with NATO.  
Whereas, the UK should muster ‘smarter’ use of the aid budget as a mode of 
influence in support of British values and interests.   
22.   As a naval power in an uncertain world, the RN requires significant investment to 
ensure continued expeditionary capability, redundancy and interoperability. 
23. Many historical themes of sea power still apply (see Redford and Grove, 2014).  
However, today there are vastly more ships operating.  While numerous foreign 
navies are expanding in quality of technology and quantity of ships, the RN is 
advancing in technology but shrinking in ships.  Despite a substantial defence 
budget, cuts to the RN have slashed the UK’s deployable military power in real 
terms. 
24. The RN remains the UK’s most capable institution for exerting influence (through 
both hard power, and as a ‘latent’ power).  In recent years it has become clear that 
the RN has become under-emphasised by government.  Both manpower and ships 
have reduced to levels which are arguably insufficient to maintain required 
operations and commitments.  The coming into service of two new aircraft carriers 
(HMS Queen Elizabeth and HMS Prince of Wales) is promising, but gaps remain.  
25. Libya (2011) demonstrated the utility of aircraft carriers (in the service of France and 
Italy) (see Taylor, 2011).  However, it should be reiterated that the application of air-
power in isolation is a non-strategy (Luttwak, 2001).  Furthermore, hindering political 
narratives such as those concerning ‘boots on the ground’ should be avoided.  The 
lack of moral courage to deploy British soldiers/marines when needed cannot be a 
legacy of Blair’s wars (see Dannatt, 2009).   
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26.   A significant portion of the aid budget must be allocated to foremost the RN, and 
secondly the Army, in order to facilitate enhanced humanitarianism.  
27. That NGOs and aid workers are neutral and transparent is a myth perpetuated by 
elements within the aid industry (Foreman, 2013).  Amidst an expanded 
understanding of the security/development nexus and interrelationships between 
the securitisation of development strategies and under-development as correlating 
with insecurity (see Duffield, 2012; Ginty and Williams, 2009), there is a concerted 
need for the military to support humanitarianism.  The peacekeeper is a 
humanitarian, whilst humanitarians frequently require force protection.  In addition 
to the RN in the Philippines, the British Army Engineers establishing field hospitals to 
fight Ebola in Sierra Leone (DFID, 2014) is one of many examples where a robust 
military response can assist humanitarianism.   
28. In conclusion, whereas it may be argued that the UK’s perceived standing within the 
international system is in relative decline, the EU (and perhaps NATO) provides an 
opportunity to counterbalance this decline.  Furthermore, greater synthesis between 
British hard power (foremost the RN) and soft power (foremost the aid budget and 
humanitarianism) provides scope for enhanced ‘smart’ power and relative influence 
as a whole.  However, the UK’s accumulative apparatus of influence must find 
greater coherence amongst themselves in the pursuit of grand strategy, while UK 
governance must work towards the uploading of British values and norms into the 
supranational EU foreign policy discourse.  The UK must be a leader within Europe, 
not a follower or outsider.  UK government must possess the moral courage to act in 
the promotion of the UK’s values and interests. 
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The Foundation for Information Policy Research 
 
The Foundation for Information Policy Research (FIPR) is an independent body that studies 
the interaction between information technology and society. Its goal is to identify technical 
developments with significant social impact, commission and undertake research into public 
policy alternatives, and promote public understanding and dialogue between technologists 
and policy-makers in the UK and Europe. 
 
FIPR has the following comments to make in response to the questions asked by the Joint 
Committee on the National Security Strategy in its call for evidence of July 24th. It appears 
logical to tackle the questions in reverse order. 
 
1. We welcome the committee’s question of how broadly ‘national security’ (NS) 
should be defined. For many years, it has been used as a universal get-out clause. 
The Court of Appeal remarked that it is a protean concept, ‘designed to encompass 
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the many, varied and (it may be) unpredictable ways in which the security of the 
nation may best be promoted’. Secretary of State for the Home Department v 
Rehman [2003] 1 AC 153. 
2. Yet the ECHR and the case law flowing from it make clear that NS exemptions must 
be proportionate, necessary and predictable in their effects, while some prohibitions 
(such as that on torture) may not be overridden under any circumstances. We 
suggest that a good starting point is the Johannesburg Principles, as elaborated in 
the Article 19 discussion at http://www.article19.org/pages/en/national-security-
more.html. 
3. The Article 19 discussion notes that one of the main roles of the state in a post-
imperial age is to act as a guarantor of human rights. It points out that NS 
restrictions, even in democratic countries, are often ‘impermissibly vague or respond 
to statements which pose only a hypothetical risk of harm, making them ideal 
instruments of abuse to prevent the airing of unpopular ideas or criticism of 
government.’ 
4. The Scottish referendum underlines its argument that national unity is better 
safeguarded by democratic process, and that NS should only be invoked when the 
threat to unity comes from force or the threat of force. It should not be invoked for 
local or isolated threats to law and order. 
5. It is also argued by the security and intelligence agencies, when lobbying for an 
enhanced role in protecting critical national infrastructure, that the state also acts as 
an insurer of last resort. When banks started to fail in 2008, voters looked to the 
Government to do something, and the same would be the case if a network-based 
attack were to take down the National Grid, or a computer worm to break the 
Internet. 
6. But it does not follow from this that protecting all manner of (mostly privately-
owned) infrastructure from sabotage should come within the definition of NS, even 
where such crimes could be of sufficient consequence to have a material effect on 
the economy. 
7. The Security Service Act 1989 says that the service’s function shall be [1(2)] the 
protection of national security and, in particular, its protection against threats from 
espionage, terrorism and sabotage, from the activities of agents of foreign powers 
and from actions intended to overthrow or undermine parliamentary democracy by 
political, industrial or violent means [1(3)] to safeguard the economic well-being of 
the United Kingdom against threats posed by the actions or intentions of persons 
outside the British Islands [1(4)] to act in support of the activities of police forces, the 
National Crime Agency and other law enforcement agencies in the prevention and 
detection of serious crime.  
8. The prevention of crimes such as sabotage of the National Grid is thus clearly seen as 
a national security mission only if the attack is performed by a foreign government 
(in which case it falls under 1(2)). Sabotage by non-state actors falls under 1(3) if 
they are outside the UK and 1(4) if they are domestic extremists.  
9. The recent history of such attacks ranges from the attempt by PIRA to blow up three 
of London’s supergrid substations in 1996, to more recent occupations of generating 
plant and other sites by environmental activists. In every case, the attackers were 
domestic. 
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10. The Intelligence Services Act 1994 similarly sets out a threefold purpose for SIS in 
1(2), namely national security, economic well-being, and supporting the prevention 
and detection of serious crime. 
11. These issues have been discussed extensively by Parliament, not just during the 
passage of the above Acts but also in the debates on the Interception of 
Communications Act 1985 and the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000. 
Ministers have assured Parliament that although boundaries are difficult to draw, 
the engagement of the national security apparatus should be restricted to serious 
matters (E.g. Lord Bassam of Brighton HL Deb, 12 June 2000, c1496). 
12. This settled disposition is now being challenged by two facts. First, critical 
infrastructure in Britain and elsewhere is becoming dependent on networked 
computer systems, and the protection of systems for electricity, water, 
communications, financial services, and even healthcare – against even petty crime – 
are becoming a matter of information security mechanisms as well as of the more 
traditional physical security.  
13. Second, GCHQ’s protective arm, CESG, has been designated the National Technical 
Authority for cybersecurity, putting it in pole position for advising not just the 
military and intelligence communities but also the full range of civil government 
departments. Thus we find CESG managers and experts involved in setting security 
policy for smart meters at DECC; advising the DoH on acceptable mechanisms for the 
anonymisation of health records; instructing the DWP how to go about 
authenticating people who lodge welfare claims online; and telling the Bank of 
England and other financial regulators what should be considered acceptable 
resilience in financial networks.  
14. This represents an enormous expansion of the scope and scale of national security 
activities, and is objectionable on quite a number of grounds. 
15. First, there is competition. Britain has many information security firms who would 
love to advise government departments on how to protect their systems, ranging 
from the big international consultancies down to small specialists. Why is the 
(Conservative-led) Government engaged in a creeping nationalisation of this 
industry? 
16. Second, there is quality. Good security engineering tends to build on a deep 
understanding of the tradecraft of the application area; for example, banks know 
quite a lot about payment fraud, while DWP has a lot of experience of people trying 
to fiddle benefits and HMRC understands carousel fraud against the VAT system. 
17. Third, there is resource. Both the Security Service and GCHQ are small, and must 
perforce focus on major threats. As a result, GCHQ’s work on smart meter security 
tackles only those threats that might bring down the grid (for example, by switching 
millions of meters off remotely) rather than the much more numerous and diverse 
threats from routine criminal activity (householders stealing electricity by 
manipulating meters, energy companies defrauding customers or colluding to 
commit competition offences).  
18. The national security apparatus is not in a position to take over, or even to 
coordinate and supervise, the work of all the UK’s police forces and regulators.  In 
fact, while the law give the agencies the role of supporting the police in investigating 
serious crime; it wisely does not grant them any role in crime prevention at all. 
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19. Fourth, there is openness, which is an ideal in engineering as almost everywhere 
else. National security is frequently used as an excuse for companies to entrench 
monopolistic abuses. To take just one example, suppliers of railway locomotives and 
signalling equipment in the UK increasingly escape the EU “right to repair” rules by 
keeping key technical documentation secret from their customers, using national 
security as an excuse. Vendors can thus low-ball supply contracts in the knowledge 
that they can make more money out of maintaining a train, over its lifetime of 30–40 
years, than from the initial sale. This ends up costing us real money, both as railway 
users and as taxpayers.  
20. The extension of ‘national security’ to larger and larger parts of the UK infrastructure 
will multiply the opportunities for abuses of this kind, and help entrench monopolies 
and oligopolies that not only impose direct economic costs but also impede 
innovation.  
21. Innovation requires open platforms on which market entrants can build new 
products that leverage existing infrastructure. For example, YouTube built a business 
starting in February 2005 and in October the following year sold the firm to Google 
for $1.65bn. This was possible because there were already hundreds of millions of 
people with PCs and broadband connections who could download and enjoy video 
clips. By comparison, the smart meter deployments made so far (for example, in 
Ontario, Italy and Spain) are locked down, so third-party developers cannot write 
applications that use their data. In consequence, the hoped-for market in energy 
service firms that would offer innovative energy-saving advice to consumers has 
simply not happened (and the UK smart meter programme, advised by CESG, looks 
set to go the same way).  
22. Sectors that fall under the national security umbrella have many other factors that 
impede innovation. For example, if suppliers need staff with security clearances, this 
creates a catch-22 where a new market entrant can’t get a sponsor for the clearance 
process until they have a customer, but can’t get a customer until they have a 
clearance. There are also serious issues with nationality, as the UK does not produce 
anything like enough software engineers and in consequence most of the staff at 
tech startups are foreign. Adding clearance costs to the existing costs and 
uncertainty of visas is a good way to steer entrepreneurial small companies away 
from a sector. 
23. In short, the locked-down national-security mindset is incompatible with the open 
standards, interfaces, labour markets and platforms required to support innovation 
in the information age.  
24. It is therefore of grave concern that current policies are drifting towards 
incorporating much of the UK’s infrastructure into a national security framework. 
25. This is starting to affect one sector after another. Financial regulators, for example, 
pressure banks to hire former intelligence agency staff and CESG-approved security 
consultants to do penetration testing, with the result that the agencies not only 
learn a lot more than they perhaps need to about financial systems’ vulnerabilities, 
but a clique of their former staff establish unjust market power in security 
consultancy. The same regulators neglect their proper duty of ensuring that victims 
of financial fraud are made whole. This is the same pattern seen in the smart 
metering project (and elsewhere). 
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26. There is a clash of incentives: for example, ‘security’ means different things for a 
bank and a bank customer. Their goals are in conflict, and the proper government 
body to arbitrate them is not an intelligence agency but a financial regulator or a 
court of law. 
27. There is also a clash of cultures: the missions of ‘national security’ and consumer 
protection are also in conflict, as the latter requires openness. 
28. Even national security itself may be compromised. Will agency staff be motivated to 
reduce risks, or merely to maximise compliance? As more and more firms in the 
security industry feel it prudent to get former senior agency staff (or ministers) on 
their board of directors, will rent-seeking cloud perceptions of the national interest 
at the policy level? 
29. The protection of civilian infrastructure, such as the railways, the banks, the NHS, the 
utilities and the Internet itself, should not therefore be primarily regarded as a 
national security matter. The national-security apparatus may have some role to play 
(in respect of possible hostile state action) but its role must never be the leading 
one. It must be limited to that which is proportionate and necessary, leaving 
appropriate responsibilities to the companies’ directors, to the regulators and to the 
police. 
30. Moving now to the earlier questions in the consultation, we doubt that a twenty-
year planning horizon is appropriate for the digital aspects of national security. While 
the product cycle of warship and warplane builders may be fifteen years, the 
computer industry’s is more like 15 months. Looking back at 1994, IBM dominated 
the industry; the Internet was an academic ghetto, used by mathematicians to 
exchange learned papers; Microsoft’s market capitalisation was only $20bn; and 
firms like Google and Facebook had not even been founded. (Mark Zuckerberg was 
only ten years old.) 
31. The emphasis should not be “Should the UK plan to maintain its global influence?” 
but “How will the UK continue to prosper in a globalised world, where we are no 
longer in a position to set the terms of trade?”  
32. We must make policy for the twenty-first century, not hanker for the nineteenth. 
 
September 27th 2014 
 
Dr Jamie Gaskarth – written evidence 
 
Background on contributor: 
 
Dr Jamie Gaskarth is Associate Professor in International Relations at Plymouth University, 
and the convenor of the British Foreign Policy Working Group of the British International 
Studies Association. He is the author of British Foreign Policy (Polity Press, 2013) and 
editor/co-editor of Rising Powers, Global Governance and Global Ethics (Routledge, 2015); 
British Foreign Policy and the National Interest (Palgrave, 2014) and British Foreign Policy: 
The New Labour Years (Palgrave, 2011) as well as numerous academic articles on foreign 
policy and security. In 2011 he was a Visiting Research Scholar at the Center for British 
Studies, University of California at Berkeley. 
 
Summary of main points: 
Dr Jamie Gaskarth – written evidence 
66 
 
 
 Identity is an important feature of any national security strategy. 
 There is a spectrum of ways of incorporating it into policymaking, from a bottom up 
strategy driven by public opinion to a top down approach imposed by elites. 
 A middle road of listening to public opinion whilst providing leadership when needed 
should be the default position of national strategy making.  
 However, identity has received only cursory attention from recent defence and 
security reviews. 
 There has been no concerted attempt to outline a particular British identity and gear 
security strategy to preserving and promoting this at home and abroad. 
 A series of current and future challenges mean that governments must pay more 
attention to identity and set out practical steps to incorporating public opinion into 
security strategy. 
 
1. Devising a national security strategy is difficult because the concept of security 
relates both to material factors, such as the physical safety of individuals and 
territory, as well as ideas, for instance, the values and institutions which are vital to 
maintaining community cohesion. At times these imperatives can come into conflict 
and tensions have to be resolved within the national community. In the process, 
security strategy very quickly turns to questions of national identity. What kind of a 
society are we attempting to secure? Could a plan to secure one aspect of our 
community, i.e. the safety of our citizens, end up threatening others, such as the 
values of tolerance or freedom of expression? 
2. Recent national security strategies and defence reviews have been criticized for not 
paying enough attention to British identity. According to a number of reports, if we 
do not think carefully about who we are, or want to be in world politics, then we 
can’t set national goals and get public support to pursue them.58  
3. Adapting insights from the strategy literature59, there is a spectrum of ways identity 
can link to policy. At one end, policymakers could find out how British citizens 
perceive themselves and what kind of actor they would like the UK to be in the 
world. Policymaking would then be a matter of trying to act out this identity in the 
most efficient way possible.  
4. Alternatively, policymakers might have their own ideas about what kind of country 
they perceive Britain to be and how it should act. The challenge in this scenario 
would be to promote a British identity (that may have narrow elite origins) to the 
wider public and bring the attitudes of the mass of the British people in line with this 
perception. 
                                                          
58 House of Lords Select Committee on Soft Power and the UK’s Influence, (2014) Persuasion and Power in the  
Modern World (London: TSO), HL150, 128-129 ; Public Administration Select Committee (PASC) (2012) 
Strategic thinking in government: without National Strategy, can viable government strategy emerge? 
(London: TSO), HC1625; PASC, (2010) Who does UK National Strategy? (London: HMSO), HC 435. 
59 In particular, Freedman, L. (2013) Strategy (Oxford: Oxford University Press) who outlines strategy from 
above and below; Humphreys, A.R.C. (2014) ‘From National Interest to Global Reform: Patterns of Reasoning 
in British Foreign Policy Discourse’, British Journal of Politics and International Relations, Early View, 10 June; 
Jermyn, S. (2011) Strategy for Action (London: Knightstone), 158-160. 
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5. In between would be a strategy that was sensitive to public attitudes and responsive 
to changes in public opinion but which also provided leadership when required – 
communicating the rationale for decisions whilst also garnering support for future 
policy directions. 
6. The first approach is bottom up, reactive to prevailing beliefs and requires sensitive 
accumulation of understanding about what the public want. This might involve 
asking the public how they would like to see the UK using force abroad, what sort of 
defence spending and capabilities they would be willing to sustain, and who they 
would like to see Britain allying itself with. An extensive public consultation exercise, 
openly conducted with public forums, focus groups and other interactive 
mechanisms such as referenda would be just some of the ways of building up a 
picture of public attitudes. The Public Administration Select Committee has 
advocated ‘iterative polling’, in which a series of differently worded questions on the 
same theme are used to tease out public attitudes.60 
7. The other end is top down, and requires either an indifferent public who are happy 
to leave defence and security to the government, or a concerted effort on the part of 
policymakers to convince the populace of the value of the particular identity they 
favour. This approach sees security strategy as about providing leadership and 
assumes a greater wisdom on the part of officials. To be sustainable this identity has 
to be set out in detail and its continuing relevance and usefulness underlined. 
However, leaders will have to forge strategy in the public interest, even in the face of 
public opposition, at times61. 
8. Strategies that seek a middle road require the most time and effort as they have to 
adapt to changes in public attitudes, have an acute understanding of the global 
context and potential challenges as well as knowing when and how to act. However, 
they should be the default position for policymakers since they combine the benefits 
of public awareness and support with the opportunity to provide leadership 
according to necessity.  
9. In any case, to be sustainable, policies have to move towards the middle of the 
spectrum over time. Top down approaches must ensure that the public has bought 
into the strategy or they begin to crumble. Meanwhile, bottom up approaches 
require leaders to be prepared to make bold decisions at times, and have the 
                                                          
60 PASC (2013) Engaging the public in National Strategy, Fourth Report of Session 2013–14 (London: TSO). 
61 There are negative examples of the first two approaches in history. Disarmament and appeasement policies 
in the 1930s were arguably following public opinion in line with the first, bottom up approach. The invasion of 
Iraq in 2003 was an example of a top down effort to convince a sceptical public of the need to act in a certain 
way to be an influential actor and reliable ally. There are also positive ones, such as the decision to join the 
European community – a top down effort – and public charitable efforts such as Live Aid and Live 8 which led 
to increased aid spending from the bottom up.  
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courage to see policies through when public support has waned as the costs begin to 
bite. 
10. The absence or limited space for discussion of British identity in recent defence and 
security strategies implies that policymakers have failed to embrace any of these 
approaches. The public is rarely consulted about defence or security matters. There 
has been no referendum on Trident renewal. In the past, public subscriptions were 
raised to fund military ships and aircraft but this public engagement with defence 
spending has ended. Chatham House polling has revealed a split between the 
attitudes of the general public and those of elites about the kind of identity the UK 
should have in the world.62 However, the government has not responded by 
considering what this means for future security policy. This is problematic as polling 
data during the interventions in Iraq, Libya and Afghanistan revealed significant 
public opposition to British involvement.63 A lack of public support can have major 
impacts on how wars are fought and therefore the likelihood of success.  
11. As many commentators have noted, successive governments have failed to provide a 
coherent explanation of their view of British identity and how this relates to security 
matters. Efforts have been made to convince the public about security threats, 
especially from terrorism. There are also governmental efforts to justify the use of 
force abroad – usually only at the point of action. But there has been no concerted 
attempt to outline a particular British identity and gear security strategy to 
preserving and promoting this at home and abroad.64  
12. In many ways, this is a very British approach to policymaking. Identity is the kind of 
abstract concept that empirically-minded British officials traditionally did not like to 
ponder. However, in recent years policymakers have shown a sophisticated grasp of 
concepts like complexity, risk, globalization, resilience, among others. It is time that 
identity was also considered as an important factor in security strategy. 
13. Identities are often multi-faceted and this can lead people to question how far any 
agreement is possible on what Britishness is and how it is best protected. To achieve 
consensus, policymakers can sometimes fall back on expressing very basic principles 
such as fair play, the rule of law, liberty, or democracy; values that few states in the 
world would not claim as their own. Alternatively, they set British identity in 
opposition to an ‘other’ such as Europe, which can have hugely damaging diplomatic 
                                                          
62 Chatham House/You Gov (2012) ‘British Attitudes Towards the UK’s International Priorities’ London: 
ChathamHouse, available at: 
http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/public/Research/Europe/0712ch_yougov_survey_0.pdf; 
Chatham House-YouGov Survey (2010) ‘British Attitudes Towards the UK’s International Priorities’, 2 July, 
(London: Chatham House). 
63 Reifler, J., Clarke, H. D., Scotto, T. J., Sanders, D., Stewart, M. C. and Whiteley, P. (2014), ‘Prudence, Principle 
and Minimal Heuristics: British Public Opinion Toward the Use of Military Force in Afghanistan and Libya’, 
British Journal of Politics & International Relations, 16: 28–55. See also Gaskarth, J. (2013) British Foreign Policy 
(Cambridge: Polity Press), 78.  
64 Initiatives such as the citizenship test, which does promote a particular British identity, are not connected 
with foreign or security policy and only relate to a small subsection of the population. 
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consequences.65 This can lead to confusion when policymakers disparage a state 
such as France at one moment only to embrace them as defence partners in the 
next.  
14. Elsewhere, I have suggested that more of an effort could be made to steer foreign 
and defence policy towards a coherent sense of British identity connected with its 
role in the world.66 Even if this is seen as too restrictive, the current tendency to 
consider identity only when policymakers are looking for support to act makes such 
appeals seem opportunistic. To ensure that the public will buy into the next national 
security strategy, it must address identity and consider how the UK will respond to 
future risks in light of how the community sees itself – and is seen by others – before 
crises emerge.  
15. This is made more vital considering the following features of the current security 
context in which identity dilemmas are paramount: 
16. Austerity 
Restrictions on public spending will continue into the next parliament. This will 
create further pressure on defence and security budgets. There is likely to be even 
more public scepticism about military actions that do not directly relate to the 
security of the British mainland.  
17. Internal fragmentation  
The Scottish referendum hints at divergent views of Britain that have to be managed. 
Immigration has also had the dual effect of increasing the sense of connection 
between Britons and wider international society whilst leading to dissent over British 
intervention abroad. 
18. Elite vs public split 
As mentioned above, the general public has a more circumscribed idea of Britain’s 
role in the world than elites. Either elites will have to change their assumptions or 
they must try and connect with the public and convert them to their point of view. 
19. Relative decline 
The coming decades will see further decline in Britain’s relative power. The question 
is whether rising powers would support an assertive British identity in the future. If 
not, the UK must devise an alternative image of the country to maintain influence. 
20. Europe 
The most fundamental strategic challenge to British security is its relationship with 
the EU. If policymakers are to achieve support for reform among other EU members, 
they will have to project an image of Britain as a committed and integral member of 
the EU. Yet, all the public rhetoric has been in the opposite direction. In the current 
climate, no significant effort has been expended to promote the European aspects of 
British identity and so it is little wonder that the public feels little connection with its 
political institutions. If a future government wishes to leave the EU, it will need to 
                                                          
65 This was noted in Linda Colley, (1991) Britons: Forging the Nation, 1707-1837 (London: Pimlico), 6. 
66 Gaskarth, J. (2014) 'Strategizing Britain's role in the world' International Affairs, 90,3, 559-581. 
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consider what effect that will have on British identity at home and abroad and 
counter negative images with positive ones. 
21. Conclusion 
22. What this discussion points to is the need to engage in a fundamental reappraisal of 
British identity. Any security strategy that purports to be national has to engage with 
the public, consider their views and be seen to take them on board.  
23. Where leaders wish to challenge these attitudes, they have to be more deliberate 
about explaining their rationale and critiquing alternatives. The days when British 
identity could be taken for granted are over. Britain is a more diverse and 
democratic place than in previous centuries and its populace are less deferential on 
security and defence matters. To gain public support for the financial expenditure 
and human cost of warfighting, and security policy more broadly, its elites have to 
connect decisionmaking to British identity in a way that will resonate with the public. 
24. That means that the next National Security Strategy needs to make a commitment to 
gauge public opinion and respond to it in its policymaking, as well as setting out 
practical mechanisms for doing so. 
 
Global Sustainability Institute – written evidence 
 
1.  This evidence is written on behalf of the Global Sustainability Institute (GSI), part of 
Anglia Ruskin University.  GSI is an interdisciplinary research institute, including both natural 
and social scientists, concerned with a wide range of sustainability issues. 
 
2.  One of the major projects currently being carried out by the Institute is the Global 
Resource Observatory.  We are drawing on the work of that project in this evidence.  In 
particular, we base many of our comments on our publication ‘Country Resource Maps’ 
(2014), a copy of which will be sent to the Committee. 
 
The scope of the National Security Strategy 
 
3.  Although military defence must clearly be an important part of any nation’s security 
arrangements, we regard the view that national security is simply a matter of preparing for 
the possibility of military threats as dangerously out-dated, unimaginative, and unrealistic.  
The range and scope of the NSS is the most important aspect which needs to be clarified. 
 
4.  In our opinion, the drawing up of a UK National Security Strategy should begin from an 
assessment of global trends and risks.  We have in mind something like the US 
Government’s National Intelligence Council reports, such as ‘Global Trends 2030: Alternative 
Worlds’ (2012).  On the basis of such an assessment, it would then be possible to review 
each significant risk to UK security, considering the means by which security might be 
safeguarded or through proactive engagement the risk reduced.  This would include military 
options, but also consideration of changes to UK domestic policy, foreign policy, and 
international agreements.  Priority within this process should obviously be given to the most 
significant potential risks to UK security.  We outline below what we believe these to be. 
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The biggest threat to UK security: climate change 
 
5.  The most important current threat to UK national security is global climate change.  This 
is affecting not only the UK itself, through for example changes in weather patterns and 
flooding, but also the international context in which the UK operates.  Global climate change 
is certain to exacerbate conflict in many parts of the world in which the UK has an interest, 
change patterns of food production, and increase the already growing numbers of 
environmental refugees, for example from Bangladesh. 
 
6.  The UK should respond to this not only by preparing to adapt to climate change within 
the UK, for example through reinforcing flood defences, but also through playing a leading 
role in international climate change negotiations, and in the actions necessary to back this 
up.  Above all, this must include a transformation in UK energy policy, anchored in a 
transition away from fossil fuels, through the increased use of renewable energy and energy 
efficiency, along with change in the way energy is used in transport, buildings, industry, and 
food production. 
 
7.  In terms of international relations, this implies close working with EU partners, a 
willingness to support the deployment of low-carbon technology in developing countries, 
and a reduction in reliance on alliances with oil-producing countries such as Saudi-Arabia.  
One consequence would be to reduce the incentive for the UK to take part in military 
intervention in the Middle East for energy security reasons, making possible a shift towards 
giving greater priority to human rights concerns. 
 
Economic threats to UK security 
 
8.  Global inequality is undoubtedly a major cause of resentment, desperation, and conflict.  
The world would be a more peaceful place, and the UK more secure, if inequality could be 
reduced from its current extremes.  Extremist ideology is often itself a response to extreme 
circumstances and a deeply-felt perception of injustice.  The UK overseas aid programme 
has a role to play here, but it should be reinforced by policies for fair trade, company law 
reform to ensure that UK companies are accountable for their actions overseas, action to 
clamp down on tax havens, and reforms designed to restrain the more dysfunctional aspects 
of the finance system.   
 
9.  The drawing up of a UK National Security Strategy should also consider the distribution of 
the world’s natural resources, such as metals, fuels, food, land, and water, and the potential 
for insecurity as a result of the risk of resource pressures and shortages.  This should guide 
not only military defence policies, but also trade policy and programmes for enabling 
resource substitution to take place where necessary.  We urge the UK Government to 
support the EU programme of work on resource efficiency, and to help ensure that this is 
continued by the new Commission. 
 
10. In particular, evidence gathered by the UK-US Taskforce on the Impact of Extreme 
Weather to UK/US Food System Resilience, supported by the Foreign & Commonwealth 
Office, which will report in 2015, should feed into the 2015 UK National Security Strategy.  
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11.  The dependence of the UK and world economy on natural resources is a major focus of 
the work of the Global Sustainability Institute.  The report which we are sending, ‘Country 
Resource Maps’, sets out some of the relevant data, including data on water, food, and fuel.  
We believe that data such as this – which the UK Government is clearly in a position to 
elaborate in far more detail – should be made an important part of the basis for the next 
National Security Strategy. 
 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
12.  The next National Security Strategy should be the first of a new type, aligned with the 
realities of the 21st Century, in which military threats to security are considered alongside 
major global trends and threats such as climate change, resource scarcities, and extreme 
economic inequality.  This approach will require the Strategy to draw on a wider range of 
analysis, and bring in a wider range of stakeholders, government departments, and policy 
areas, than has been the case with previous such strategies. 
 
Institute for Conflict, Co-operation and Security, University of Birmingham – written 
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Preface 
 
1. The University of Birmingham has recently held a number of Policy Commissions. The 
most recent of these was The Security Impact of Drones: Challenges and Opportunities for 
the UK and was chaired by Sir David Omand, former UK Security and Intelligence 
Coordinator, and a former Permanent Secretary of the Home Office and Director of GCHQ. 
The Commission explored the challenges and opportunities that Remotely Piloted Aircraft 
(RPA) technology – both commercial and military – are likely to pose for current and future 
UK governments. Beyond the controversies surrounding the US use of armed RPA as part of 
their counter-terrorist cross-border campaigns, the Commission considered the wider 
impact of the new technology on warfare, national security and public safety, and the 
implications for UK public policy in a national, regional, and international context.  
 
2. The writers of the current submission are the Academic Lead of the Policy Commission 
(Prof. Nicholas Wheeler), two members of the Commission (Prof. Stefan Wolff and Hon. 
Prof. Paul Schulte), and one of the Research Associates on the Policy Commission (Dr. 
Christopher Wyatt). All three are also currently working on an ESRC-funded project titled, 
The Political Effects of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles on Conflict and Cooperation Within and 
Between States.67 The Report of the Birmingham Policy Commission was launched at the 
Royal United Services Institute on 22 October 2014.68 Our evidence to this Committee is 
                                                          
67 More details on the project are available at the following link: 
http://www.birmingham.ac.uk/research/activity/conflict-cooperation-security/Projects/Unmanned-Aerial-
Vehicles/Projects.aspx  
68 The Report is available at the following link: http://www.birmingham.ac.uk/research/impact/policy-
commissions/remote-warfare/index.aspx  
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going to focus on RPA-relevant aspects in relation to each question, but will contextualise 
them in relation to other, wider, issues. 
 
What should be the UK’s national security priorities for the next twenty years, and how 
should these steer the next NSS? 
 
The UK’s place in the world 
 
3. The UK’s significant place in the world is politically and historically complex and this will 
not be maintained without cost, risk, and difficulty. Much will depend upon the British 
public’s attitude towards the risks and costs of an assertive national role in the world 
beyond the nation’s simple demographic or economic rankings, and on national credibility 
within the international system, especially over membership of institutions such as the 
Security Council, NATO, and the EU.  Satisfactory and effective engagement will not be 
achieved without concerted political will.  An adequate NSS will therefore need to be 
fundamentally sensitive to the issues of explanation, resilience, and political sustainability 
which will arise from different choices in the security field. 
 
4. The question has been posed as to whether a NSS can simultaneously accommodate 
reduced resources and increased burdens ‘while at the same time asserting “no reduction in 
influence”’69, in light of the ‘relative decline on the global stage’70. In our view, any NSS 
needs to consider the relevance of RPA and their systems. In many respects, they are 
instrumental in addressing this apparent disconnect. Remotely piloted and driven air, sea 
and land vehicles, combining features like over-watch and counter rocket, artillery and 
mortar (C-RAM) systems, and coupled with a high degree of automation in maritime and 
undersea craft and systems are just the sort of craft to be able to do more in situations of 
diminished resource. Moreover, they do so allowing for ‘no reduction in influence’ and 
power can continue to be projected where it is needed. RPA and other like ground and 
maritime vehicles also greatly facilitate the ability of the armed forces to react to 
emergencies as they occur. 
 
5. The British position in the world vis-à-vis these units and their systems will continue to be 
bound by the exigencies of international humanitarian law (otherwise known as the law of 
armed conflict and international human rights law). It is likely that British attitudes to the 
employment of armed force in general will continue to be distinguishable from both that of 
the United States and Europe. But international practice over the kinetic use of RPAs may 
converge where a state has obtained an international mandate to save lives in humanitarian 
emergencies. Britain’s use of these technologies overseas will continue to be in accord with 
UK judgements of international law, which will in some cases rest upon necessary UN 
mandates. Public differentiation of the British position from that of other powers, especially 
the United States, will be paramount and will have to be sensitively established.  But we do 
not recommend an open breach and denunciation of US RPA strikes against terrorists within 
countries where governments have not formally consented to their operation. This is 
primarily because the US government is already aware of contrary UK interpretations of 
international law, and has numerous US experts already objecting to the legal and strategic 
                                                          
69 JCNSS, 2010: Paragraph 30. 
70 JCNSS, 2014: Paragraph 47. 
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consequences of US policy, while open British criticism would jeopardise shared defence 
equities, embarrass US regional allies friendly to the UK and involved to varying degrees in 
the US RPA counterterrorist campaign, and strengthen the Jihadi narrative. 
 
6. The UK’s role confers on it certain rights and responsibilities with regard to RPA and their 
systems, as with other matters. At the annual conference of the Convention on 
Conventional Weapons (CCW) in Geneva on 13 and 14 November, states have the 
opportunity to renew the CCW mandate and continue discussions in 2015 on lethal 
autonomous weapons systems (LAWS). The recent decision by the UK Government to 
support renewal of the mandate has been applauded and will present a good opportunity 
for, as Tom Watson and others have put it, the UK ‘Government to engage further and 
assume a leading role in securing a new international framework to address the concerns of 
LAWS. The UK’s experience in arms control, the technology of precursor systems such as the 
Taranis, and diplomatic influence, place your Department [the FCO] in a unique position to 
take a leading role in a new international process, building on existing CCW work.’71 
 
Should the UK plan to maintain its global influence?  Should we aim for a national 
consensus on the UK’s future place in the world? 
 
Strategic choices 
 
7. As the JCNSS has put it: ‘If the current strategy is not guiding choices then it needs to be 
revised’72 and ‘the National Security Secretariat should develop a methodology which 
enables the impact and likelihood of risks to be considered alongside the amount of 
government effort and resources that are being deployed to mitigate it’.73 We agree that 
widely convincing methodologies are important, highly desirable but not necessarily 
attainable.  We would particularly support enhanced research into the interactions between 
external intervention and internal radicalisation and terrorism, and the frequently asserted 
additional emotional “blowback” from factors such as cultural incompatibility and long 
range Western firepower in ‘Wars among the People’ in the Third World.  Greater certainty 
here would be valuable both to guide and to publicly defend likely strategic judgements 
facing the UK.  But we do not underestimate the sheer intellectual difficulty of establishing 
and measuring psychological causations. 
 
8. In the increasingly complex situation facing all major international players there may 
simply be no convincing objective way of judging relative risks, opportunities, threats, 
dangers, second-order effects, and feedback factors, especially over ‘debounded risks’7475, 
such as wide spectrums of potential cyber-attack, deployment by terrorists of WMD on a 
catastrophic scale or the worst, interactive consequences of climate change, none of whose 
probability of occurrence and severity of outcome can be reliably predicted. 
 
                                                          
71 Letter from Tom Watson, Chair of the APPG on Drones, Admiral Lord West, Martin Caton, Chair of the APPG 
on weapons and protection of civilians, and Professor Sir David Omand to Rt Hon Philip Hammond MP, 17 
November 2014, page 1. 
72 JCNSS, 2010: Paragraph 41. 
73 JCNSS, 2014: Paragraph 29. 
74 See, especially, Ulrich Beck - World Risk Society (Cambridge, MA: Polity Press, 1999) 
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9. The chances of achieving widespread national consensus over appropriate precautions 
and responses will consequently be low.  Security choices will have to be made on the basis 
of governmental judgements which are not likely to be widely shared and will certainly have 
to be energetically explained and justified, both to the British public and to a Parliament 
which has shown itself to be somewhat sceptical over at least the overt use of force.  To 
mitigate the potentially perverse consequences of this situation we think it is desirable that 
British governments, in and between National Security Strategies, should consciously, 
continuously and methodically explain the complexity and unavoidability of many of the 
threats facing the United Kingdom (and in the Birmingham Policy Commission report we 
have mentioned the issue of hostile use of RPA as an example of this).  If this is not done, 
there will remain a strong structural incentive for Ministers to take exaggerated and 
suboptimal decisions over priorities for investment and political attention which reduce the 
personal criticism they would themselves face from failure to stop highly publicised, 
increasingly atrocious and shocking, but relatively small-scale events like terrorist attacks.  
There may be further perverse consequences if an over precise and prescriptive National 
Security Strategy, holding British politicians to individual account, were to lead to de facto 
prioritisation favouring the avoidance of eventually traceable and politically costly 
responsibility for lapses in UK internal security.  This could come at some cost to efforts to 
maintain the more diffuse collective effectiveness of the NATO Alliance in relation to 
interstate (including proxy) conflict or tension. 
 
10. For remotely piloted and highly automated systems, whatever the degree of national 
consensus in the security field, these systems will become increasingly integral to the cost-
effective defence of the Realm and wider British interests.   
 
11. This would not require a grand strategy for a tactical arm but it would mandate a 
strategic approach to RPA use in conjunction with other systems. For remotely piloted 
aircraft, systems might be general high level networking, such as C4ISTAR (Command, 
Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and 
Reconnaissance) as well as with allies, such as MAJIIC2 (Multi-Intelligence All-Source Joint 
ISR Interoperability Coalition). Similar arrangements would likewise obtain for ground and 
maritime systems and their role will help inform strategic choices.  The expense of 
developing new systems will be high, so there will be a continuing strategic imperative to 
find cost sharing collaborative arrangements with allies. 
 
How can the next NSS be made most useful in guiding decisions in Government and long-
term spending decisions? 
 
International relationships 
 
12. We are again struck by the unrealism and undesirability of projecting any rigidly 
prescriptive National Strategy far ahead into an exceptionally unpredictable global situation.  
As the recently retired Head of the US Defense Intelligence Agency put it:  
 
‘What I see each day is the most uncertain, chaotic and confused international 
environment that I’ve witnessed in my entire career… a period of prolonged societal 
conflict that is pretty unprecedented. In the Middle East, we’re starting to see issues 
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arise over boundaries that were drawn back in the post-colonial era following World 
War I. In some regions, we’re seeing the failure of the nation-state, and…the 
disintegration of the [Westphalian] system of nation-states: a strategic landscape 
and boundaries on the global map changing right before our eyes. That change is 
being accelerated by the explosion of social media. And we in the intelligence 
community are trying to understand it all’.76 
 
13. Against this background it seems essential to us that the next NSS should positively 
stress the need for plans and capabilities which would support strategic flexibility.   
 
14. For RPA, the US Pivot to Asia and the role of the UK government in Europe are not the 
only factors which will need to be taken into account in future British decision making. The 
deteriorating security situations the Middle East and Africa are likely to be increasingly 
important. Given that the UK does not possess an active aircraft carrier and it does not 
possess a carrier-borne remotely piloted aircraft, and unmanned underwater vehicles are 
still in their infancy, Britain’s contribution to any Pivot to Asia looks both manned and 
minimal. The RPA it has are better suited to operations in Iraq/Syria and Africa, where 
postcolonial states are in difficulty and where allies like America and France are also 
increasingly turning their attention. 
 
Which will be the UK’s critical international relationships over the next 20 years? 
 
15. Britain’s key international partners seem likely to remain the US and Europe and 
traditional allies. Bilateral relations with other states, within or on supply routes to conflict 
zones, are also likely to become more important, especially where remotely piloted aircraft 
are being deployed. 
 
16. With regard to critical international relationships, it should be noted that bilateral 
relationships with France, Germany and Italy are important. These concern RPA 
development in a technological and procurement sense but also are important in terms of 
strategy, especially where the UK approach could be the centre-piece of an EU approach. 
This is particularly evident in the recent agreement with Dassault and other companies, 
where ‘contracts worth £120 million have been awarded for the early phase of a 
development programme for unmanned combat air systems’.77 
 
17. Other critical relationships exist with Russia and China. Although not allies, relations with 
these countries – in general with respect to the NSS and with respect to RPA more 
specifically – are going to need to be managed carefully, whether it is tensions in the 
Eastern Ukraine or cyber threats from the PLA (People’s Liberation Army). 
 
How should the 2015 NSS handle the uncertainty over the UK’s role in Europe? 
 
                                                          
76 James Kitfield – ‘Lieutenant-General Michael Flynn's Last Interview: Iconoclast Departs DIA With A Warning’,  
Breaking Defense, August 07, 2014 http://breakingdefense.com/2014/08/flynns-last-interview-intel-iconoclast-
departs-dia-with-a-warning/  
77 See: https://www.gov.uk/government/news/120-million-anglo-french-defence-contract for the latest position at 
time of writing. 
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18. There should be a robust threat assessment in the next iteration based upon whatever is 
the announced governmental strategy towards the EU and commitment to a referendum. 
Regardless of the questions of immigration and a referendum on Europe, we take the view 
that the NSS should make a strong case for the most effective possible links the EU to 
respond to threats with multiple economic, mass population movement, terrorism and 
military dimensions.  Wherever achievable and appropriate, the UK should try to ensure 
that these European responses are evolved in association with NATO.  For RPA, links with 
other European countries are essential for the UK’s position. Co-operation in operations in 
Libya have demonstrated this, as has the recently-signed agreement for the development of 
RPA. 
 
Risks and contingency planning  
 
What are the main risks to the UK’s national security? Is the Government’s horizon-
scanning effective, and are our national contingency plans adequate? 
 
19. The Joint Committee is ‘concerned that in some areas the Government seems genuinely 
not to have any contingency plans.  This is dangerous and unwise.’78 The ability to do 
contingency planning is indispensable, but each individual contingency plan is manpower 
intensive and risks rapidly becoming irrelevant in circumstances of accelerating international 
change. So the Joint Committee’s specific criticisms seem to us exaggerated. 
 
20. However, while Cybersecurity is well addressed in the Strategy, we believe there should 
be more attention to wider Information War (in Russian terminology, Non-Linear, or 
Contactless, Warfare, though the Russians may not be its only practitioners), Hyper-
connected electronic communication, in its propaganda as well as its technically disruptive 
aspects, is what Clausewitz might today have identified as a significant example of ‘the 
other means’ by which ‘political intercourse’ is continued into what can be called war.  The 
increasingly intensive propagation of lies and propaganda permitted by electronic media will 
increase the probability of dissent within the UK political system over appropriate responses 
to inevitably disputable and ambiguous threats.  As a Latvian Ambassador recently asked 
‘What does it mean for freedom and openness and the right of people to receive 
uncontrolled information [when] this open information space is penetrated by clear 
propaganda instruments, instruments of modern warfare?’79 Maintaining Alliance or 
national cohesion under these conditions, while facing chaotic international developments 
and pervasive uncertainties about what is permitted under international law, will therefore 
be a strategic priority, and a problem in itself.  It will be worsened if religious, diaspora or 
environmental discontents merge with resentments over growing inequalities in income, life 
prospects and employment security, blending into new narratives of disillusion, suspicion, 
and opposition to expensive security investments or resolute actions in support of British 
interests or Western values.     
 
                                                          
78 JCNSS, 2014: Paragraph 34. 
79 Ambassador Andris Razans , quoted in " Russia’s Information War: Latvian Ambassador, Finnish Strategist Warn 
On Cyber" http://breakingdefense.com/2014/06/russias-information-war-latvian-ambassador-finnish-strategist-
warn-on-cyber/  
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21. With regard to the utility of RPA and their systems, the main risks to the UK are unlikely 
to be conventional conflict. Instead, they are more likely to be Islamic Terrorism and cyber-
related threats. Remotely piloted aircraft have a role in countering both, but could be 
seriously inhibited in those potential roles if delegitimised and demonised through internal 
British political dynamics, interacting with externally fostered propaganda. 
 
22. This may well be especially problematic in the years covered by the 2015 National 
Security Strategy because the UK and its allies already face a strategic situation in which the 
paradigmatic escalatory intervention of the first decade of the 21st Century, large-scale 
transformative attempts at contested state building, has been tested by the strategic 
disappointments in Iraq and Afghanistan.  In those theatres the much heralded 
Comprehensive Approach, using all aspects of national power by consortia of intervening 
countries, though perhaps necessary, has clearly been proven to be insufficient, at least in 
timescales which Western electorates are prepared to support.  If commitments of Western 
boots on the ground are consequently no longer politically feasible, the two resultant 
alternatives are likely to be either or both upstream engagement with Low Income States 
under Stress, in development and Security Sector Reform, or limited, largely stand-off 
assistance if such states do find themselves facing insurgencies, employing special forces 
and air power, especially RPA.80 Thus, in current circumstances where British ground troops 
will not be redeployed to Iraq, RAF Reapers, alongside manned aircraft, are now being used 
both for Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) to support Iraqi Security Forces 
and Kurdish armed organisations, and inside the borders of Iraq, direct kinetic attack against 
the forces of the so-called Islamic State.  
 
23. To date, RPA have also helped forces on the ground find refugees and spot troop 
movements. They are also able to deter hostile action by their very presence and protect 
civilians against hostile forces. Indeed, the role of RPA in conflicts determined by the 
responsibility to protect (R2P), monitored by international organisations, is one which is 
increasing all the time, including with UN forces and the OSCE. 
 
24. For more kinetic operations, the utility of RPA and their systems is through functionality 
like network degradation, striking the enemy, area denial, aerial interdiction, as a force 
multiplier and as force protection. Any consideration of the UK’s role in overseas conflict 
would need to take these factors into account, especially in situations where risks to pilots 
could be removed. 
 
25. The Government’s horizon-scanning appears comprehensive in that strategies like 
Contest, Prevent and the Cyber Strategy cover those issues. Joint Doctrine Note 2/11 will 
continue to cover remotely piloted aircraft for the interim.81 Each aspect could be seen to 
have been covered. Where national contingency plans might not be said to be always wholly 
adequate, importance lies in the uses of remotely piloted aircraft and other like systems in 
                                                          
80  Paul Schulte ‘What We Do If We Are Never Going to Do This Again: Western Counterinsurgency Choices after 
Iraq and Afghanistan’ in The New Counterinsurgency Era in Critical Perspective edited by Celeste Ward Gventer, David 
Martin Jones, and MLR Smith, (Palgrave Macmillan 2014). 
 
81 HCDC - Remote Control: Remotely Piloted Airy Systems – current and future UK use: Government Response to the Committee's 
Tenth Report of Session 2013–14, Sixth Special Report of Session 2014–15, HC 611, 29 July 2014, page 3. 
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dealing with threats like Islamic Terrorism and cyber-related issues. It strikes us that it is 
here that gains could be made, with cross-cutting and joined-up approaches.  
 
26. With regard to resilience, we find that traditional understandings of target hardening, 
perimeter and entry point defence, with concomitant stand-off distances will have to be 
rethought with the new technologies available. 
 
27. Looking at the question of the use of remotely piloted aircraft in the maintenance of 
internal law and order, we take the view that the National Police Air Service and the 
Association of Chief Police Officers should formulate a strategy for their use in such cases, 
along with a code of conduct governing their use.82 
 
Scope 
 
How broadly should the NSS define national security?   
  
28. There is the concern that: ‘We are not convinced that the Government gave sufficient 
attention in the NSS to the potential risks that future international economic instability 
might pose for UK security.’83  
 
29. We agree that the economic position is crucially important, especially in view of the 
‘hyper- competition’ which can be anticipated from China and other economies beyond 
Europe and North America. But since economic predictions do not command much 
reliability beyond a few months, horizon scanning, the systematic development of 
alternative options, and strategic flexibility of thinking will be increasingly important in the 
globally volatile economic system. Increasing all these UK capabilities should therefore be 
part of any enlightened UK strategy.   
 
30. Regarding remotely piloted aircraft and their systems, it is essential that demonstrator 
programmes like the Taranis remain well-funded. For industrial research and development 
in the remotely piloted aircraft/systems sector, ring fencing and inflation proofing ought to 
be a key policy position. These measures would help insulate and cushion the sector against 
adverse shocks. Where this is less easy to guarantee, robust diplomacy underlying secure 
collaboration with allies remains essential. We consider a broad scope to be essential in 
identifying threats and strategizing our response to them. 
 
 
Hon. Prof. Paul Schulte, Prof. Nicholas J Wheeler, Prof. Stefan Wolff, and Dr Christopher M 
Wyatt 
 
12 November 2014 
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Executive summary 
 Russia and other powers have exploited the West’s lack of coherent strategic 
thinking since the end of the Cold War 
 In an interconnected world with few boundaries left, British decision-makers and 
their national security “community” need a new mindset 
 The UK, both within and outside NATO, must be able to fight the right kind of war — 
the one for global public opinion — even more than a military one 
 Annexation of Crimea: what Western commentators have called a new kind of 
warfare is in fact the latest chapter in a 100-year-old playbook Russians call “active 
measures” 
 Recent Russian security and intelligence budgets have grown annually by an 
estimated 15%-20%, with spending going to operations 
 Between 2015 and 2017, Russia’s overall (declared) budget for State-funded 
broadcasting will rise by more than 200% 
 Russian reliance on strategic information operations will only grow, as military 
doctrine shifts emphasis from conventional battlegrounds to psychological and 
perception wars 
 One of the greatest challenges NATO faces is how to prevent Russian State-
controlled media from radicalising the Russian diaspora within its borders 
 NATO leaders need to realise fully the opportunities and threats that information operations 
present, and devote adequate resources to address them 
 There is a need for a true national security community that harnesses the enormous 
talents and power of British society at large 
 
Introduction84 
1. Russia’s annexation of Crimea and invasion of Ukraine’s Donbas region have again 
exposed the West’s lack of coherent strategic thinking following the end of the USSR. 
Especially since Vladimir V. Putin attained political office 15 years ago, Russian strategic 
information operations (IOs) have increasingly exploited Western political “short-termism” 
and relative retrenchment, subverting and paralysing decision-making.85 Despite clear 
warnings like the 2007 cyber-attacks on Estonia,86 and provocations triggering war with 
Georgia (2008)87 and now Ukraine, some policy-makers in the West still think wishfully 
about Moscow’s intentions towards former Soviet states. 
 
                                                          
84 All views expressed are the author’s own. With 15 years’ experience in international security affairs in 
the public, private and academic sectors, he is also a historian of Russian subversion and intelligence. The 
Institute for Statecraft (IfS) is an independent body dedicated to refreshing the practice of statecraft, improving 
governance and enhancing national security. 
85 Victor Madeira, ‘Russian subversion — haven’t we been here before?’ Statecraft Papers, IfS, 30 July 2014 
(www.statecraft.org.uk/research/russian-subversion-havent-we-been-here). 
86 Chloe Arnold, ‘Russian group’s claims reopen debate on Estonian cyberattacks,’ Radio Free Europe 
(RFERL), 30 March 2009 
(www.rferl.org/content/Russian_Groups_Claims_Reopen_Debate_On_Estonian_Cyberattacks_/1564694.html ). 
87 European Union (EU), Independent international fact-finding mission on the conflict in Georgia, volume (vol.) 
I, September 2009, pages (pp.) 11, 31 (http://www.ceiig.ch/pdf/IIFFMCG_Volume_I.pdf ). 
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2. This submission addresses how in an interconnected world with few boundaries left, IOs 
change the very essence of “national” security. In a world where a single Twitter message or 
YouTube video clip — genuine or otherwise — can instantly re-awaken (and manipulate) 
centuries-old feuds, British decision-makers and their national security “community” need a 
new mindset. 
 
3. The July 2014 call for evidence listed seven questions (Q). This submission touches mainly 
on Q1 (‘What should be the UK’s national security priorities for the next twenty years, and 
how should these steer the next NSS?’) and Q7 (‘How broadly should the NSS define national 
security?’). But this evidence speaks also to Q3 (‘How can the next NSS be made most useful 
in guiding decisions in Government and long-term spending decisions?’) and Q6 (‘What are 
the main risks to the UK’s national security?...’). 
 
The mind as the battlefield 
4. Events in Crimea and the Donbas prove the West cannot keep looking at “national” 
security primarily from a military hardware perspective. After the recent Wales summit, 
NATO statements on renewed commitment to Article 5 and higher defence spending were 
indeed encouraging, but misplaced. Russia and other revisionist powers like China (but also 
supposedly pro-West regimes like Turkey and Thailand, for example) increasingly use IOs to 
challenge Western narratives in the psychological realm while heavily censoring and 
violently suppressing domestic dissent.88 
 
5. Though aimed at Western audiences also, Kremlin IOs target mainly Russian “hearts and 
minds”. Trapped in a cocoon of lies and “spin” that the West must pierce, average Russians 
have both the most to lose and to gain, and so are the best hope for stopping Moscow’s 
destabilisation of the former Soviet bloc. The UK, both within and outside NATO, must 
therefore be able to fight the right kind of war — the one for global public opinion — even 
more than a military one. 
 
6. Given Russia’s revolutionary traditions and often-poor military readiness, armed conflict 
is a last resort. And when it is not, even then it is one of the final stages in the process of 
aggression.89 When possible, Moscow has long preferred waging what Western 
commentators have mistakenly called a new kind of warfare since the March 2014 
annexation of Crimea.90 
 
                                                          
88 BBC News China, ‘China “censors Hong Kong protest posts on social media”,’ 29 September 2014 
(www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-china-29411270); Nathaniel Mott, ‘The year of digital blockades continues with 
China’s Instagram ban,’ Pando, 29 September 2014 (http://pando.com/2014/09/29/the-year-of-digital-blockades-
continues-with-chinas-instagram-ban/ ). 
89 Janis Berzins, Russia’s new generation warfare in Ukraine: implications for Latvian defence policy, National 
Defence Academy of Latvia — Center for Security and Strategic Research, Policy Paper 02, April 2014, p. 6, 
(http://www.naa.mil.lv/~/media/NAA/AZPC/Publikacijas/PP%2002-2014.ashx ). 
90 In February 1927 HM Ambassador to Germany, Sir Ronald Lindsay, urged London to realise that short 
of military action against the USSR, Britain was fighting ‘a new kind of war’. Anti-subversive measures could not 
be gradual: they had to be part of a package of ‘economic boycott, breach of diplomatic relations’, as well as 
‘propaganda and counter-propaganda’ and ‘pressure on neutrals.’ Victor Madeira, Britannia and The Bear: the 
Anglo-Russian intelligence wars, 1917—1929 (Woodbridge: 2014), p. 159. 
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7. At its core, this mix of political, covert, economic and other activity is but the latest 
chapter in a 100-year-old playbook Russians call “active measures”.91 Though modernised to 
exploit the speed and reach of 21st-century mass and social media, this playbook retains its 
basic aim: to influence behaviour, enabling the Soviet-era intelligence officers ruling Russia 
today to manipulate opponents. Active measures seem new to us now only because the 
West — which never fully came to grips with this challenge between 1917 and 1991 in the 
first place — allowed its Russia expertise to die away after the Cold War and forgot vital 
lessons along the way.92 
 
8. Modern Russian IOs date back to Soviet “special propaganda”, first taught on its own in 
1942.93 Along the way, Moscow perfected the concept of reflexive control, essentially 
making opponents act as desired without them being aware of the Kremlin’s hidden hand.94 
Eventually, Soviet military doctrine regarded social revolution in enemy territories — 
precisely what Crimea and the Donbas have experienced — as victory.95 
 
9. Moscow strategically exploits the volume and speed of modern communications to create 
alternate but quickly shifting realities, causing uncertainty and stopping free speech. A 
particularly effective method has been to blend traditional online “trolling” (i.e. abusive 
disruption) by people with the automated variety done by “bots”, or networks of 
computers.96 The outcome is what one might call “shallow but deep”. Content in comments 
sections below articles remains shallow, with no real debate of inconvenient issues or facts, 
                                                          
91 Active measures are ‘aimed at exerting useful influence on ... the political life of a target ... its foreign 
policy ... misleading the adversary, undermining and weakening his positions, [and] the disruption of his hostile 
plans.’ Vasiliy Mitrokhin, ed., KGB lexicon: the Soviet intelligence officer’s handbook (London: 2002), p. 13. Active 
measures are rooted in how Russian geography shaped Mongol warfare tactics and strategy. Flat Russian 
steppes provide virtually no natural cover/concealment, making active deception a vital element of any 
successful military operation. Jeffrey Malone, ‘Russian approach to information warfare,’ Australian Defence 
Force Academy, September 2014, slide 4 (www.slideshare.net/jeffreymalone1/the-russian-approach-to-
information-warfare ). 
92 In the UK’s case, see Commons Defence Committee, Towards the next Defence and Security Review: part 
two — NATO, HC 358, 31 July 2014, pp. 35-36 
(www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201415/cmselect/cmdfence/358/358.pdf ). 
93 Jolanta Darczewska, The anatomy of Russian information warfare: the Crimean operation, Centre for Eastern 
Studies, Warsaw, 42, May 2014, p. 9 
(www.osw.waw.pl/sites/default/files/the_anatomy_of_russian_information_warfare.pdf ). 
94 Reflexive control is ‘a means of conveying to a partner or an opponent specially prepared information to 
incline him to voluntarily make the predetermined decision by the initiator of the action.’ Berzins, Russia, p. 7, 
footnote (fn.) 9. 
95 Raymond W. Leonard, Secret soldiers of the Revolution: Soviet military intelligence, 1918—1933 (Westport: 
1999), p. 46. 
96 The 2014 budget for a single one of these Russian “troll” groups is a reported £6 million. Max Seddon, 
‘Documents show how Russia’s troll army hit America,’ BuzzFeed, 2 June 2014 
(www.buzzfeed.com/maxseddon/documents-show-how-russias-troll-army-hit-america). See also John Robb, 
‘History will be written by the bots,’ Global Guerrillas, 6 August 2014 
(http://globalguerrillas.typepad.com/globalguerrillas/2014/08/history-will-be-written-by-the-bots.html ); Milan 
Lelich, ‘Victims of Russian propaganda,’ New Eastern Europe, 25 July 2014 (www.neweasterneurope.eu/articles-
and-commentary/1278-victims-of-russian-propaganda ); Catherine A. Fitzpatrick, ‘Here comes the Kremlin’s troll 
army,’ The Interpreter, 6 June 2014 (www.interpretermag.com/14302/ ); Chris Elliott, ‘The readers’ editor on... pro-
Russia trolling below the line on Ukraine stories,’ The Guardian, 4 May 2014 
(www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/may/04/pro-russia-trolls-ukraine-guardian-online ). 
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while the volume of Russian “trolling” quickly buries anti-Kremlin views so deep in a stream 
of nonsense that most readers never even see them. 
 
10. The stakes will get even higher for the West in coming years. Recent Russian security 
and intelligence budgets have grown annually by an estimated 15%-20%, with spending 
going to operations (including IOs) and not line items like infrastructure, for example.97 This 
aggressive and concerted espionage campaign is overwhelming NATO and EU counter-
intelligence services.98 
 
11. And between 2015 and 2017, Russia’s overall (declared) budget for State-funded 
broadcasting will rise by more than 200%. Funding for television network RT alone, perhaps 
Russia’s best-known outlet overseas, will rise from £191 million this year to £246 million in 
2015. With nearly a 25% increase, RT will launch French- and German-language channels to 
target and influence core EU countries — and the Russian diaspora within them.99 
 
12. By comparison, total combined income for BBC World Service and BBC Monitoring in 
2013-14 was just over £255 million, down 14% from about £296.5 million in 2010-11.100 
 
13. Some countries are finally trying to counter Russia’s IO offensive. Estonia, for instance, is 
to launch a Russian-language television station, ETV3. But with an annual budget of only £5 
million and not likely to be running for another year,101 ETV3’s impact will be minimal given 
that Moscow has such a head start. The USA has also reacted and, as part of the 2014 
Ukraine Freedom Support Act enacted this month, Washington will commit just over £6 
million annually for the next three years to counter Kremlin propaganda.102 
 
                                                          
97 Private conversation. 
98 See Michael Weiss, ‘In plain sight: the Kremlin’s London lobby,’ The Interpreter, 20 March 2013 
(www.interpretermag.com/in-plain-sight-the-kremlins-london-lobby/ ); John Schindler, ‘Putin’s espionage 
offensive against France,’ The XX Committee, 2 August 2014 (http://20committee.com/2014/08/02/putins-
espionage-offensive-against-france/ ); Andrew Rettman, ‘Belgian intelligence chief talks to EUobserver: transcript,’ 
EUobserver, 17 September 2012 (http://euobserver.com/secret-ue/117554 ); Fidelius Schmid and Holger Stark, 
‘Spies strain German-Russian ties,’ Der Spiegel, 2 July 2013 (www.spiegel.de/international/world/trial-of-russian-
spies-in-germany-strains-diplomatic-relations-a-908975-druck.html ); Mark Galeotti, ‘Keeping the spooks in 
Czech,’ The Moscow Times, 24 September 2012 
(http://themoscownews.com/siloviks_scoundrels/20120924/190273084.html ); Michael Weiss, ‘The Estonian 
spymasters,’ Foreign Affairs, 3 June 2014 (www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/141521/michael-weiss/the-estonian-
spymasters ). 
99 Gabrielle Tétrault-Farber, ‘Looking West, Russia beefs up spending on global media giants,’ The Moscow 
Times, 23 September 2014 (www.themoscowtimes.com/news/article/looking-west-russia-beefs-up-spending-on-
global-media-giants/507692.html ). 
100 BBC full financial statements 2013/14, p. 27 (http://downloads.bbc.co.uk/annualreport/pdf/2013-
14/BBC_Financial_statements_201314.pdf ); BBC full financial statements 2010/11, p. F32 
(http://downloads.bbc.co.uk/annualreport/pdf/bbc_ar_online_2010_11.pdf ). 
101 Estonian Public Broadcasting (ERR), ‘Russia expanding soft power, says Mihkelson,’ 24 September 2014 
(http://news.err.ee/v/politics/104086ad-51a1-457d-98f9-a762733cd48f ); idem, ‘ERR proposes 6.5 million euro 
budget for Russian language channel,’ 4 June 2014 (http://news.err.ee/v/politics/c52817d0-1fea-470c-a93d-
f8bf87ecf493 ). 
102 RFERL, ‘US Senators back funding to battle Russian “propaganda”,’ 19 September 2014 
(www.rferl.org/content/us-senators-back-funding-battle-russian-propaganda/26595966.html ). 
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14. But again, given the vast sums Moscow devotes to IOs, US spending is also likely to have 
limited impact: £6 million is the 2014 budget for a single Russian “troll” group (see fn. 13 
above). 
 
15. Russian reliance on strategic IOs will only grow. Military doctrine to 2020 favours a shift 
from: destruction to influence; eradication of opponents to their inner decay; conventional 
battlegrounds to information, psychological and perception wars; and from physical conflict 
to that in the mind.103 
 
Ukraine: the information dimension 
16. Bullets cannot kill ideas. If anything, Crimea’s annexation has again reminded the world 
that when used properly, ideas make victory possible without needing to fire a single shot. 
 
17. As Ukraine’s economy worsened in the 1990s and 2000s, Moscow expanded its 
influence by promoting the notion of a “Russian world” across Crimea. To do this, the 
Kremlin used local political parties and “civil” society groups, pensioner and military 
veterans’ associations, as well as branches of universities and other State institutions. 
Moscow funded educational tours to highlight Soviet and Russian history instead of 
Ukrainian. In time, such “hearts and minds” efforts gave the Kremlin control over Ukrainian 
civilian and military authorities.104 Russian military, security and law-enforcement forces, for 
instance, psychologically and ideologically conditioned Ukrainian counterparts to see them 
as “friends and brothers”. Once this was done, Moscow was free to act.105 
 
18. Russia began the informational part of its Ukraine campaign in 2008 by seeking to 
discredit: a) the West across post-Soviet countries; and b) Ukrainian independence by 
underlining Kyiv’s inability to manage its own affairs. The Kremlin also stressed that all 
Russian-speaking areas are Russian territory. This strategic IO follows a pattern similar to 
that used by Nazi Germany in the Sudetenland in the 1930s. The aim behind such 
propaganda is to get people acting on instinct, blunting rational thought.106 
 
19. After decades of often-wilful neglect by politicians in Kyiv, Ukrainian military and 
security forces in Crimea were in poor state. Following the EuroMaidan protests, this 
personnel was thoroughly demoralised, largely cut off from the chain of command and so 
even more vulnerable to Russian psychological/other pressure. Pro-Kremlin political 
“tourists” and groups stirred up unrest, promoting an alternative vision to Kyiv rule: Mother 
Russia will take better care of you. Local paramilitary units soon seized critical infrastructure 
and vital access points across Crimea.107 
 
20. Annexation itself took considerable preparation, underpinned by a complex IO campaign 
(mainly deception, maskirovka, and disinformation, dezinformatsya). Russian military 
personnel moved into Crimea and neighbouring regions under the cover of normal 
                                                          
103 Berzins, Russia, pp. 4-5. 
104 Andrii Ryzhenko (ВМС України), ‘Annexation of Crimea: story and lessons,’ 9 June 2014, slide 4 
(www.slideshare.net/andriiryzhenko5/crimea-annexation-lessons-ll2014 ). 
105 Ibid., slides 18-19. 
106 IfS reporting. 
107 Ryzhenko, ‘Annexation,’ slide 9. 
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rotations, to link up with pre-positioned war materiel. The Sochi Winter Olympics gave 
further cover for military pre-positioning and exercises, as well as secret deployments under 
the guise of counter-terrorism measures.108 And only recently have NATO experts grasped the 
true strategic importance of Russia’s Zapad [West]-2013 exercise, in which an estimated 150,000 
personnel took part — including units now fighting in the Donbas.109 
 
Cognitive challenges 
21. Ultimately, one of the greatest challenges NATO faces is how to prevent RT and other 
Russian State-controlled outlets from radicalising the Russian diaspora within its borders. 
But Western societies, policy-makers and their national security communities face two other 
related issues. 
 
22. One is that partly due to the information revolution since the end of the Cold War, 
generational awareness of — let alone insight into — relevant periods and incidents in 
history paradoxically seems to be diminishing. And while a world of instant communication 
clearly has vast benefits, many “net-izens”’ seeming compulsion to interact constantly with 
little or no time for reflection is slowly changing human behaviours, hollowing out our 
collective memory.110 
 
23. The second issue is that for various reasons (not least a round-the-clock media cycle, as 
well as the vast amount of information decision-makers must absorb and make sense of 
daily), policy-makers are not getting enough time/distance to focus on truly strategic issues. 
 
24. Shortly before retiring earlier this year, US Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) Director 
Lieutenant-General Michael Flynn gave an interview. He stressed three challenges DIA had 
faced during his tenure: the surprising spread of Islamism despite 12 years of Western 
counter-insurgency operations; the information revolution of recent decades and how it had 
driven crises like Ukraine; and challenges US intelligence faced in adapting to this new, data-
driven world.111 
 
25. Revealingly, Flynn spoke of spending much of his time drawing lessons from what has 
been called fourth-generation warfare (i.e. conflict between State and non-State actors) 
against Islamists.112 Yet sophisticated opponents like Russia, China and Iran have long fought 
                                                          
108 Ibid. 
109 Pauli Järvenpää, ‘Zapad-2013: a view from Helsinki,’ The Jamestown Foundation, August 2014 
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on an altogether different plane: so-called seventh-generation warfare (i.e. IOs targeting 
human minds and consciousness).113 
 
26. NATO leaders (and their national security communities) need to realise fully both the 
opportunities and threats that IOs present, and devote adequate human, intellectual and financial 
resources to address them. Otherwise, when the next Crimea happens on NATO soil, all the bullets 
in the world will make no difference if the real battlefield is the human mind. 
 
The UK case 
27. Fundamentally, there seems to be no UK national security “community” in the proper 
sense of the word. During the Cold War, there was a fairly clear division between internal 
and external security, with an enemy that was clearly identifiable. These days, internal and 
external threats merge and are often hard to tell apart. 
 
28. With recent and upcoming cuts to the Ministry of Defence and other parts of the Civil 
Service, and with security/intelligence agencies constrained by budgets, UK Government no 
longer has the internal expertise (in terms of numbers and quality) to tackle these new, 
amorphous threats. There is a need, therefore, to create a true national security community 
that harnesses the enormous talents and power of British society at large (with proper 
consideration to security/vetting needs). 
 
29. The UK, both within and outside NATO, must be able to fight the right kind of war — the 
one for global public opinion — even more than a military one. And this time round, much 
more than just some extra funding for “strategic communications” teams will be needed. 
Rival powers are deploying highly sophisticated, cohesive, comprehensive and well-funded 
IO strategies. The UK must do likewise, and not underestimate the vast scale of human, 
intellectual and financial capital its adversaries are expending.114 
 
30. Unlike Cabinet, for instance, the JCNSS is ideally placed to carry out long-term, strategic 
thinking on such vital issues and to stimulate it across Government. 
 
Recommendations 
31. Double current combined spending on BBC World Service and BBC Monitoring by 2017-
18. They are tremendous assets to British “hard” and “soft” power alike, and were the envy 
of NATO during the Cold War for their reputation and impact worldwide. When Russia, 
China, Iran and others are investing heavily in English-language broadcasting, the UK needs 
a voice in those countries more than ever. 
 
32. Drawing on expertise inside and outside UK Government, create a national programme 
to approach IOs as comprehensively as Russia and China do. This cannot be piecemeal, and 
should be a coherent, integrated, multi- and inter-disciplinary approach over the next 
                                                          
113 Berzins, Russia, p. 9, fn. 15; Commons Defence Committee, Towards (HC 358), especially pp. 4, 12-13, 16-
17, 28-29, 32. 
114 China employs over two million people as Internet monitors/analysts to shape domestic and foreign 
perceptions. Andrea Chen, ‘Chinese Internet censors target collective activities more than sensitive subjects, says 
Harvard report,’ South China Morning Post, 23 August 2014 (www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1579606/chinese-
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decade: from information security and strategic communications, through psychology and 
anthropology, to linguistics and journalism, among others. 
 
33. Closely scrutinise (and if necessary intervene to block) the strategic influence that 
foreign countries exert on British universities and other institutions through donations, 
sponsorships and/or language institutes. Too often, these arrangements further donor 
countries’ national interests, not Britain’s. 
 
34. Fund a National Critical Languages Programme for British students only: 500 new 
university places annually over 10 years. By the end of their three-year degree, graduates 
must be fluent in at least one of the designated critical languages (e.g. Arabic, Cantonese, 
Hindi, Indonesian, Japanese, Korean, Mandarin, Persian, Russian and Urdu) to benefit from 
student debt relief. 
 
35. Along with key allies like Poland, Georgia, Estonia and Taiwan, for instance, co-fund area 
studies programmes in the UK highlighting alternative regional perspectives. This should 
balance out distorted, revisionist narratives that Moscow and Beijing are peddling to 
Western audiences. 
 
30 September 2014 
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How should the 2015 NSS handle the uncertainty over the UK’s role in Europe?’ 
 
UK-EU relations: geopolitical dimensions 
 
Britain in Europe: awkward questions 
1. Despite hopes that the 2010 National Security Strategy would explore some of the 
fundamentals of Britain’s international standing, relationships and security, the 
strategy did not adequately address one of the UK’s most important security issues: 
the UK’s relationship with the European Union. Other relationships were also either 
overlooked or taken for granted, including that with the USA.  
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2. The UK’s relationship with the EU is a core security concern. One would not think this 
given the UK’s parochial debate about the EU. Britain’s debate often lacks any 
appreciation of the wider geopolitical implications of Britain’s relations with the EU. 
Instead the debate focuses almost entirely on British demands and expectations for 
a renegotiated relationship or, should Britain withdraw – a Brexit – from the EU, 
what is the best post-withdrawal UK-EU deal (often focused on trade) for the UK. 
3. This ignores how renegotiation could change the politics of the EU in ways that 
affect wider Europe, especially so if, as some fear, it led to a weaker and more 
fragmented EU. A British exit from the EU could profoundly change the EU, European 
politics, NATO, transatlantic relations and some wider international relations. 
4. The UK-EU relationship has also to be seen in a context in which by mid-century the 
UK could have a larger population, economy and military than any state in the EU. 
Questions should therefore be asked about how the absence of the most powerful 
state from the EU could affect European security, what this could mean for the UK 
and in particular whether the UK risks throwing away the opportunity to lead 
Europe.  
5. It is these potential wider changes that will be of greatest concern to other members 
of the EU, allies such as the USA and Turkey, and countries such as Russia. To them, 
what is good or bad for Britain or their bilateral relations with the UK, will be 
secondary to wider questions of what Britain’s behaviour could mean for Europe, its 
unity and security. For example, a UK withdrawal that resulted in a more inward 
looking EU would have significant consequences for transatlantic economic and 
security relations. An alternative example would be a British exit leading to an EU 
that becomes more united, with consequences for NATO-EU relations and the EU’s 
position in the world. 
6. Just as international concerns about Scotland’s independence were not about 
Scotland but about the wider implications for the UK, Europe and NATO, so too will 
such thinking shape international responses to the UK’s behaviour with the EU. 
7. If the 2015 national security strategy is undertaken by a government intent on 
pursuing a renegotiation and in-out referendum then to ensure the strategy takes 
fully into account the UK’s role in the world and the world Britain will face over the 
next 10-20 years, it should come to terms with the nature of the UK-EU relationship 
and the implications for the UK’s and Europe’s security from a potential British 
withdrawal.  
8. If the government elected in 2015 does not intend to pursue such a course, changes 
in the EU such as those to the Eurozone mean Britain could face a difficult choice in 
relations with the rest of the EU. The possible security implications of these choices 
should be considered in the strategy. Failure to do so would leave any new strategy 
relying on the same parochial thinking that dominates UK debates about the EU and 
which leave it unprepared for dealing with the concerns and reactions that are likely 
to shape those of its allies. 
9. The following sections outline several potential security considerations that could 
flow from the UK’s relationship with the EU. They are based on wider research I have 
undertaken into the possible implications for the EU of a British exit including the 
Stiftung Wissenshaft und Politik 2013 research paper Europe without Britain: 
assessing the impact on the EU of a British withdrawal; the 2014 DGAP report 
(edited jointly with Almut Moller) that contains 26 national views (from around 
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Europe and the world) on UK-EU relations The United Kingdom and the European 
Union: What would a Brexit mean for the EU and other states around the world?; and 
work being undertake for academic journal articles on the geopolitical issues that 
surround the possibility of a Brexit. Full details of these publications can be found at 
www.timothyoliver.com. 
Britain in Europe: the coming and going power 
10. The UK will always be a European power and the security of Europe will be a core 
concern. The UK’s commitment to NATO, membership of the EU, relations with EFTA 
states, membership of the Council of Europe, close military relations with a range of 
states around Europe, and bases in Cyprus, Gibraltar and (even beyond withdrawal 
in 2019) facilities in Germany reflect the fact that Europe and the North Atlantic are 
central to the security of the UK mainland. 
11. Despite Europe’s centrality to British security and power, London can appear unsure 
of itself and in retreat in Europe. This is especially so in the European Union (EU) 
where the UK’s relationship is best captured by words such as vetoes, spoiler, 
wrecker, blackmailer, isolated, gambling with is future. This is not simply the result 
of the current government. Britain was ‘an awkward partner’ in EU politics long 
before the Conservative Liberal Democrat coalition came to power. Given how long-
running the UK-EU saga is, some in the rest of the EU might welcome the prospect of 
a British exit taking it as a sign of the country’s retreat, decline and disappearance. 
But the awkward reality for supporters of such a view is that this would mean the EU 
loses the country that by the middle of the century could be – in every key area – the 
most powerful in Europe. Britain’s rise in Europe poses challenges for the EU, 
especially for Germany, currently the EU’s largest and leading state but one facing a 
long period of decline. 
12. Predicting the future, especially the world of the mid-twenty-first century, is filled 
with uncertainties. Nevertheless, it looks plausible that in the 2040s Britain’s 
population could overtake that of a declining Germany. The British population could 
also be amongst the least elderly in the EU. Likewise, by 2020 the UK could have 
overtaken France as the EU’s second largest economy, while London looks set to 
continue racing ahead as Europe’s global city. While Britain’s military faces further 
cuts, the UK is currently building aircraft carriers and nuclear submarines which 
could still be in operation beyond 2040 meaning Britain will remain Europe’s leading 
military and strategic power. 
13. Projected EU population changes to 2060115 
2013 2060 
Germany – 80.5 million UK – 79 million 
France – 65.6 million France – 74 million 
UK – 63.8 million Germany – 66 million 
Italy – 59.7 million Italy – 65 million 
Spain – 46.7 million Spain – 52 million 
                                                          
115 Both sets of figures from Eurostat. 2013: http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/cache/ITY_PUBLIC/3-20112013-
AP/EN/3-20112013-AP-EN.PDF 2060: http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/cache/ITY_PUBLIC/3-08062011-
BP/EN/3-08062011-BP-EN.PDF  
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EU – 505.7 million EU – 517 million 
 
14. Of course, population, economic weight and military capabilities are no guarantors 
of power. Yet, aside from the unlikely prospect of German demographic or French 
economic resurgence, the UK’s size looks set to grow as opposed to decline. 
An EU without the UK: implications for European Unity 
15. There is little to no analysis of how a British withdrawal or renegotiation might 
change the EU and what would this mean for the UK and European geopolitics. Two 
sets of challenges will change the EU internally, both with consequences for the UK 
and Europe. 
a. First, the short-term problem of negotiating a British exit and withdrawal. 
Despite the inclusion of a withdrawal clause in the EU treaties, it is largely 
unknown territory to negotiate the loss of any state, especially as large a 
country as the UK. This could distract both the UK and the EU from more 
pressing political, economic and security concerns. 
b. Second, the balance of power within the EU would shift. Negotiations would 
take place to change the EU’s institutions, votes and budgets. Some states 
fear the loss of a large economically liberal state would make the EU more 
inward looking, tending more towards protectionism. Governments of large 
states worry the disappearance of a large state would mean smaller states 
gain an upper hand. The Franco-German axis could be unsettled, leaving a 
more dominant Germany. For northern and western European states, the 
loss of the UK could shift the EU southwards and eastwards, unsettling 
northern and western states and bringing to an end the possibility of 
enlargement to states such as Turkey. 
16. The overriding concern – in terms of security, economics and politics – surrounding a 
Brexit is whether it would unite or undo the EU. Worries that granting Britain a 
renegotiated relationship in the EU will lead to its unravelling because it could lead 
to an EU ‘à la carte’ have to be compared with worries a Brexit could set an example 
that challenges the direction of European integration that other states then follow. 
Whether this happens depends on how the UK performs outside the EU. It is easy to 
overplay the potential damage of a Brexit. In facing the Eurozone crisis the EU has 
faced a far bigger existential crisis than might emerge from the UK withdrawing or 
renegotiating its membership. A crucial factor here is how a Brexit could impact on 
Germany, the EU’s driver, paymaster and indispensable nation. The EU has yet to 
face a crisis made in Germany. A Brexit that combined with such a crisis – perhaps 
one connected to another Eurozone crisis – could lead to an EU reduced to a core of 
Eurozone members or even the complete break-up of the EU. Alternatively, rid of ‘an 
awkward partner’, the EU could become more united. The Eurozone and the EU 
would more neatly align allowing for more integration. Instead of hitting Germany, a 
Brexit could strengthen Berlin’s position and German support for more integration.  
Implications for European Security, NATO and Transatlantic Relations 
17. Britain, along with France, has been crucial to many of the EU’s efforts to work 
together on foreign, security and defence policies. Losing Britain from the EU could 
Dr Tim Oliver – written evidence 
91 
 
undermine any such efforts; potentially further weakening much sought for – 
especially by the USA – efforts to strengthen European foreign, security defence 
cooperation whether this be in defence business cooperation or in taking a more 
robust line with Russia. Nobody should cheer the failure of Europe’s predominant 
political, economic and social organisation to bring about better cooperation 
amongst European states in these areas. If the EU is incapable of facilitating this then 
the question arises of who can facilitate it and how. 
18. A British exit could add to tensions and rivalry between NATO and the EU. There 
would be implications for non-EU European members of NATO such as Turkey and 
Norway. The EU and NATO need to work together, not compete. This is especially so 
given developments in Eastern Europe and the continuing decline in European 
defence spending. NATO’s hard power capabilities and the EU’s ‘soft’ power 
capabilities should work in tandem. 
19. The USA would be frustrated by a British exit from the EU. Washington would worry 
about the possibility of a Brexit weakening the UK, changing the EU and complicating 
European defence cooperation. Despite what some in the UK might like to believe, 
and what some sceptics of Britain elsewhere in the EU hold as a truth, the UK is not 
the USA’s only ally in the EU. The ‘Special Relationship’ of intelligence sharing, 
nuclear cooperation and special forces would likely survive a Brexit.  
20. However, the US-EU relationship can overshadow the UK-US relationship, if only 
because the EU’s collective GDP of $15.9 trillion dwarfs that of Britain’s $2.4 trillion. 
The USA would look to other allies within the EU such as Poland or the Netherlands. 
It is unlikely there would be a shortage of applicants to getting closer at the UK’s 
expense. 
21. Britain’s central role in EU foreign, defence and security cooperation has not been 
entirely constructive. Fears about sovereignty and jeopardising NATO have 
constrained the UK’s commitment. Removing the UK could free such an obstruction. 
We should remember that the EU’s international relations – whether in military or 
soft power - are varied and widespread. Should the EU without the UK act more 
coherently then it could develop as a more robust European arm of NATO, or, as 
some fear, an alternative to it.  
22. Other states such as Australia, Japan or Canada would therefore think carefully 
about how Britain’s behaviour could influence their relations with the wider EU and 
Europe. Many of them, and the USA, would resist and resent any behaviour by the 
UK that essentially asked them to choose between the EU and UK. Britain should not 
think that if it withdraws from the EU then its allies will also change their relations 
with it in favour of the UK. The EU, and its individual members, will remain important 
and collectively more so than the UK. 
23. From the perspective of the USA, and from other states such as Russia, the outcome 
of a Brexit, or British behaviour that weakens the EU, could be a more multipolar 
Europe. The poles could be the UK, Russia, Turkey and the EU. An EU weakened by 
the exit of the UK could make more likely a scenario of Europe being a contested 
space between Russia, the USA and Asia. Again, should the EU become more united 
then the UK, Russia and Turkey would be smaller poles surrounding the dominant EU 
pole. Either option would have significant security implications for the UK that 
should be taken into account while drafting the 2015 national security strategy. 
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Conclusions 
24. While there is much debate about the possible implications for the UK of either a 
renegotiated relationship with the EU or an exit, there is little analysis of what this 
could mean in a wider European geopolitical sense. This sort of thinking should feed 
into the 2015 national security strategy when it considers UK-EU relations. 
25. HMG cannot assess whether a Brexit or renegotiation is good or bad for the UK – 
especially a UK that could by mid-century be the most powerful state in Europe – 
unless it adequately assesses whether it would be good or bad development for 
wider European geopolitics. Failure to do so would demonstrate a narrow, parochial 
way of thinking about British national security. 
26. Geopolitical thinking will be the way UK behaviour is viewed by other members of 
the EU, members of NATO, especially the USA, and countries such Australia, Japan or 
Russia. 
 
Oxford Research Group – written evidence 
 
Summary 
 The strategic purpose of the NSS should be to build global peace and security as the 
UK cannot insulate itself from insecurity abroad.  The NSS can only achieve this by 
acknowledging what drives insecurity, not merely acknowledging the symptoms of 
conflict and insecurity.  
 The UK should plan to manage its relative decline as a world power and focus its 
resources more regionally or through intergovernmental organisations.  The National 
Security Council should coordinate its resources and levers of international influence 
as part of a comprehensive cross-government strategy. 
 Sequencing of the forthcoming NSS review and Strategic Defence and Security 
Review (SDSR) is critical.  Unlike in 2010, the NSS must precede the SDSR and be 
coordinated with it such that UK defence and security policy responds explicitly to 
risks identified in the NSS.  
 The UK’s key alliances over the next 20 years are likely to privilege the US and 
European partners, notably France.  This will have significant reputational 
implications given recent and current military interventions.  Broader and deeper 
relations with ‘southern’ democracies is desirable in future.  
 The main short and medium term risks to UK security are likely to arise as ‘blowback’ 
from post-2001 UK military campaigns and perceived support for authoritarian 
regimes in the greater Middle East.  Climate change, marginalisation and resource 
scarcity pose major long-term threats.  
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 The NSS should be informed by a broad ‘human security’ perspective that 
understands individual and collective security as linked through a web of social, 
political, economic and ecological factors and responsibilities.  Broader debate on 
the nature of human, national and global security is desirable as part of the NSS 
review process. 
1. Introduction  
1.1 Oxford Research Group (ORG) is a UK-based charity that provides information, 
analysis, methodology, policy advice and mediation in order to promote a more sustainable 
approach to global security.  ORG currently runs or hosts programmes working on: 
sustainable security and alternatives to militarisation; the implications of ‘remote control’ 
warfare; and mediation of several conflicts in the Middle East.   
1.2 This submission will focus on seven questions raised by the Joint Committee in its 
call for evidence: 
 The UK’s national security priorities 
1. What should these be over the next 20 years and how should they steer the 
next NSS? 
 The UK’s place in the world 
2. Should the UK plan to maintain its global influence? 
 Strategic choices 
3. How can the next NSS be made most useful in guiding decisions in 
government and long-term spending decisions? 
 International relationships 
4. Which will be the UK’s critical international relationships over the next 20 
years? 
 Risks and contingencies 
5. What are the main risks to the UK’s national security? 
6. Is the government’s horizon-scanning effective? 
 Scope 
7. How broadly should the NSS define national security? 
2. The UK’s National Security Priorities, 2015-35  
What should the UK’s national security priorities be for the next 20 years, and how should 
these steer the next NSS? 
2.1 The objective of the NSS should be to build an environment of sustainable 
international peace and security, recognising that the UK’s national security is indivisible in 
the long-term from that enjoyed by other states and peoples.  This is necessarily a strategic 
process that must identify not just current and future threats to the UK but also what drives 
the insecurity behind those threats.  This is crucial for the Strategy to devise means by which 
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the UK can work to mitigate or resolve these factors over the long-term.  Focus on defined 
present threats or responses to specific crises is likely to lead to policies that seek to contain 
or ‘neutralise’ threats through securitised responses.  While occasionally necessary as 
emergency measures, such responses are often counter-productive and antithetical to the 
strategic objective of preventing and resolving conflict.  
2.2 Approaches taken to prioritise risks should be reviewed, including a number of 
aspects of the National Security Risk Assessment Exercise (NSRA) that formed part of the 
2010 NSS.  The compilation of this static ranking system to inform the decisions laid out in 
the SDSR contradicts assertions within the 2010 NSS that the diversity and complexity of the 
contemporary risk environment means that “no single risk will dominate […] we no longer 
face such predictable threats”. This assertion has certainly proven true since 2010. “Risk of 
major instability, insurgency or civil war overseas which creates an environment that 
terrorists can exploit to threaten the UK” (considered only a Tier Two risk in 2010) has been 
at the forefront of UK security thinking since then and has motivated UK interventions in 
Libya, Mali and now Iraq. Given the complex and changeable nature of the risk 
environment, the utility of a static ranking system should be revisited. 
2.3 The NSRA should be more directly linked to the NSS, which has in its current 
iteration taken a more nuanced approach to complex risks.  Both the 2010 NSS and 
preceding Ministry of Defence report Global Strategic Trends – Out to 2040 describe global 
environmental constraints and resource insecurity, including climate disruption, as a source 
and multiplier of critical risks to the UK.  Yet, inconsistency between the NSRA and the NSS 
means that threats arising from the multiplier effect of climate change – not just natural 
disasters – did not feature in the 2010 NSRA.  Given that SDSR defence policy takes the 
security risks ranked in the NSRA as a foundation for security responses, any NSRA 
undertaken for the next NSS must include a more comprehensive view of security risks.  
3. The UK’s Place in the World 
Should the UK plan to maintain its global influence?  
3.1 The UK must be realistic about its global influence in the 21st century and plan to 
manage its relative decline rather than cling to the role of a 19th century great power. The 
UK may currently be a global diplomatic and trading power but it no longer has the capacity 
to project effective military power beyond Europe, the Mediterranean and North Atlantic.  
The rise of new powers in the South Atlantic, Indian Ocean and western Pacific will be the 
defining feature of the 21st century geopolitical transition.  This is likely to be accompanied 
by greater local resistance to the privileged military and diplomatic role of the UK and other 
former colonial powers outside of strictly European affairs.  
3.2 Global influence is complex; its aspects and levers include diplomacy, military, aid, 
trade, finance, historic or reputational influence, and the ‘soft’ powers of media, culture and 
Oxford Research Group – written evidence 
95 
 
education. These may be reinforcing, or they may negate one another. Whereas the UK 
traditionally thinks of its historical legacy as boosting its contemporary influence, this legacy 
may actually undermine UK security in an increasingly educated, informed and unequal 
world.  Factors that tend to undermine British perceived legitimacy and influence include: 
the colonial legacy, historic and recent military interventions, retention of nuclear weapons, 
failure to reform the UN Security Council and its veto, alliances, and arms sales.  In 
particular, the UK’s very close relationship with the US has an enormous impact on global 
perceptions of British power, influence and independence.  Uncritical diplomatic and 
economic relationships in the Middle East, notably with Israel and the Gulf monarchies, also 
have significant consequences for British influence.  
3.3 The UK should consider what combination and coordination of its levers of global 
influence would best achieve its strategic objective of upholding national and international 
security.  Taking a more holistic human security approach will help to reduce the counter-
productive dependency on military tools in attempting to build, enforce, or reinforce 
security.  The National Security Council (NSC) is potentially a very important institution in 
assessing and coordinating the UK’s various levers of influence over national and global 
security governed by a comprehensive, all-government mandate and strategy.  It should be 
given greater powers to distribute and coordinate these resources within an agreed overall 
envelope, rather than the present system, which de facto prioritises military over diplomacy 
over aid and soft power resources, and prioritises control over cooperation.  
4. Strategic Choices 
How can the next NSS be made most useful in guiding decisions in government and long-
term spending decisions? 
4.1 Given that the NSS should inform the resourcing decisions of the SDSR, the near 
synchronised release of the NSS and SDSR in 2010 gave rise to questions of strategic 
continuity. If the NSS is truly to guide long-term spending decisions, the timing of the 
updating of both documents is crucial. While welcome, the timing of this inquiry into the 
NSS already gives rise to questions of whether enough time is left ahead of 2015-16 to 
sequence the processes adequately. We urge the committee to do what it can to urge 
prioritising the NSS review ahead of the SDSR, pushing the SDSR process into 2016 if 
necessary. This staggered scheduling for review of these strategies, such that the NSS can be 
announced before the SDSR, would ensure that the latter can be a truly coherent and 
strategic response to the NSS. 
4.2 The NSS as a document is less important than the NSC as an institution. Translating 
the NSS into actionable policy will require that the NSC be resourced to serve its original 
purpose.  While the NSC should be the central instrument for translating the NSS from 
paper to policy for continual assessment of the global threat environment, it has thus far 
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spent focused more on crisis response than on long-term responses to international security 
challenges. The Joint Committee stated its concerns in this regard in February 2013.116 
4.3 The context within which the NSS is reviewed is also crucial.  Government defence 
procurement decisions over the past year – including the confirmation of the purchase of 14 
F-35B fighters, new aircraft carriers and the recent £1.1bn investment in new intelligence, 
surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance technology for counter-terrorism 
operations – pre-determine the options and resources available for British security 
operations in future, before the NSS has outlined what the likely threats will be and the 
SDSR has outlined how the UK will respond to them. We urge the committee to consider 
within the NSS review what ability the Government should have to make key defence 
spending decisions so close to the updating of the strategy itself.   
5. International Relationships 
Which will be the UK’s critical international relationships over the next 20 years? 
5.1 It is likely that UK’s critical international relationships will continue to be with NATO 
and the European Union (whether or not the UK remains a full member) over the next 
decades.  The United States and, to much lesser extent, France are likely to continue to be 
the main bilateral partners.  These relationships may be problematic for the UK’s security in 
that it is widely perceived to be the junior and uncritical partner to the US as the dominant 
(but declining) world power.  Thus, discontents about the US’ military-led control and 
containment policy towards the non-western world will increasingly be reflected upon the 
UK.  The relationship with France may have a localised resonance (notably in Africa and the 
Near East) for perceptions of the UK where the two great nineteenth century powers are 
seen to collaborate in neo-colonial dominance.  In these regards, NATO’s ambitions to carve 
a role for itself in ‘non-territorial defence’ outside of Europe may be problematic for the UK.  
5.2 Whereas for most of their history the EU and most of NATO were almost exceptional 
in their commitment to democracy and civil liberties, the number of such broadly ‘liberal’ 
states has increased hugely in the last 20 to 30 years.  Many of the Latin American, Asian 
and African states of the ‘Third Wave’ of democratization (roughly 1970s-1990s) are now 
becoming well institutionalised democracies with comparable values to the UK.  Yet, with a 
few Commonwealth exceptions, the UK’s key international partners remain confined to the 
North Atlantic alliance of the late 1940s.  As the relative power and reputation of the ‘West’ 
declines, effective security and influence for the UK will depend on stronger relationships 
with non-western democracies such as India, Brazil, Indonesia, Mexico and South Africa.  
6. Risks 
What are the main risks to the UK’s national security?  
                                                          
116 JCNSS, The work of the Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy in 2012, 2nd Report of Session, HL 
Paper 115  HC 984, 28 February 2013, p.4. 
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6.1 ‘Blowback’ from the various ill-considered UK and US military interventions since 
2001 is currently the most acute risk to UK security.  These have proved comprehensively 
that force has limited use in countering terrorism and violent extremism.  Many of the most 
pressing security challenges facing the UK are directly related to the previous use of military 
force in regime change operations such as Iraq and Libya, both of which have resulted in 
resurgent violent extremism, myriad armed actors, fragile and fractured states incapable of 
dealing with these dynamics, and huge negative consequences for regional security 
environments. Threat from these operations is compounded by explicit or implicit British 
support for US, Israeli, French and Saudi or Emirati operations elsewhere in majority Muslim 
countries, in which the UK is perceived as part of the ‘far enemy’ with a neo-colonial 
ambition to divide and rule the Islamic world. 
6.2 As assessed in the 2010 NSS, and Global Strategic Trends—Out to 2040, climate 
disruption and its multiplier effect on global security issues will be a driver of insecurity “so 
pervasive in nature and influence that it will affect the life of everyone on the planet over 
the next 30 years”.  The current decade has already seen a clear increase in impact across 
the world. Events since 2010, including excessive heat waves, floods, droughts and Typhoon 
Haiyan, the strongest land-fall cyclone ever recorded, all point to accelerated disruption. 
Current impact is asymmetric, falling mainly in often densely populated areas of the ‘Global 
South’ such as south and south-east Asia, where high levels of poverty and/or rapid 
urbanisation result in low resilience to climate disruption.  The security impacts of such 
disruption on unregulated migration, competition over resources and subsequent 
exacerbation of existing tensions must not be underestimated.  Indeed, the role of climate 
disruption as a catalyst of the ‘Arab Spring’ is increasingly being explored.  
6.3 A complex interplay of discrimination, poverty and social and economic inequalities 
continues to undermine global security.  Uprisings across the Arab world, devastation 
wrought by Boko Haram in northern Nigeria, and violent protests in the streets of Paris, 
London, Stockholm, Rio de Janeiro and Ferguson have brought the impact of marginalisation 
to the forefront of security debates in the current decade. This is a global phenomenon with 
interconnected local and transnational drivers, in many cases exacerbated by severe global 
resource and environmental constraints.  In particular, potential links between social 
exclusion and terrorism – outlined as a Tier Two risk in the 2010 NSRA - appear to be coming 
to the fore in sectarian conflicts across the Levant.  As income and group inequalities widen, 
and the disproportionate impact on marginalised populations of environmental, food, land, 
water and energy insecurity becomes increasingly clear, such risks will be exacerbated.  
6.4 Compounding the security risks posed by socio-economic inequality, increased 
access to information technologies around the world means that, while the great majority of 
the world’s population are on the economic and political margins, their knowledge of their 
own marginalisation is steadily increasing, as is their organising capacity. Anti-elite 
sentiments can be a powerful driver of radicalisation and militarisation, and the longer the 
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majority world is side-lined from the benefits of global economic prosperity, the greater the 
threat to global security. 
Is the Government’s horizon-scanning effective, and are our national contingency plans 
adequate? 
6.5 A number of important horizon-scanning processes, such as the MOD’s Global 
Strategic Trends provide ample understanding of the complexity of the modern security 
environment and myriad scenarios that might arise to threaten British security. Again, the 
central instrument for bringing such analysis into the NSS – the National Security Council – 
has been overly focused on specific reactions to global crises.  Effective horizon-scanning, 
particularly towards a preventive security agenda can help to address the recurrent nature 
of modern security challenges, but only if the NSC is tasked and resourced to embrace such 
methodologies and respond proactively.   
6.6 The NSS process must consider how to actively link long-term thinking into the NSS 
and, more importantly, into the work of the NSC. While the most recent Global Strategic 
Trends study considers the security environment for the next 30 years, the static 
quinquennial nature of the NSS reduces incentive to raise the risk horizon beyond five years. 
More effective use of the NSC presents an opportunity to ensure that the NSS remains a 
‘living document’ capable of absorbing shifts in the global security environment and 
planning more strategic responses. 
7. Scope 
How broadly should the NSS define national security? 
7.1 Despite its island location and military strength, there is no prospect of the UK 
isolating its ‘national’ security from not just regional but global insecurity.  This should be an 
underlying assumption of the new NSS, just as the 2010 NSS states that “Our security, 
prosperity and freedom are interconnected and mutually supportive”.  UK security, 
prosperity and freedom cannot be effectively insulated from global insecurity, poverty and 
oppression.  This is particularly true where such conditions are, or are widely perceived to 
be, the result – directly or indirectly – of UK policy, such as military interventions or support 
for authoritarian governments, or UK protection of structural advantages, such as trade 
policies and veto rights in the UN Security Council.  
7.2 The focus on prosperity as a fundament of national security in the 2010 NSS is 
problematic in that the UK’s historic and contemporary prosperity are rooted in structural 
inequalities in the international economic and financial systems that undermine the 
prosperity of many less developed societies.  In particular, the next NSS may wish to 
examine the impact on global human security of the City of London and several UK overseas 
territories in their role as financial hubs.  These have negatively impacted the UK’s will to 
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respond effectively to Russian actions in Ukraine as well as contributing, through facilitating 
capital flight, organised crime and tax avoidance, to the fragility of many poorer countries.  
7.3 Thinking globally, the NSS should follow a broad ‘human security’ perspective that 
understands individual and collective security as linked through a web of social, political, 
economic and ecological factors and responsibilities.  There is by no means a national 
consensus on what ‘security’ means and a wider, more open debate on the nature of 
human, national and global security is highly desirable as part of the NSS review process.  
The recent Ammerdown Invitation117 to dialogue on ‘Security for the future’ is a valuable 
contribution to the British reconceptualization of security and should be taken up by 
Parliament and Government as part of a process of rethinking UK defence and security 
strategy.  
 
Oxford Research Group is an independent non-governmental organisation and registered 
charity, which works to promote a more sustainable approach to global security.  ORG has 
been building trust between policy-makers, academics, the military and civil society since 
1982.  ORG and its internationally recognised consultants combine detailed knowledge of 
security issues, together with an understanding of political decision-making, and many years 
of expertise in facilitating constructive dialogue.  More information can be found at: 
www.oxfordresearchgroup.org.uk  
This submission was written for ORG by Richard Reeve, Director of the Sustainable Security 
Programme, and Zoë Pelter of the Sustainable Security Programme, with input from Betsy 
Barkas, a Quaker Peace and Social Witness Peaceworker.  
September 2014 
 
Population Matters 
 
1. Summary 
The UK’s rate of population growth is one of the highest in Europe; England is already the 
most crowded country in Europe; the UK is ever less self-sufficient in energy, food, and 
ecological resources, let alone manufactures; 80% of the people want a smaller 
population; and yet the ONS 2050 projection is between 68.7 and 87.7 million (ie 7 and 46 
more Manchesters). These have security implications; and only a stable or reducing 
population will prevent these sources of potential internal instability increasing. 
Internationally, population growth and its consequent resource and job shortages are a 
significant contributory factor to the Arab rising, and to instability in the Sahel, which can 
spill over into British cities. Resource shortages are also population ‘longages’. (‘Not 
                                                          
117 The Ammerdown Invitation: Security for the Future, published 23 September 2014 on openSecurity.net, see 
http://www.oxfordresearchgroup.org.uk/sites/default/files/Security_for_the_Future.pdf  
Population Matters 
100 
 
enough stuff available to go round all the people” is synonymous with “Too many people 
for the stuff available to go round”). Most of the numbers quoted below are from our own 
research. 
 
2. The UK Economy 
It has become unfashionable among economists to discuss the balance of payments; yet it 
is far from clear what we shall export in exchange for our food, energy and manufactures, 
demand for which increases with population growth, as security of supply decreases. 
‘Financial services’ from outside the Euro area seem unconvincing, even without recent 
scandals and pre-2008 incompetence.  Population growth also contributes to: un- and 
under-employment (which remains high); low real wages (because the work-force grows 
faster than jobs); and thus increased income inequality (as returns to capital exceed those 
to labour). All population growth creates a gap between GDP growth, on which economists 
focus, and GDP per capita, which is what matters to ordinary citizens.  Less noticed is the 
heavy infrastructure cost of population growth, paid by people already here solely in order 
to maintain standards for ever more people. This masquerades as ‘investment’, but is 
actually depreciation or maintenance. We estimate the costs to 2050 will be  £1.1 trillion 
at the lower end of the 2050 population projections, and £4.2 trillion at the upper end – all 
pre-empting genuine investment funds which could have been spent on improving 
services and quality of life. 
 
3.  Climate Change 
Population growth exacerbates the risks from climate change in three ways: 
a) Every additional person uses more energy and thus either increases carbon emissions 
or reduces everyone else’s sustainable carbon ‘allowance’. If the EU 80% carbon 
reduction target were met, but the 2050 EU population hit the lower end of the 
projected range, this ‘allowance’ would be 25% higher than at the upper end. The gap 
for the UK, growing faster than the EU average, would be greater. 
b) Every additional person puts more pressure on UK food resources – already vulnerable 
to flood and drought like all agriculture - and hence decreases our food security 
further. 
c) More people need more houses, some of which will go into flood plains, increasing 
flood risk and the costs of its management. 
 
4.  Energy Security 
The energy supply and cost (higher energy bills) implications of reaching the top of the 
projected 2050 UK population range rather than the bottom, while cutting carbon 
emissions by 80% below 1990 levels include:       
 The additional cost of new power stations would be between £380bn and £1.02tn; 
 For zero carbon, this equates to 260k more wind turbines, or 20 more per day; 
 Holding emissions constant requires additional renewables for 450k people pa; 
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 Massive investment is needed in (still infant) energy storage technology, to 
overcome renewables intermittency; this rises sharply with population growth. 
 
5. Food Security 
The UK is currently 62% self-sufficient in food. At current consumption levels, the 
maximum sustainable UK population that could be fed from UK resources in 2050 would 
be 15m. The projected 75 million (2050 medium projection) could be sustained only at 
20% of current consumption per head. This disregards: climate tipping points; the 
progressive loss of farmland to housing and other built development; and heightened 
flood risk. The conventional view that the ‘world food market’ will always feed us is a naïve 
economists’ abstraction, ignoring the evidence that food exporting countries impose 
export controls when their own reserves are threatened. Food shortages have major 
security implications. “Every city is nine meals from anarchy” (axiom attributed to the 
Security Service). 
 
 
6. Water Security 
Memories being short, many have forgotten the major water shortage threatening in early 
2012. The implications for UK water supplies at the limits of the projected 2050 population 
range include:  the upper limit would require 1.5 - 4.9m more tonnes of water per day 
than the lower limit; the additional reservoirs would cost £5.9 - £22.6bn more, adding to 
bills; all merely to maintain supply standards. 
 
7. Biophysical Sustainability   
The (Blue Planet Award-winning) Global Footprint Network estimates the UK’s renewable 
ecological resources at 25 % of its current consumption per head and technology, the 
deficit being made up from other countries’ bio- capacity and from natural capital. This 
gives us a biophysically sustainable population (indefinitely from own resources) of 17 
million. (GFN figures are imprecise, but probably over-estimates, since they ignore non-
renewables and biodiversity). 
 
8. International Security 
As the Foreign Affairs Select Committee’s report on ‘Extremism in North and West Africa 
(March 2014) made clear, “We see evidence of a link between rapid population growth 
and political instability. We believe that the UK Government should continue to impress on 
its international partners the need for international action to extend the availability of 
family planning in the Western Sahel.” Population Matters has long argued for all 
development projects in high-fertility countries, aiming for security and prosperity, to 
include a significant element of family planning and women’s empowerment programmes. 
 
9. International Development  
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This poverty/security link is widely observed. In the 20 highest fertility countries with the 
fastest growing populations, the number of people in absolute poverty has increased 
during the past three decades, despite a sharp increase in the amount of aid given. High 
fertility rates and consequent rapid population growth is the main cause. The key aid 
sector to reducing fertility and hence poverty, family planning, received only 0.31% of total 
aid. In its absence, all other aid programmes consist largely of running to catch up with 
population growth, and are thus partly or wholly wasted. 
 
10. Conclusion 
In over-crowded countries on an over-crowded and degrading planet, population growth 
exacerbates most structural long-term problems, including those of security. Given the 
relatively trivial cost of the programmes needed to correct it, such programmes should be 
factored into all strategies to achieve long-term sustainability, including security strategies. 
 
11. Recommendations 
The Government and opinion formers should: 
 create a national consensus that a stable or smaller population is an urgent national 
interest; 
 add Population to the duties of an inter-departmental Minister, with a small co-
ordinating staff; 
 review tax and benefit policies, removing perverse incentives for large (>two 
children) families; 
 set a long-term UK policy aim of balanced migration; 
 promote population stabilisation policies, by voluntary means, internationally. 
 
Roger Martin, Chair, Population Matters 
21 August 2014 
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A progressive vision for peace? Towards the next National Security Strategy 
 
Summary 
 
Saferworld welcomes the opportunity to input into the Joint Committee on the National 
Security Strategy’s inquiry towards the next National Security Strategy. As a UK-based 
independent conflict prevention and peacebuilding organisation, operating in over twenty 
conflict-affected and fragile states around the world, we can offer relevant perspectives and 
reflections on how the UK pursues its security and development interests in the world. This 
submission will argue that in order to protect Britain’s interests effectively in the long-term, 
UK national security should be interpreted through a broad lens that takes the promotion of 
sustainable peace – founded on human security and inclusive, fair, responsive and 
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accountable states – as its overarching objective. While recognising that a more stable and 
less aggressive world order is in the UK’s interests, the National Security Strategy should 
outline what this means for the UK in practice and how the different elements of 
government, civil society, the private sector, academia and the public can contribute to a 
vision of UK national security that has human security considerations at its heart.  
 
Recommendations for the next National Security Strategy: 
 Take the long view: think through the impact of the UK’s engagement in the world in 
terms of what will work in favour of sustainable peace in the long term.  
 Prioritise a conflict-sensitive approach to the UK’s overseas engagement: avoid 
exacerbating drivers of conflict in pursuit of shorter-term or narrowly-defined national 
security or economic objectives.  
 Attach much greater importance to the long-term impacts of UK and partners’ strategies 
on good governance and corruption, taking every opportunity to encourage countries 
where the UK engages to achieve inclusive, responsive, fair and accountable state-
society relations as the first priority for achieving international stability.  
 Continue to build on a commitment to conflict prevention as outlined in the Building 
Stability Overseas Strategy (BSOS) across all UK Government departments engaged in 
conflict-affected and fragile states, including through sustained support for people’s 
access to security and justice as part of development programming. 
 Ensure parliamentary scrutiny over decisions taken by the National Security Council on 
the whole of the UK’s engagement in conflict-affected states, including the new Conflict, 
Stability and Security Fund (CSSF). 
 Promote international cooperation on efforts to prevent conflict, including through 
continued support for the implementation of the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) and inclusion 
of peace in the post-2015 development framework. 
 Increase engagement with rising powers to expand international cooperation on conflict 
prevention. 
 Initiate a wider public discussion on how the UK defines and pursues its national security 
overseas. 
 
Introduction 
 
1. Saferworld welcomed the recognition that it is in the UK’s interests to promote a 
more peaceful world in the 2010 National Security Strategy, and subsequent articulation of 
the UK’s approach in the Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR) and Building Stability 
Overseas Strategy (BSOS). However, we also emphasised that while there are benefits for 
the UK’s own national security in working to support the development of more stable and 
cohesive societies around the world, in order to be effective in promoting sustainable 
peace, a concern for ordinary people living in fragile states must be at the heart of the UK’s 
conflict prevention efforts. A focus on addressing and preventing conflict is welcome and 
should remain a core commitment in the next National Security Strategy. However, there is 
a risk that humanitarian or development aid will be made subservient to short term national 
security objectives. This must be carefully avoided because it is likely to render aid to these 
contexts ineffective, compromise important principles of the impartiality of aid, and expose 
aid agencies to violence. To be effective, UK aid spent in these countries must be about 
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meeting the real needs of poor, vulnerable, marginalised populations, and contributing to 
sustainable peace through supporting the achievement of human security. 
 
2. The opportunity presented by the next National Security Strategy to examine the 
practical lessons from the UK’s engagement in conflict affected states, including 
counterterrorism, statebuilding and stabilisation approaches, should help to inform the UK’s 
approach. The next National Security Strategy should reaffirm and build on the commitment 
to conflict prevention articulated in the BSOS to become increasingly coherent and long-
term in practice. While this submission does not cover the whole of the content of the 
National Security Strategy, it will argue that the long view – forward thinking and firmly 
grounded in evidence of the effects of past interventions – must be taken to underpin a shift 
in the UK’s approach to national security that recognises the interdependence of the UK’s 
own security with peace and stability founded on good governance throughout the world.  
 
Defining UK National Security Priorities 
 
3. When determining the UK’s national security priorities for the next twenty years it 
will be essential to look at how the UK sees its role in the world and what definition of 
‘national security’ it is pursuing. There are currently competing narratives describing the 
UK’s priorities and desired role in the world.118  The next National Security Strategy provides 
an opportunity to articulate a shared vision of UK national security with human security at 
its heart, reaffirming a commitment to support efforts to build open, just and accountable 
state-society relations, promoting good governance and the rule of law, while assessing 
whether pursuing other short-term interests might undermine these efforts. 
 
4. It is not enough to define UK national security interests in the short term, or solely 
based on the security of Britain in isolation from the security and well-being of the public in 
the world at large. Developing the next National Security Strategy offers an opportunity to 
reflect on how national security objectives have been pursued in practice through relatively 
short-term UK-supported stabilisation, counter-terrorism and statebuilding interventions 
overseas. The Committee should examine the impact of these interventions on peace and 
stability overseas and the relationship between overseas peace and stability and UK national 
security. Are national security objectives and the interventions pursued to deliver them 
consistent with the evidence of what works in promoting sustainable peace – founded on 
human security and inclusive, fair, responsive and accountable states?119   
 
5. In pursuing its national security interests the UK should question what injustices or 
grievances may result directly or indirectly from short-term and conflict-insensitive policy 
decisions. The nature of such decisions may be:  
 
                                                          
118  For more on this, see written evidence by Owen Barder and Alex Evans to the International 
Development Committee in inquiry ‘Beyond Aid’, paragraphs 32-37 
http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/international-
development-committee/beyond-aid-the-future-uk-approach-to-development/written/12424.pdf 
119  For evidence and analysis of what works for promoting sustainable peace see Saferworld, ‘Addressing 
conflict and violence from 2015 - Issue Paper 2: What are the key challenges? What works in addressing 
them?’ (November 2011) http://www.saferworld.org.uk/resources/view-resource/708-issue-paper-2-what-
are-the-key-challenges-what-works-in-addressing-thema   
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• military (indiscriminate use of violence, military aid to actors who are perpetrating 
abuses),  
• economic (sanctions perceived to be unjust, failure to regulate markets in goods and 
resources from conflict-affected countries, imposition of unequal trade rules, 
irresponsible arms trade),  
• diplomatic (support for allies who are violating human rights and/or international 
law), or  
• development related (further support for such allies).  
 
Instead, all UK policy instruments should be consistent with and support the long-term 
objective of encouraging ‘legitimate and effective institutions’, as set out in the BSOS. The 
BSOS recognises the risks of providing too much capacity building support to states, and 
that a balance is required to strengthen accountability and empower society to help shape 
more inclusive, responsive, fair and accountable governance. Looking to the next National 
Security Strategy, it will be important to reinforce this commitment and place greater 
emphasis on the security and well-being of ordinary men, women, boys and girls, including 
through building accountability and transparency of state institutions and working to 
strengthen and empower communities and civil society to shape their institutions of 
governance and service delivery. Avoiding support for repressive regimes in the pursuit of 
UK national security objectives is a particular lesson to take on board, as poor governance, a 
lack of accountability and corruption are known to be particularly important drivers of 
conflict.120 121   It can be tempting to support security actors that are on the same ‘side’ as 
the UK in the pursuit of short-term objectives through military aid or other support, but 
doing so is likely to entrench corrupt and abusive actors, and therefore serve to undermine 
long-term stability.  
 
6. In order to avoid these pitfalls, it will be important both to learn lessons from past 
engagements (such as stabilisation activities in Afghanistan) as well as undertake thorough 
                                                          
120  On governance and conflict: ‘There is significant convergence in the literature on the central 
importance of state-society relations in fostering less violent, more sustainably peaceful societies. Paffenholz, 
the Crisis States Research Centre (CSRC) and Stewart all stress the importance of how societies are governed, 
the type of institutions that exist, and the emphasis placed on gaining societal trust.   Backing this up, World 
Bank research has found that better governance reduces the risk of civil war by 35-45%.  The Institute for 
Economics and Peace (IEP) has come to a similar conclusion through analysis of 300 cross-country datasets and 
its own Global Peace Index for 153 countries.’ See especially: Paffenholz, T, ‘Underdevelopment and Armed 
Conflict: Making Sense of the Debates’ (conference paper, 2008), p.17. Putzel J, Di John J, ‘Meeting The 
Challenges Of Crisis States’ (Crisis States Research Centre, 2012), p.iii, citing Goldstone J et al, ‘A global model 
for forecasting political instability’, American Journal of Political Science, 54, (2010), pp.190–208. D Keen, 
'Greed and grievance in civil war', in International Affairs, 88: 4 (2012) 757–777. World Bank, World 
development report 2011: conflict, security and development (2011), p.10.  Institute for Economics and Peace, 
‘Structures of peace: identifying what leads to peaceful societies’ (2011), p.7.  
 
121  On corruption and conflict: ‘Research by the IEP highlights that two indexes focusing on corruption 
(Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) and the World Bank’s World Governance 
Indicator on Control of Corruption) correlate very strongly with the Global Peace Index – demonstrating a very 
strong link between corruption and conflict. At the global level, both the OECD and Collier have suggested that 
measures to curb corrupt practices by governments and businesses are vital. ’ See especially: Institute for 
Economics and Peace, ‘Structures of peace: identifying what leads to peaceful societies’ (2011), pp.30-31; 
OECD, Supporting Statebuilding in Situations of Conflict and Fragility, (2011), p.55. Paul Collier, The Plundered 
Planet, (2010), p.82. 
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ongoing conflict analysis to identify drivers of conflict and paths towards peace to inform 
the UK’s approach in each context. A thorough conflict and peacebuilding analysis should 
inform the UK’s upstream conflict prevention activities, including under the new Conflict, 
Stability and Security Fund (CSSF) that will replace the Conflict Pool in 2015 under the 
direction of the National Security Council (NSC).122   In the midst of potentially competing 
priorities at the National Security Council level, the prioritisation of a long-term approach 
with a focus on human security under the CSSF will be important, as will ensuring that 
overall UK engagement is focused on a shared vision for long-term sustainable 
development. 
 
7. In this regard there has been progress since the last National Security Strategy in the 
form of the Joint Analysis of Conflict and Stability Guidelines (JACS) which are increasingly 
being used to conduct analysis coordinated by the Stabilisation Unit. However, the 
Committee may want to clarify how terms of reference for each JACS are decided – who 
commissions them and how often are they reviewed? Is there a relevant JACS for each 
priority country identified by the National Security Council? To what extent do they inform 
the development and adoption of country strategies outlining the UK’s political, economic, 
defence and development engagements by the National Security Council? What other 
information and analysis is available to the National Security Council and how far up the list 
of priorities is overseas peace and stability? The encouraging progress to imbed conflict 
analysis should be consolidated during the development and review of NSC country 
strategies to ensure that all aspects of UK engagement are conflict-sensitive and working in 
favour of sustainably peaceful outcomes in the long-term. Identifying the drivers of conflict 
and the motivation of actors is a crucial step in assessing the likely impact of interventions 
and resources, including those for counterterrorism, stabilisation and statebuilding, on long-
term peace overseas and related UK national security. 
 
How broadly should the NSS define national security? 
 
8. The Prime Minister in his evidence to the Committee emphasised the need to adopt 
a wide definition of national security, noting that it is in the UK’s national security interest to 
invest in development and to promote British values such as democracy, human rights and 
freedom of speech if the UK is to promote security in the longer term123.  We would 
encourage the Committee to continue to ensure that values such as human rights and 
personal freedoms are at the core of any future National Security Strategy and that a 
progressive definition of UK interests is adhered to in practice in the UK’s engagement 
across departments, not just through DFID’s work.  
 
9. However, DFID does have an important role to play in promoting a fairer and more 
secure world through its work. Saferworld has long argued for the value of investing in 
addressing the drivers of conflict and the factors that perpetuate people’s insecurity in 
                                                          
122  See joint briefing by Saferworld, International Alert and Conciliation Resources for detailed 
recommendations to parliamentarians on the Conflict, Stability and Security Fund 
http://www.saferworld.org.uk/resources/view-resource/834-investing-in-long-term-peace-the-new-conflict-
stability-and-security-fund 
123  http://www.parliament.uk/documents/joint-committees/national-security-
strategy/PM%20session/JCNSS14-01-30TranscriptCameronC.pdf 
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everyday life as part of promoting development. UK support for people’s access to 
responsive and accountable security and justice services as part of its development work 
serves as an important contribution to overall development aims. The contribution of 
development to reducing inequalities in access to resources, opportunities and services 
(including security and justice) between different identity groups within developing 
countries is likewise hugely important to conflict prevention. The UK should continue to 
contribute to preventing conflict through its development work, including through 
promoting ‘positive peace’ in the post-2015 development framework.124 
 
10. This does not mean instrumentalising development in the pursuit of national 
security, but rather recognising the value in promoting the welfare of ordinary people, 
including through fair and accountable security and justice services and socio-economic 
development, for promoting sustainable peace overseas as a contributor to UK national 
security. It should not be assumed that development aid alone is the solution to those 
conflicts that are defined in popular discourse and policy circles as problems of 
radicalisation, extremism or terrorism. Nor should development be employed to secure 
military gains, as this undermines not only the supposed impartiality of aid, but also its 
effectiveness and endangers humanitarian actors. The resolution of conflict – including that 
involving ‘extremists’ and ‘terrorists’ - requires national, regional and international actors to 
consider their own roles and responsibilities and the impact that their combined political, 
economic, security and development engagement will have on the issues underpinning the 
conflict. 
 
11. In relation, it is essential to have wider public discussion about how the UK defines 
and pursues its national security. The UK Government has been a key supporter of 
community-focused security dialogues in the developing world; it is equally important that 
there are conversations at the community level in the UK about how the UK interprets and 
asserts its national security interests abroad. How do people in the UK understand our 
common security? What does the public know about the impacts of the UK’s actual 
interventions overseas? Does the public understand how their own security depends on 
finding lasting solutions to conflicts overseas founded on the rights of all people to justice, 
security and livelihoods? The Committee may consider for example a call recently put out by 
a group of experienced UK peacebuilding experts (The Ammerdown Invitation) for a broad 
civic conversation about alternatives to the current approach to national security125.  The 
group outlines its concerns about the existing model and offers a different vision for the 
future, welcoming input on this debate from government, politicians, civil society and the 
general public.  
 
                                                          
124  The post-2015 development framework, which will replace the Millennium Development Goals when 
they expire in 2015, is currently in the process of negotiation. Saferworld has set out how a future 
development agenda might contribute to sustainable peace in Saferworld, (2014), ‘From the Sustainable 
Development Goals to the Post-2015 Development Agenda: Building a Consensus for Peace’, 
http://www.saferworld.org.uk/resources/view-resource/831-from-the-sustainable-development-goals-to-the-
post-2015-development-agenda-building-a-consensus-for-peace 
125  The Ammerdown Invitation, (2014), ‘Security for the future: in search of a new vision’, Open 
Democracy, https://www.opendemocracy.net/opensecurity/ammerdown-invitation/security-for-future-in-
search-of-new-vision 
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Should the UK plan to maintain its global influence? Should we aim for a national 
consensus on the UK’s future place in the world? 
 
12. The traditional forms of UK global influence such as military and economic power 
may be increasingly less viable if we take a long-term and realistic approach to Britain’s role 
in the world. However, this does not mean that the UK does not retain considerable 
influence, including in the form of soft power. The UK is still a significant player in shaping 
the world order, and the next National Security Strategy should prioritise objectives around 
UK leadership in setting strong international standards, such as through the pursuit of better 
global regulation of the arms trade (including continued support for the Arms Trade Treaty), 
a strong post-2015 development framework with peace, good governance and rule of law at 
its core, and support for multilateral and regional bodies to improve their effectiveness in 
promoting shared social goods.   
 
13. The UK should, however, be realistic about its ability to promote peace on its own. In 
a changing world order, the balance of external influence in fragile and conflict-affected 
states is also changing. For example, China as the major investor in South Sudan’s oil 
industry must be a key player in restoring peace to the country. In Somalia, Turkey is an 
increasingly significant actor through its humanitarian and diplomatic activities.  So, along 
with continued support and engagement with international and multilateral organisations 
including the UN and the EU External Action Service, the UK should step up its engagement 
with China, Turkey and other rising powers in order to promote international cooperation 
on conflict prevention. Departments like DFID as well as UK civil society can make an 
important contribution in this respect, as they hold a wide range of development and other 
expertise that can inform progressive conversations about what works (and what doesn’t) in 
fragile and conflict-affected contexts.   
Conclusion. 
 
14. The 2010 National Security Strategy, along with the Strategic Defence and Security 
Review and the Building Stability Overseas Strategy, set out a welcome UK commitment to 
preventing conflict and building peace. The next National Security Strategy should build 
upon this commitment and clearly set out how this vision will increasingly be 
operationalised in practice across government departments. A stronger and explicit focus on 
the overall objective of promoting sustainable peace – founded on human security and 
inclusive, fair, responsive and accountable states – across the whole of the UK’s 
engagement in conflict-affected and fragile states would demonstrate a forward-looking 
and progressive approach to national security. The strategy must resist confining the UK to 
short-term, conflict-insensitive policies and practices that respond to narrowly-defined 
security or economic interests and seek to put the UK on a strong footing for securing its 
long-term interests. 
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1. SGR is an independent UK-based membership organisation of about 900 natural 
scientists, social scientists, engineers, IT professionals and architects. Founded in 1992, 
we promote science, design and technology that contribute to peace, social justice, and 
environmental sustainability. SGR carries out research, education and advocacy work 
mainly focused on four main issues: security and disarmament; climate change and 
energy; who controls science and technology? and emerging technologies. 
2. SGR has recently published an in-depth report entitled ‘Offensive Insecurity: The Role of 
Science and Technology in UK Security Strategies’. In it, we critically assessed recent 
government policies and spending patterns related to the application of science and 
technology to security issues. This involved analysis of Ministry of Defence data on 
military R&D spending and a comparison of this with data on areas of civilian R&D which 
can make a contribution to security. Key evidence from this report and subsequent 
analysis form the basis of this submission. The references are given at the end of this 
submission and printed copies are being sent to the Committee. 
 
What should be the UK’s national security priorities for the next twenty years, and how 
should these steer the next NSS? 
 
3. The UK government continues to be heavily focused on potential military threats and 
how they might be countered with military power. There is limited acknowledgement 
that military responses in recent years have not only failed to achieve stated objectives, 
but have often been counter-productive. There has been much less attention to non-
military security threats and the need to tackle the roots of conflict to bring about a 
lasting peace – although this is slowly started to change. SGR’s view is that the next NSS 
should be steered by a much greater focus on tackling the roots of conflict – which 
include a range of social and environmental factors such as resource depletion, climate 
change, economic injustice and the spread of military technologies. It should be more 
widely recognised that non-military security threats – such as climate change – are likely 
to become a much greater problem that conventional military threats. 
4. The role of science and technology within this security landscape is critical. Decisions 
taken now on priorities for research and development – across the natural sciences, 
social sciences and engineering – will be central to shaping how the UK is able to deal (or 
not deal) with security problems far into the future.  
5. SGR’s assessment of recent security-related R&D spending in the UK concluded that 
there is a strong focus on military R&D with much lower levels of spending in areas 
which could help tackle the roots of conflict. For example: 
a. The Ministry of Defence’s annual spending on R&D (2008 to 2011) was between 
two and seven times the size of the public R&D spending that helps to tackle the 
roots of conflict. The latter R&D included work on international development and 
poverty alleviation, climate change impacts, sustainable energy technologies, 
food security, international relations, natural resource management, 
biodiversity, environmental risks and hazards, sustainable consumption and 
other measures to mitigate and adapt to climate change. 
b. The area of the MoD’s R&D with the highest budget was nuclear weapons 
systems. UK public R&D spending for nuclear weapons technologies was more 
than five times that on renewable energy technologies. This example is indicative 
of a strong focus on military technology with an ‘offensive’ or ‘force projection’ 
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capability, with much less priority given to technologies which help tackle climate 
change, acknowledged by the government to be a major security threat. 
c. Our view is that public spending on military R&D – especially for ‘force 
projection’ – should be markedly reduced while that for tackling the roots of 
conflict should be markedly increased, with much greater integration of this work 
into UK policy-making circles. 
6. For some major security problems, the 20 year time horizon is too short, and a lack of 
consideration of longer-term effects could well to lead to misallocation of current 
resources. This is true especially for climate change because time delays in the climate 
system mean that the full effects of current carbon emissions will not be felt for several 
decades. 
7. There should also be greater emphasis on increasing the resilience of the UK’s society 
and economy to social and environmental shocks, as well as to potential military threats. 
Several of the R&D areas discussed above – for example, sustainable energy systems – 
would be valuable for this purpose. 
 
Should the UK plan to maintain its global influence?  Should we aim for a national 
consensus on the UK’s future place in the world? 
 
8. SGR supports the UK maintaining global influence through civilian action, especially 
through:  
a. R&D focused on policies and technologies which strongly support 
environmentally sustainability, social justice and peace-building;  
b. equitable trade and other economic policies; 
c. official development assistance; and  
d. taking a leading role in international environmental, disarmament and human 
rights treaties.  
9. SGR supports the rapid shrinking of the role of UK military approaches to security 
problems. 
10. We need a national debate on the UK’s role in the world. At the moment, the 
government’s main emphasis seems to be that the UK’s strategy should continue to 
include a major role for ‘force projection’. Public engagement strategies seem simply 
aimed at justifying, not debating, this position. 
 
How can the next NSS be made most useful in guiding decisions in Government and long-
term spending decisions? 
 
11. At minimum, the NSS will need to: 
a. outline a comprehensive set of major security risks, including those with a social, 
political, economic or environmental dimension;  
b. highlight the range of options for trying to deal with them, from early 
preventative action to crisis management; 
c. estimate the risks and costs of different courses of action/ inaction to allow 
decision-makers to consider which might be most appropriate at a given stage; 
d. highlight the international co-operation necessary to increase the chances of 
success. 
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12. Critically, the NSS will need to include a wide range of civilian activities – for example, 
those listed in 5a above, which will have numerous other benefits beyond the security 
arena (such as the creation of skilled science and technology jobs in the sustainable 
energy sector). The NSS will also need to consider non-combat roles for the military – for 
example, supplying emergency aid when civilian options are not available. 
13. In general, SGR’s view is that there is a serious imbalance in current spending patterns 
which prioritise expensive, risky military technological options over cheaper, 
preventative civilian options. So arguably the most important role of the next NSS is to 
achieve a more reasonable balance. 
 
What are the main risks to the UK’s national security? Is the Government’s horizon-
scanning effective, and are our national contingency plans adequate? 
 
14. There has been significant value in, for example, horizon scanning reports compiled by 
the MoD’s Development, Concepts and Doctrines Centre. However, our view is that 
there have been major shortcomings in incorporating this and other assessments into 
UK security policies such as the last NSS and Strategic Defence and Security Review. In 
particular, we believe that security spending allocations are not well aligned with a 
realistic assessment of a range of security concerns. UK spending is excessively focused 
on developing and deploying military force projection which is no defence against 
threats such as terrorism, energy insecurity or climate change. In our view, budget 
allocations for military force projection should be reduced markedly and allocations 
increased to the areas listed in 5a above and to interventions such as diplomacy, civilian 
and humanitarian actions. We make a range of more specific suggestions in our report.  
 
How broadly should the NSS define national security?   
 
15. National security should be defined based on a broad range of factors which affect the 
stability of UK society. The academic literature has introduced concepts such as ‘human 
security’ and ‘sustainable security’ – which include social, economic and environmental 
factors – and these have been increasingly adopted by UN bodies. We share the view 
that application of these concepts is central in creating and maintaining national 
security.  
16. Concepts of national security necessarily must include consideration of international 
security. The UK cannot insulate itself from international security problems through 
some sort of ‘fortress mentality’, and it must acknowledge that some of its approaches 
to national security concerns undermine international security. For example: 
a. The continued deployment of nuclear weapons provides justification for non-
nuclear weapons states to seek such weapons of mass destruction to seek to 
bolster their own security; 
b. The continued deployment of nuclear weapons also exacerbates the risk of 
nuclear war – even a limited one – which would cause massive devastation, 
including global disruption of the climate system, threatening the national 
security of virtually every country on the planet; 
c. The continued prominent role for ‘force projection’ provides a justification in the 
minds of some for asymmetric terrorist action against a broad range of Western 
interests (including the UK). 
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Summary 
 
1. Citizens occupy an increasingly central role in the risk management cycle and their 
cooperation in building societal resilience is essential in the twenty-first century. 
However, despite the rhetoric of successive National Security Strategies (NSS), the 
methods by which risks and threats to the UK are assessed and prioritised do not 
consider the views of diverse publics. The UK’s national security priorities should 
reflect the concerns of citizens: to ignore this is itself potentially a risk to societal 
resilience and contingency planning. 
 
2. Little is known about how diverse publics view security, how they know and 
understand concepts of ‘security’ and ‘threat’, and which issues they find most 
‘threatening’, and this is a significant blind spot. The evidence we present is based on 
a programme of ESRC-funded research that has sought to uncover and address this 
gap. Our main findings address two priority themes raised by the Select Committee 
Announcement: methodology for risk and contingency planning and the scope of 
the NSS. These findings can be summarised as follows. 
 
a. Citizens identify different kinds of security threats at global, national, 
community, and personal levels. 
 
b. Framing security threats at different levels will have significant consequences 
on threat perception and public policy preferences. 
  
c. There is a gulf between ‘official’ and ‘lay’ knowledge and perception of 
security threats.  
 
d. Awareness of government messages about security threats is low and does 
not lessen perceptions of threats; minority groups feel powerless in the 
formulation of national security policy. 
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3. These findings have significant implications ahead of the next Strategic Defence and 
Security Review and NSS: 
 
a. If citizens’ views on security threats are to be taken seriously and the content 
and credibility of the NSS is to be known and enhanced among diverse 
publics then more inclusive methodologies for formulating national security 
policy are required. 
 
b. A more consultative approach would not only increase the democratic 
legitimacy of the NSS: in the longer term it would provide the footing for a 
more sustainable National Security Strategy, offer better value for money, 
and contribute towards greater societal resilience. These elements are all the 
more important in the context of diminished resources. 
 
About the Authors 
 
Dr Daniel Stevens is an Associate Professor in Politics at the Department of Politics and 
International Relations, University of Exeter, Cornwall, TR10 9FE 
(D.P.Stevens@exeter.ac.uk). He is the author or co-author of over 30 peer reviewed journal 
articles on topics such as the psychology of political attitudes, public opinion, and voting 
behaviour. 
 
Dr Nick Vaughan-Williams is Reader in International Security at the Department of Politics 
and International Studies, University of Warwick, Coventry, CV4 7AL (N.Vaughan-
Williams@Warwick.ac.uk). He has published 7 books and over 30 scholarly journal articles 
and book chapters in the field of International Relations and Security. 
 
Information for the Committee 
 
1. Citizens are increasingly expected to play a central role in the national security 
architecture of Britain. The 2008 National Security Strategy (NSS) was committed to 
finding ‘new opportunities to seek views from members of the public’. This was 
presented as ‘the next step in a process of engagement designed to ensure that 
government thinking on national security constantly keeps pace with the rapidly 
evolving global security environment. Similarly, the 2010 NSS reiterated the ‘need to 
build a much closer relationship between government, the private sector and the 
public when it comes to national security’ and claimed that ‘we all have a part to 
play in keeping the country safe – be it from terrorists, cyber attack or natural 
disasters’.  
 
2. Yet despite the centrality of the citizen in the 2008 and 2010 NSS and an increasing 
emphasis on dialogue and inclusion, successive governments have not sought to 
incorporate the diverse views of the public in the assessment and prioritisation of 
risk and threat. The methodology underpinning the tiered list of threats in the NSS 
closes off wider public consultation and debate about national security priorities. By 
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calculating risk only according to the likelihood of occurrence and scale of impact at 
the national level the NSS ignores the range of issues that shape everyday 
experiences of threat and security among diverse publics. Both elements need to be 
combined in an enhanced methodology.  
  
3. The stakes in contemporary security threat perceptions are high for government 
and citizens alike. While liberal democracies attempt to balance civil liberties and 
security, a threatened public skews the trade-off toward the latter, tending to favour 
repression, intolerance, exclusionist, and potentially aggressive attitudes toward 
minorities, and to show a greater willingness to support war against external sources 
of threat. 
 
4. A threatened public may be more receptive to the enhancement of otherwise 
unpopular or illiberal policies. Indeed, the combination of threats and the belief that 
elites sanction punitive actions that combat threats is particularly dangerous to 
democracy. Instead of adapting levels of protection to the perceived existence of 
threats, it may lead to the modulation of threat perceptions in order to justify 
enhanced levels of protection, such that protection itself may become a security 
threat. 
5. Dominant voices in academia and policy-making communities alike have privileged 
elite knowledge and understanding about security. To some extent this is to be 
expected given the demands of strategy at a national level, but these dynamics have 
reproduced a blind spot such that there is little awareness of how security, threat, 
and risk is known and experienced in different ways by diverse publics. How do 
‘ordinary’ people think about threat and security? What issues do they find 
threatening and why?  
 
6. Our programme of research included a nationally representative online survey of 
2,000 participants and 20 in-depth focus groups across six British cities: Bristol, 
Cardiff, Glasgow, Leicester, London, and Oldham. Groups varied according to gender, 
socio-economic background, faith, age, and included 60 participants in total (31 
female, 29 male) (see Appendix 1).  
 
7. Individuals identify different kinds of threats at the global, national, community, and 
personal levels: members of the British public perceive the most threats at the global 
level and the least at the community and personal levels, and the kinds of threats 
they identify as global or national tend to differ from those they identify as 
community or personal. The national level is not one that resonates with most 
citizens. 
 
8. The online survey gauged the views of a diverse sample of social, multi ethnic and 
religious backgrounds. It showed that people who see more national threats tend to 
be more intolerant of minorities and have a stronger white identity, while people 
who perceive threats as global are more tolerant of minorities and have a weaker 
white identity. These differences extend to policy preferences, where more global 
threats appear to favour solutions such as international aid over straightforward 
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security policies, whereas perceptions of more national threats led to a preference 
for enhanced security measures. 
 
9. Framing security threats as ‘international’ rather than ‘national’ may have very 
different consequences on who is threatened and on public preferences for policies 
such as spending on defence and security. This has potentially important 
ramifications for initiatives designed to shape perceptions of security threats and 
efforts to mitigate them and/or offer reassurance. 
 
10. There is a significant gap between the issues that citizens find threatening to their 
security and that of their communities on the one hand and those listed in the 
2010 NSS. Only 3% of our respondents saw ‘International Terrorism’ – a Tier One 
threat – as a pressing security threat to themselves, their families, and local 
communities in their everyday lives. Individuals are more concerned with online 
banking and cyber-bullying than the issue of ‘hostile attacks on UK cyber space by 
other states and large scale cyber crime’ – also listed as a top-tier risk. Other priority 
issues not mentioned in the 2010 NSS are financial insecurity, local crime, and 
Islamaphobia among Muslims. The issues listed in the NSS appear strange and 
aloof: the understanding of security employed needs to be broadened and 
deepened to reflect the security concerns of diverse publics. 
 
11. There are a number of initiatives to enlist the support of citizens throughout the risk 
management cycle, but there is little public awareness of or appetite for 
engagement with government-led initiatives. Posters and announcements in public 
spaces enjoin ‘citizen-detectives’ to be vigilant at all times and call hotlines to report 
any behaviour that they deem to be ‘suspicious’. At ports, airports, and international 
railway stations, ‘trusted’ travellers are expected to interact willingly with biometric 
technologies such as ‘e-Gates’ in order to facilitate identity-based risk management 
and minimise queues. Local Resilience Forums (LRFs) invite individuals to feed into 
local community risk registers in order to identify the greatest risks in a given area 
and then plan and exercise to help mitigate against those risks. Among minority 
communities in particular there is evidence of fear of involvement and an 
association between awareness of government messages and perceptions of more 
rather than less threat. To be effective in encouraging the support of citizens and to 
ensure their productive engagement in building societal resilience their views need 
to be built into and reflected in the NSS. 
 
12. In general, focus groups said they feel less secure now than in the past. The 
invocation of 9/11 as a turning point was common and conversations with older 
groups in particular tended to contrast today’s climate of fear and anxiety as being 
higher when compared to the eras of the Cold War. Our focus groups suggest for 
some religious and ethnic groups the threat of being stereotyped and connected 
with terrorist activity was a barrier to engagement with the risk management 
cycle. There is a bifurcation between those for whom heightened surveillance 
necessitates and justifies suspicion of others and those for whom heightened 
surveillance means they feel unfairly targeted because of their race.  
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13. Our groups also suggest that many British citizens feel disenfranchised from the 
NSS, which is in their name and yet fails to include and reflect their priorities. 
Listening to voices otherwise marginalised by national security strategy offers new 
opportunities to test existing agendas and set new ones:  
 
 “Sometimes you feel marginalised and we feel our voices are not being 
heard. These kinds of sessions need to be organised across the country on a 
much bigger scale. How long are people going to wait while the common man 
is suffering. That is the thing. They need to act” (Azza, London). 
 
 “The role of government should be to consult with the public […] meetings 
like this for example will bring things to mind that you might not normally 
think of and this is an opportunity for potentially new ideas through the likes 
of research to be fed up through the ranks”. (Bob, Cardiff). 
 
14. Everyday views, anecdotes, and stories serve as important reminders that the idea of 
a singular ‘public’ is neither possible nor desirable to sustain when identifying and 
seeking to mitigate security threats. If governments are committed to incorporating 
the views of citizens more prominently in matters of security – as indicated by the 
2008 and 2010 NSS – then a first move would be to acknowledge and find ways at a 
local level to engage productively with diverse publics. The programme of surveys 
and focus groups we undertook offers guidance for how this might be achieved in a 
new enhanced methodology for the next NSS. To continue to ignore the views and 
concerns of diverse publics in the NSS is itself potentially a risk to national security, 
contingency planning, and societal resilience.   
 
Daniel Stevens and Nick Vaughan-Williams, 30 September 2014 
Notes 
This evidence is based on a programme of research carried out between March 2012 and 
July 2013 by Stevens and Vaughan-Williams, entitled ‘Public Perceptions of Threat in Britain: 
Security in an Age of Austerity, which was funded by the UK Economic and Social Research 
Council (ES/J004596/1). 
 
The project sought to investigate: 
 How members of the public understand the concepts of "threat" and "security"; 
 What they consider to be the most pressing threats to their security; 
 Whether their views coincide with notions of threat and how to respond to and 
mitigate them in the government's National Security Strategy. 
 
The research was based on 20 mini-groups of three respondents from the main regions of 
Britain, as well as a large-scale survey of 2,000 respondents.  
 
Published document to accompany this evidence: 
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 D. Stevens and N. Vaughan-Williams (2014) ‘Citizens and Security Threats: Issues, 
Perceptions, and Consequences Beyond the National Frame’, British Journal of 
Political Science. Forthcoming. Available on First View: 
http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayAbstract?fromPage=online&aid=92892
82&fulltextType=RA&fileId=S0007123414000143  
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Executive summary and recommendations 
1. The 2010 National Security Strategy (NSS) states that the UK’s national interest 
comprises ‘security, prosperity and freedom’ (para 0.9), and that national security 
requires that values such as democracy, human rights and the rule of law are recognised 
internationally (p. 4). While it lists a number of risks to UK national security, the NSS 
does not recognise one issue which poses significant risks to international security, 
prosperity and the rule of law: corruption. Transparency International-UK International 
Defence and Security Programme believes that the risk posed by corruption should be 
an integral part of the next National Security Strategy.  
2. Corrupt practices adversely affect the UK’s national security. They weaken the legitimacy 
of governments, hamper the development of licit economies, and fuel societal 
grievances, fostering instability and contributing to state failure and conflict in regions of 
strategic importance to the UK. Corruption in the defence sector is particularly 
pernicious as it undermines the state’s ability to protect its citizens and respond to 
threats. Corrupt practices also distort international markets, reduce business 
opportunities, and waste money in aid and trade.  
3. TI-UK DSP recommends that corruption is recognised as a threat to the UK’s national 
security and prosperity, and ways of mitigating it are incorporated into security and 
defence policies. Specific recommendations include: 
 that levels of corruption risks, particularly in the defence and security sectors, are 
incorporated into assessing risks to the security and prosperity of the UK; 
 that security and defence assistance initiatives explicitly recognise the risks that 
corruption poses and that anti-corruption, integrity and institution-building are 
included as an integral part of training of international partners’ forces; 
 that the UK government works with like-minded partners to address corruption 
risks in international organisations; 
 that the UK recognises that investing in Transparency, Accountability and 
Counter-Corruption (TACC) capacity is likely to be an asset in building 
relationships with allies, including the United States and NATO; 
 that all stabilisation mission mandates incorporate the requirement to address 
corruption risks; this includes developing an accurate understanding of corrupt 
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networks and types of corruption, designing targeted measures to tackle them, 
and ensuring that personnel are trained in tackling corruption risks; 
 that reserve recruitment include those with skills and expertise relevant to 
countering corruption, ensuring that the armed forces have access to the right 
specialists; 
 that assembling and analysing evidence of corruption risks is incorporated into 
the tasking of military intelligence gathering; 
 that the government not authorise a transfer of arms when there are substantial 
grounds for believing that there is a material risk of an arms transfer involving 
corrupt practices or corruption at any stage of the transfer. This should include 
government-to-government deals and pay particular attention to the role of 
brokers, agents, and intermediaries. 
 
Background 
4. Transparency International (TI) is widely recognised as the world’s leading anti-corruption 
organisation. Its London-based Defence and Security Programme run by TI-UK (TI-UK DSP) 
has been working constructively with the defence industry, government defence 
establishments, and civil society around the world for more than 10 years to develop 
practical tools to address corruption risks in defence and security. TI-UK DSP has worked 
with NATO to develop and implement its Building Integrity Programme and carries out anti-
corruption training in co-operation with the UK Defence Academy. It also conducts, supports 
and disseminates original research enabling better understanding of corruption risks in the 
security and defence sector. Its flagship tools are the Government Defence Anti-Corruption 
Index and the Defence Companies Anti-Corruption Index, which measure corruption risks 
and disseminate best practice in the defence and security sector. TI-UK DSP receives funding 
from, among others, the UK Department for International Development, the Dutch Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs, and the UK Ministry of Defence. 
 
Introduction 
5. The Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy has called for submissions 
addressing 6 main areas that pertain to the next National Security Strategy, to be adopted in 
2015. TI-UK DSP offers practical recommendations for three of those areas: 1) scope of the 
next National Security Strategy; 2) risk and contingency planning; and 3) international 
relationships. We also propose practical measures to support the implementation of our 
recommendations. 
6. Our primary recommendation is that corruption is recognised as a threat to the UK’s 
national security and incorporated into security and defence policies, including 
international crisis prevention and management and security and defence assistance. It 
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should be taken into account when assessing risks and when planning responses, 
particularly those that pertain to security and defence assistance and military interventions.  
7. The issue of corruption as a threat to stability and peace has been steadily gaining 
recognition, including within the UK government, but this recognition has been relatively 
recent. By including corruption as relevant to issues of national security and prosperity, the 
2015 National Security Strategy would contribute to the growing awareness of the risks 
carried by corrupt practices and would prompt the inclusion of anti-corruption measures in 
policies across the Government. 
 
Corruption and national security 
Corruption is defined as the abuse of entrusted power for private gain. 
 
Corruption risk refers to the degree of probability that corruption occurs within a certain 
area or activity, and the potential cost associated with that corruption. It thus reflects the 
probability that such losses, whether monetary, social, or political, can arise; and reflects 
the degree of such cost when it occurs.  
 
8. The 2010 National Security Strategy (NSS) states that the UK’s national interest comprises 
‘security, prosperity and freedom’ (para 0.9), and that national security requires that values 
such as democracy, human rights and the rule of law are promoted internationally (p. 4). 
The NSS also lists a number of risks to UK national security. However, it does not recognise 
one issue which poses significant risks to international security, stability, prosperity and the 
rule of law: corruption, which the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace has recently 
referred to as the ‘unrecognized threat to international security’.  
 
9. Corrupt practices constitute a major risk to national and international security. They 
threaten international peace and security—including in regions of strategic importance to 
the UK—by adding to and exacerbating other risks, including sectarian cleavages and weak 
institutions. Corrupt practices weaken the rule of law, create a culture of impunity, weaken 
the legitimacy of governments, hamper the development of strong licit economies, and 
make recourse to state institutions almost impossible, fuelling grievances and aiding the 
recruitment of insurgents and terrorists. They diminish the resilience of state structures, 
making it more difficult for states to withstand shocks and react to conflicts and violence.126 
Corruption in the defence sector is particularly pernicious as it undermines the state’s ability 
to protect its citizens, limits its ability to respond to threats, and can spill over into other 
                                                          
126 Department for International Development, Foreign and Commonwealth Office and Ministry of Defence, Building 
Stability Overseas Strategy, 2011, para 3.3. 
Transparency International UK, International Defence & Security Programme – written evidence 
120 
 
sectors. Corrupt practices also distort international markets, reduce business opportunities 
and waste money.  
10. Corruption and conflict are strongly correlated: twelve out of fifteen countries ranked 
lowest in the Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index are also home to 
insurgencies or extremist groups.127 Fallout from embedded, systemic corruption links such 
seemingly disparate events as the Arab Spring, conflict in Ukraine, the failure of the Malian 
army in 2012 and of the Iraqi security forces in the face of ISIS in 2014. These can carry 
security risks for the UK as they threaten regional stability and expose the fragility and 
societal illegitimacy of state structures. Corruption and lack of transparency in the defence 
and security can also lead to proliferation of weapons and to chemical, biological, 
radiological and nuclear (CBRN) materials being easier to obtain for extremist groups (para 
0.18). 
 
11. Not only does corruption threaten peace, security and prosperity, it can also reduce the 
effectiveness of measures aimed at enhancing stability and state capacity. If not taken into 
account, it can undermine efforts to foster rule of law. Corruption wastes international aid, 
as funds are misappropriated or diverted by corrupt networks permeating governments. 
Unrecognised and not counteracted, it can damage the legitimacy of international missions 
in fragile states and threaten mission success.128  
12. The issue of corruption as a threat to stability and peace has been steadily gaining 
recognition, including within the UK government, but this recognition has been relatively 
recent. The issue came to the top of the international security agenda around 2011, when 
its impact on the situation in Afghanistan and the threat it posed to the success of the 
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission was recognised. Admiral Mike Mullen, 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, observed that some Afghan institutions which were 
central to the transition of power from ISAF to local forces were deeply corrupt and 
subverted by criminal networks, and conceded that American ‘inattention’ to how  aid and 
reconstruction funds were disbursed had contributed to the growth of the  problem.129 
Generals Stanley McChrystal and David Petraeus, both ISAF commanders, recognised that 
the achievement of the counter-insurgency goals ‘depend on fighting corruption’, which 
Afghans have identified as the most important reason behind support for the Taliban over 
the Karzai government. Fighting corruption, one NATO official said, was ‘a moral imperative, 
and […] an operational imperative’.130 General Sir Nick Carter, Chief of the General Staff and 
former Deputy Commander of ISAF, stressed the malign influence of corruption, which 
created a culture of impunity and fuelled the insurgency; he also accepted that ISAF lacked 
                                                          
127 Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Corruption: The Unrecognized Threat to International Security, 2014, p. 4 
128 TI-UK DSP, Corruption Threats and International Missions: Practical Guidance for Leaders, pp. 7-13; TI-UK DSP and TI 
Germany, Corruption as a Threat to Stability and Peace, 2012, pp. 17-18. 
129 ‘Mullen warns of Afghanistan transition corruption’, Defense News, 1 August 2011, accessed September 2014. 
130 Joshua Partlow, ‘For General Petraeus, battling corruption in Afghanistan is a priority’, Washington Post, 29 July 2010, 
accessed September 2014. 
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understanding of the problem and actually exacerbated it through inadequate contracting 
and logistics procedures. Achieving ISAF’s operational goals required it to recognise that 
these essentially political issues were relevant to security-related outcomes and needed to 
be addressed through a comprehensive political-military strategy.131  
 
13.  Within the UK security policies, the threat posed by corruption is not yet uniformly 
recognised. The 2010 NSS only mentions corruption once (p. 13), in the context of desired 
progress in Afghanistan and without recognising its wider implications, and the 2010 
Strategic Defenc and Security Review (SDSR), which fleshes out some of the NSS 
implementation strategies, does not mention corruption at all.  The International Defence 
Engagement Strategy, which focuses on using defence assets in relationship-building, does 
not mention corruption risks or anti-corruption activities, even though corruption can have 
a severe impact on the effectiveness of security sector reform and stabilisation missions. 
14. The FCO-based Stabilisation Unit recognises that corruption plays an important role in 
conflict environments and that stabilisation operations can in fact entrench it,132 and the 
FCO/DfID/MOD Building Stability Overseas Strategy recognises that ‘[v]iolent conflict is 
closely linked to bad governance, corruption and the lack of broad-based economic 
development’ (para 3.3.). The 2013 Serious and Organised Crime Strategy recognises that 
‘[b]ribery and corruption are tools of serious and organised crime’, and organised crime in 
turn threatens national security (paras 1.26 and 1.3). At the 2014 Munich Security 
Conference, the then- Secretary of State for Defence Philip Hammond stated:  
[T]op-down institution building, re-enforcement of capacity and challenging 
institutionalised corruption in particular, […] is not just a moral imperative. It is a 
practical imperative. Anyone who is familiar with Afghanistan, … will understand 
how institutionalised corruption simply saps the ability of the society, of the 
economy to operate efficiently and effectively.133 
15. This inconsistent treatment in UK policy indicates that corruption is not yet seen as 
relevant to all aspects of national and international security. This is a mistake, as it hampers 
the development of an integrated strategy for reducing the risk of instability and conflict. 
Corruption is relevant to the risks and threats identified by the NSS, including instability 
caused by fragile states, and to the responses identified by the SDSR. Given that in conflict 
environments military personnel usually play a more significant role then civilians, it is 
imperative that they also have an awareness of the importance of corruption issues and 
expertise in how to counter them. Without explicit, high-level recognition of the threat 
posed by corruption to stability and peace, it is unlikely that its pernicious influence will be 
                                                          
131 R. Jeffrey Smith, ‘U.S. military describes Its mistakes in Afghanistan’, The Center for Public Integrity, 6 May 2014, 
accessed September 2014; General Sir Nick Carter, ‘Drawing lessons from Afghanistan’, The British Army Journal 2011, 
accessed September 2014. 
132 Stabilisation Unit, ‘Addressing Corruption in Stabilisation Environments’, Stabilisation Issues Notes 2012, accessed 
September 2014. 
133 Philip Hammond, Secretary of Defence, Remarks at the Munich Security Conference, 1 February 2014. 
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recognised and counteracted across the board. This is the role that the 2015 NSS should 
play.  
 
Scope of the NSS 
16. While awareness of corruption as a threat has been steadily rising, it tends to be pushed 
aside when issues perceived as more urgent—such as military crises—arise. We recommend 
that the 2015 NSS explicitly recognises corruption, which increases the likelihood of state 
failure and conflict, among the most significant threats to national and international 
security. This recognition is the best way to ensure that a focus on anti-corruption activities 
and long-term preventive strategies informs all aspects of the implementation of the NSS, 
including security and defence assistance and stabilisation missions. 
17. The Committee has suggested that the 2010 NSS does not pay enough attention to 
international economic instability. TI-UK DSP agrees. International economic instability and 
distortion of international business opportunities—both fostered by corrupt practices—is a 
risk for a nation as dependent on open markets as the UK. We recommend that corruption 
and ensuing economic instability are recognised as a risk to the UK’s economic prosperity. 
 
Risk assessment: factoring in corruption 
18. The two major aspects of risk assessment are the likelihood of something happening and 
the severity of its consequences. Corruption increases the likelihood of conflict and 
instability occurring, and therefore should be incorporated into security risk assessments. 
We recommend that levels of corruption, particularly in the defence and security sectors, 
are incorporated into assessing the likelihood of conflict and instability.  
International partnerships 
19. The SDSR includes engagement with, and reform of, the UN and NATO as one of the UK’s 
five priorities in international engagement (paras 5.2, 5.6, 5.11). The UN plays a vital role in 
supporting peace and stability, not least through it crisis response and peacekeeping 
operations. However, in order for the organisation to achieve its full potential, it needs to 
address the risk of corruption on operations and in its procedures.134 Recent reports of the 
UN Board of Auditors strongly suggest that the UN needs to strengthen the way it works 
with implementing partners in order to reduce the risk of fraud and thus decreased 
efficiency.135 On its part, NATO also needs to improve its record on transparency and 
accountability, revitalise programmes such as Building Integrity, and incorporate anti-
                                                          
134 TI-UK DSP, Corruption in Peacekeeping. Strengthening Peacekeeping and the United Nations, 2012, pp. 3-11. 
135 ‘Financial reports and audited financial statements for the biennium ended 31 December 2013 and the Report of the 
Board of Auditors’, Vol. 1, New York: United Nations 2014, pp. 40-53. Available at 
http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/69/5(VOL.I), accessed September 2014. 
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corruption guidance into its mission mandates.136 We recommend that the UK government 
works with like-minded partners to address corruption risks and lack of transparency in 
international organisations. 
20. The NSS stresses the imperative of the UK working with partners—particularly the 
United States—to address risks to national security (para 2.11). The SDSR states that utility 
to the UK’s partners and allies is one of the criteria which should be applied to whether 
capacities should be preserved and developed (para 2.9), and adds that partner capacity 
building and cooperation on international interventions constitute important aspects of the 
U.S.-UK relationship (para 5.6). Transparency, Accountability and Counter-Corruption (TACC) 
expertise is one asset which the UK should build up and which would be welcomed by 
partners, particularly by the United States. The UK already has some expertise in this area, 
through the TI-UK DSP and the ‘Building Integrity’ programme in the UK Defence Academy, 
funded by the DfID / FCO / MOD Conflict, Security and Stabilisation Fund. This is a good base 
on which to build capability which would not only address important issues, but could also 
be used in building relationships. The 2013 TI-UK DSP’s Government Defence Anti-
Corruption Index has found that the United States was one of only two countries which has 
military doctrine addressing corruption on operations;137 the steadily rising level of 
attention the U.S. is giving to the nexus of corruption and security is also exemplified by the 
establishment of Task Force Shafafyiat (Transparency) and the appointment of Special 
Inspector General for Afghanistan Recionstruction (SIGAR). NATO’s Joint Analysis and 
Lessons Learned Centre also advises that counteracting corruption risks needs to be 
incorporated into mission doctrine and that personnel need to possess expertise necessary 
to deal with corruption risks.138 Given the U.S. and NATO interest in anti-corruption 
measures on operations, allied expertise and capacity on the issue would likely be very 
welcome. We recommend that the UK invests in TACC capacity as one way to strengthen 
its international partnerships, particularly those with the United States and within NATO.  
21. The SDSR states that ‘non-operational defence engagement’ would be ramped up: new 
initiatives would include training, joint exercises, and despatching civilian policy advisers to 
foreign forces and defence ministries (para 4.B.2). TI-UK DSP welcomes defence 
engagement initiatives, but cautions against focussing them solely on tactical training and 
assistance. The example of Mali and the virtual collapse of its security forces vividly 
illustrates the dangers of limiting security and defence assistance to tactical and operational 
training. General Carter Ham of the US Africa Command (AFRICOM) acknowledged that with 
training focussed almost entirely on tactical and operational aspects, ethics, integrity and 
responsibility had been neglected – with dire consequences.139 The same issues are playing 
                                                          
136 Leah Wawro, TI-UK DSP, NATO’s black hole: New report reveals excessive secrecy, 11 June 2014, accessed September 
2014. 
137 See ‘Operations’, Government Defence Anti-Corruption Index 2013, accessed September 2014. 
138 NATO’s Joint Analysis and Lessons Learned Centre (JALLC), Counter- and Anti-Corruption. Theory and Practice from 
NATO Operations, 2013, accessed September 2014, p. iv. 
139 ‘Mali crisis: US admits mistakes in training local troops’, BBC News, 25 January 2013, accessed September 2014. 
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out in Iraq in 2014.  Without training in ethics, integrity, and anti-corruption issues, and 
making defence staff aware of practical mechanisms to address the pernicious influence of 
corruption, security and defence assistance will not be effective. We recommend that 
security and defence assistance initiatives explicitly recognise the risk from corruption and 
that ethics, anti-corruption and integrity engagement are made an integral part of training 
of international partners’ forces.  
 
Corruption threats and the NSS: a few notes on implementation 
22. The 2015 National Security Strategy will be fleshed out through a number of subsequent 
policies, including the 2015 Strategic Defence and Security Review. We realise that the 
priority of the Committee is the NSS; however, we would like to provide a few examples of 
how the focus on corruption can be translated into concrete initiatives, to illustrate the 
feasibility of addressing corruption through national security initiatives.  
23. Corruption is a threat to the success of stabilisation missions and thus can damage an 
important tool for fostering stability and peace. If not addressed, corruption will threaten 
mission objectives such as better governance and economic development. It can also 
damage the legitimacy of the mission itself if the international forces are seen to be 
engaging with and supporting corrupt actors. In counteracting corruption, stabilisation 
missions face a complex task, as different types of corruption require different reform 
packages.140 The complexity of the issue, however, should not be license to ignore it: as the 
example of Afghanistan suggests, if not addressed, entrenched corruption will decrease 
security levels and government effectiveness in the long term, thus necessitating longer 
mission deployments.141 We recommend that all mission mandates incorporate anti-
corruption measures. This should include developing an accurate understanding of corrupt 
networks, types of corruption, and targeted measures to tackle them, and training for 
civilian and military personnel on tackling corruption risks. In a practical anti-corruption 
handbook aimed at military leaders, TI-UK DSP has identified ten pathways through which 
corruption affects peace and stability, including criminal patronage networks (CPNs), which 
operate along tribal, sectarian or ethic lines; military and police corruption; diversion of 
foreign aid; and exploitation of natural assets.142 Disrupting these pathways is a good 
starting point for practical measures aimed at increasing legitimacy and effectiveness of 
state institutions. 
24. The Future Army 2020 programme is based on reserves playing a greater role in support 
of regular units. TI-UK DSP thinks that this is an opportunity to embed Transparency, 
Accountability and Counter-Corruption (TACC) expertise in the armed forces: the 
                                                          
140 Addressing Corruption in Stabilisation Environments, p.1. 
141 JALLC, Counter- and Anti-Corruption. paras 30-37; TI-UK DSP, International Community and Corruption in Afghanistan 
(working title), forthcoming, January 2015. 
142 Corruption Threats and International Missions, pp. 15-19. 
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recruitment drive for reservists should draw on the expertise which already exists in the 
private and wider public sector in forensic accounting and investigation, including 
countering money laundering.  We recommend that reserve recruitment include those 
with existing skills and expertise relevant to anti-corruption, ensuring that the armed 
forces have access to the right specialists when they are needed most.  
25. Effective anti-corruption measures cannot be implemented without adequate 
intelligence about corrupt networks and pathways through which corruption works. This 
requires refocusing the tasking of intelligence effort on the activities of the host government 
and allies as well as the acquisition of intelligence on the enemy. ‘Actionable intelligence’ 
should not mean only intelligence leading to military action, but also that which leads to 
targeted anti-corruption initiatives being designed and makes it possible to change the 
structure of incentives and isolate groups which spoil the settlement. We recommend that 
the tasking of military intelligence gathering be extended to include the acquisition and 
analysis of information and evidence on corruption. 
26. The international arms trade is among the most corruption-prone sectors. Corrupt 
practices in arms transfers have negative consequences for human rights and sustainable 
development, particularly but not only in the importing states, as well as for efforts to 
combat violent organised crime and terrorism. Corruption undermines the ability of states 
to control the diversion of weapons from their intended end-users and can facilitate the 
proliferation of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear weapons. Corruption also 
inflates the cost and/or reduces the quantity or quality of the weapons which nations 
acquire to defend themselves. We recommend that the government should not authorise 
a transfer of arms when there are substantial grounds for believing that there is a material 
risk of an arms transfer involving corrupt practices or corruption at any stage of the 
transfer. This should include government-to-government deals and pay particular 
attention to the role of brokers, agents, and intermediaries. 
30 September 2014 
 
 
 
